By Risto Karajkov, Osservatorio sui Balcani, Rovereto, Italy, July 3, 2008

The Balkans is safer than thought. This is the basic message from a recently published report, “Crime and Its Impact on the Balkans,” by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime.

The report, which was launched last week, made global headlines as some of its arguments run counter to common wisdom—that the Balkans is a gloomy and risky place.

With detailed, comprehensive statistics, the report concludes that the Balkans, contrary to widespread opinion, does not have a problem with conventional crime: “South East Europe does not, in fact, suffer from high rates of crime, at least in terms of the range of offences commonly referred to as ‘conventional crime’: murder, rape, assault, robbery, burglary, theft, and the like. In fact, most of the region is safer than West Europe in this respect.” The report notes, “This key fact is often omitted from discussions on crime in the region.”

The report focuses on the so-called Western Balkan countries (former Yugoslavia minus Slovenia plus Albania), Bulgaria, Romania, and Moldova, but its comparisons include Central and Western European countries, and other parts of the world.

In 130 pages of in-depth analysis, the report gives a full account of all crime-related issues that concern the Balkans, from conventional to organized crime and corruption. It discusses both the socioeconomic and political preconditions of crime, and, in turn, the possible impact crime has on the region’s development.

The report first analyzes the social conditions in the Balkans and notes, “The social conditions in South East Europe are not the sort generally associated with high crime regions. In essence the Balkans does not represent a favourable environment for crime.” The report reaches these conclusions because of a set of factors that include the region’s demographic makeup—aging population, low fertility rates (with the exception of Kosovo), combined with strong outward migration, again mostly involving young people. The report considers the additional factors of income and education levels. Incomes are small but the number of people in abject poverty is limited. The region’s communist legacy has left a low, although now widening, income inequality, which is “regarded as the most robust quantitative correlate of crime rates.” Education levels are relatively high (by global standards).

After analyzing the standard indicators of conventional crime, such as murders and theft (especially auto theft), the report unequivocally concludes that the region is safer overall than Western Europe, “In terms of the standardized murder rates … most countries of the region fall at or below the European average. Moldova and Albania are exceptions, but even these two countries are safer than most of Eastern Europe.” For example, the West European average of murders per 100,000 people (2004 data) stands at 2.5, Macedonia at 2.3, Croatia at 1.8, Romania at 2.5, Bulgaria at 4.1, Albania at 5.7, and Moldova at 8.0. Russia has the worst statistics with an average of 19.9 murders per 100,000 people.

“Albania stands out as having a relatively high murder rate,” concedes the report, but “the number of murders committed in Albania in 2006 is only 5% of what it was after the collapse of government in 1997.”

In addition, the report notes the positive trend over the past decade of declining murder rates throughout the region: “Combining the data from Moldova, Albania, Romania, Croatia, Bulgaria, and Serbia, the number of murders in the region essentially halved between 1998 and 2006.”

In other forms of conventional crime, the report finds Western Europe “to have over twice the burglary, over four times as much assault, and 15 times as much robbery as South East Europe.” For example, in terms of vehicle thefts per 100,000 vehicles, the United Kingdom has the worst statistics with 1,330, Greece has 185, and Austria has 125, whereas Moldova has 184, Croatia has 166, Macedonia has 113, and Albania has 90. Bulgaria has the worst statistics in the region with 412 vehicle thefts per 100,000 vehicles, but the report notes Bulgaria’s declining trend.

With in-depth discussion and analysis for possible mistakes, the report concludes that these relatively positive numbers are not the result of government “adjustments” to look better before the international monitors: “The only conclusion that can be drawn is that South East Europe is one of the safer areas of the world, and that progress is being made in making the region even safer.”

The data on conventional crimes provides the good news; however, the report moves on to discuss the real issues in the region, and that is organized crime: “The issue that makes headlines in South East Europe is not conventional crime … but organized crime.” Here, the report notes two dimensions: “the role that groups from South East Europe have played in organized crime in West Europe” and “the impact that organized crime has had on the region itself.”

In the section on organized crime, the central issue is drug trafficking. A shorter section covers human trafficking and smuggling of migrants, but the report seems to consider these a much smaller threat, which is nevertheless declining.

The report provides details of the Balkans’ role as a major drug route from Asia to Western Europe: “The most valuable form of contraband crossing the region is heroin. South East Europe lies along the most convenient route (the so-called ‘Balkan route’) between the supplier of some 90% of the world’s heroin (Afghanistan) and its most lucrative consumer market (Western Europe). It is estimated that about 100 tons of heroin crosses South East Europe on its way to Western Europe, of which 85 tons eventually makes it to the consumer, a flow valued at US$25-30 billion. This is more than the GDPs of most of the countries of the region, and consequently this flow has great corrupting power.”

Although “the ‘Balkan route’ has been the continent’s primary heroin trafficking route for decades” the report notes, “the share of South East Europeans who consume opiates is half that of West Europe and one-sixth that of East Europe.” This, according to the authors, “suggests the flow has been conducted by highly organized groups determined to command the highest return for their product, rather than by a diffuse network of couriers who might ’spill’ some of the heroin into their local communities.”

The report additionally notes that “the problem of South East Europe as a gateway for drugs to West Europe must be distinguished from the problem of South East Europeans dealing drugs in West European countries, although the two issues are obviously related.”

In discussing drug trafficking as the most serious form of organized crime concerning the Balkans, the report strongly emphasizes the role of “ethnic Albanians” in the drug trade: “Since the mid-1990s, ethnic Albanian traffickers have been said to control the trafficking of this commodity west into Europe. Past estimates suggested that ethnic Albanian traffickers controlled 70% or more of the heroin entering a number of key destination markets.” For example, the report notes, “About half the heroin seized by the Italian authorities in 2006 was taken from Albanian nationals.”

In trying to explain the “ethnic colour” of organized drug trafficking, the report uses numerous references from national sources in Western Europe, which have singled out Albanian ethnicity: “‘Ethnic Albanian Criminal Groups’ are the only national group discussed in the 2006 Europol publication ‘The Threat From Organized Crime.’”

The report suggests that “ethnic Albanian heroin trafficking is arguably the single most prominent organized crime problem in Europe today.”

Corruption, which is a major issue in the Balkans, is not a focus of the report, but it does observe that “while conventional crime levels are low and organised crime appears to be in decline, [the] one area of criminal activity that is especially problematic in the Balkans [is] corruption and economic crime.”

The report refers to studies from Transparency International to illustrate the scope of corruption in the region: “Large shares of the population continue to report paying bribes. Albania had the highest rate of annual bribe paying (66%) of the 57 countries polled in the 2006 TI Global Corruption Barometer, and the South East European average was 4.5 times as high as the West European average.”

By offering detailed statistics and a realistic approach in analyzing the Balkan crime problem, the report is timely and relevant. It disproves some previous partial or incomplete research and statistics, which feed the stereotype that the Balkans is simply dangerous. The report provides a comprehensive overview of the state of crime in the region. The problem is organized crime and corruption. Conventional crime, although much higher than before the beginning of transition, is still low.

From Osservatorio sui Balcani.

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By Risto Karajkov

With its expansion ever since the end of the cold war, the European Union has been increasingly projecting itself as a moral force in global affairs. It has called itself a community of values and has been tirelessly repeating to would-be members that full embrace of democracy and human and minority rights is the only way into the club.

No one has learned this refrain better than eager candidates from the Western Balkans. There, the idea of joining the European Union has been put on a pedestal. Europe symbolizes everything that is good, as opposed to the wicked backwardness of Balkan imperfection. Countries there need to constantly strive to democratize and reform in hope that they can one day join.

As much as this idea is unreservedly accepted, it appears that it is not fully corroborated by facts on the ground. Some of the countries in the (geographic) Balkans that seem to have very serious issues with respect of minority rights are in fact European Union member states.

Both Greece and Bulgaria adamantly refuse to recognize their Macedonian minority. Both countries have lost cases before the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg. They continue to stubbornly refuse to comply with the court’s decisions to allow the registration of the political parties of their Macedonian minorities. At the same time they do not have a problem using their leverage as members of the European Union to impose unprincipled conditions on Macedonia. Greece has already made a name for itself doing just that. Bulgaria shows signs it might take the same road.

Last month Greece vetoed Macedonia’s entry into NATO over the name dispute. Athens opposes the use of the name “Macedonia” by Skopje, as Greece claims it is exclusive part of its cultural heritage. Greece threatened it would also block Macedonia in the European Union unless a solution to the name dispute is found that is to its liking. Greece’s move pushed Macedonia into political crisis. The government called early elections.

Europe has been continuously labeling Turkey (non-European Union state) as a rogue with regards to human rights standards, but (the few) Armenians in Turkey have their churches and schools. Greece’s denial goes so far that it does not even allow the free self-determination of the Macedonian minority, let alone start to discuss standards in education, use of mother tongue, or political participation. Last month the European Free Alliance, a European political party, staged an event in the European Parliament to protest this discrimination in Greece and called the Macedonian minority there one of the “last unrecognized minorities in Europe.”

In Albania (non-European Union state), often described as the most backward country in Europe, the small Macedonian minority freely votes their own and has a mayor in the region of Mala Prespa. In Bulgaria, a novel member of the European community of values, around a hundred members of the unrecognized political party of the Macedonian minority O.M.O. Ilinden Pirin were called by the police for “talks” last week, because they engaged in organizing a small historic commemoration. A classical tactic of police intimidation.

Trying to play an honest broker and stabilize the Balkans, the United States pushed hard to get Macedonia into NATO but could not fight the Greek veto. In the process even Washington got entangled in the primitive Balkan nationalisms that simply refuse to accept that people are free to declare as they wish.

State Department official Daniel Fried during his recent visit to Athens had to argue with the Greeks over this purportedly basic human entitlement. His counterparts reportedly told him there was no such thing as Macedonians. His answer, rephrased, involved something like “Oh, but I was there last week. I saw them.”

State Department spokespeople get into semantic discussions on a regular basis with a legendary Greek journalist at press briefings over whether there is a Macedonian identity, nation, or language.

For Greeks, Macedonians are “Slavs” who are stealing Greece’s history by calling themselves Macedonians. For the Bulgarians, they are Bulgarian kin who have been brainwashed during Tito’s Yugoslavia, and think they are Macedonian, but are actually Bulgarian.

The European Union has been way too condoning of Greek discriminatory demands pointed against Macedonia. Back in 1992 it adopted an infamous Lisbon document that said the new country could not use the name “Macedonia” and it postponed its recognition. It softened over time in view of reality. Macedonia was recognized by the United Nations in 1993, under the provisional name of “former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia” (FYROM). Over the years the European Union has not showed a sign of willingness to deal constructively with the issue. Only last week one of its committees had to change in a document all reference to “Macedonian language” or “Macedonian culture” to “the language of FYROM” and so forth, in face of Greek pressure.

The bottom line is that one should be free to declare as she or he feels. That is the substance of the right to free expression of identity. Restrictions to this end, whatever the pretext or ideology, are limitations of freedom and serious infringement of democratic standards. If on top of that the people subject to such restrictions are made to fear to speak their language in public, or have no schools for their kids in their mother tongue, or even fear persecution, for them the society they live in is not democratic.

One must be free to declare as he or she wants. The same way the European Union promotes democracy abroad, it needs to do it in its own yard. If judicial action is not enough and it obviously isn’t, Brussels must take more-decisive political action and demand that its members recognize minorities.

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I. Introduction

On February 17, 2008, Kosovo became a new state by seceding from Serbia. It was the second time in less than a decade that Kosovo declared its independence.

Pundits warned against this precedent-setting event and foresaw a disintegration of sovereign states from Belgium to Macedonia, whose restive western part is populated by Albanians. In 2001, Macedonia faced the prospect of a civil war. It capitulated and signed the Ohrid Framework Agreement.

Yet, the truth is that there is nothing new about Kosovo’s independence. Macedonians need not worry, it would seem. While, under international law, Albanians in its western parts can claim to be insurgents (as they have done in 2001 and, possibly, twice before), they cannot aspire to be a National Liberation Movement and, if they secede, they are very unlikely to be recognized.

To start with, there are considerable and substantive differences between Kosovo’s KLA and its counterpart, Macedonia’s NLA. Yugoslavia regarded the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA or UCK, in its Albanian acronym) as a terrorist organization. Not so the rest of the world. It was widely held to be a national liberation movement, or, at the very least, a group of insurgents.

Between 1996-9, the KLA maintained a hierarchical operational structure that wielded control and authority over the Albanians in large swathes of Kosovo. Consequently, it acquired some standing as an international subject under international law.

Thus, what started off as a series of internal skirmishes and clashes in 1993-5 was upgraded in 1999 into an international conflict, with both parties entitled to all the rights and obligations of ius in bello (the law of war).

II. Insurgents in International Law

Traditionally, the international community has been reluctant to treat civil strife the same way it does international armed conflict. No one thinks that encouraging an endless succession of tribal or ethnic secessions is a good idea. In their home territories, insurgents are initially invariably labeled as and treated by the “lawful” government as criminals or terrorists.

Paradoxically, though, the longer and more all-pervasive the conflict and the tighter the control of the rebels on people residing in the territories in which the insurgents habitually operate, the better their chances to acquire some international recognition and standing.

Thus, international law actually eggs on rebels to prolong and escalate conflicts rather than resolve them peacefully.

By definition, insurgents are temporary, transient, or provisional international subjects. As Antonio Cassese puts it (in his tome, “International Law”, published by Oxford University Press in 2001):

“…(I)nsurgents are quelled by the government, and disappear; or they seize power, and install themselves in the place of the government; or they secede and join another State, or become a new international subject.”

In other words, being an intermediate phenomenon, rebels can never claim sovereign rights over territory. Sovereign states can contract with insurrectionary parties and demand that they afford protection and succor to foreigners within the territories affected by their activities. However, this is not a symmetrical relationship. The rebellious party cannot make any reciprocal demands on states. Still, once entered into, agreements can be enforced, using all lawful sanctions

Third party states are allowed to provide assistance - even of a military nature - to governments, but not to insurgents (with the exception of humanitarian aid). Not so when it comes to national liberation movements.

III. National Liberation Movements in International Law

According to the First Geneva Protocol of 1977 and subsequent conventions, what is the difference between a group of “freedom fighters” and a national liberation movement?

A National Liberation Movement represents a collective - nation, or people - in its fight to liberate itself from foreign or colonial domination or from an inequitable (for example: racist) regime.

National Liberation Movements maintain an organizational structure although they may or may not be in control of a territory (many operate in exile) but they must aspire to gain domination of the land and the oppressed population thereon.

They uphold the principle of self-determination and are, thus, instantaneously deemed to be internationally legitimate.

Though less important from the point of view of international law, the instant recognition by other States that follows the establishment of a National Liberation Movement has enormous practical consequences: States are allowed to extend help, including economic and military assistance (short of armed troops) and are “duty-bound to refrain from assisting a State denying self-determination to a people or a group entitled to it” (Cassesse).

As opposed to mere insurgents, National Liberation Movements can claim and assume the right to self-determination; the rights and obligations of ius in bello (the legal principles pertaining to the conduct of hostilities); the rights and obligations pertaining to treaty making; diplomatic immunity.

Yet, even National Liberation Movements are not allowed to act as sovereigns. For instance, they cannot dispose of land or natural resources within the disputed territory. In this case, though, the “lawful” government or colonial power are similarly barred from such dispositions.

IV. Internal Armed Conflict in International Law

Rebels and insurgents are not lawful combatants (or belligerents). Rather, they are held to be simple criminals by their own State and by the majority of other States. They do not enjoy the status of prisoner of war when captured. Ironically, only the lawful government can upgrade the status of the insurrectionists from bandits to lawful combatants (”recognition of belligerency”).

How the government chooses to fight rebels and insurgents is, therefore, not regulated. As long as it refrains from intentionally harming civilians, it can do very much as it pleases.

But international law is in flux and, increasingly, civil strife is being “internationalized” and treated as a run-of-the-mill bilateral or even multilateral armed conflict. The doctrine of “human rights intervention” on behalf of an oppressed people has gained traction. Hence Operation Allied Force in Kosovo in 1999.

Moreover, if a civil war expands and engulfs third party States and if the insurgents are well-organized, both as an armed force and as a civilian administration of the territory being fought over, it is today commonly accepted that the conflict should be regarded and treated as international.

As the Second Geneva Protocol of 1977 makes crystal clear, mere uprisings or riots (such as in Macedonia, 2001) are still not covered by the international rules of war, except for the general principles related to non-combatants and their protection (for instance, through Article 3 of the four 1949 Geneva Conventions) and customary law proscribing the use of chemical weapons, land and anti-personnel mines, booby traps, and such.

Both parties - the State and the insurrectionary group - are bound by these few rules. If they violate them, they may be committing war crimes and crimes against humanity.

V. Secession in International Law

The new state of Kosovo has been immediately recognized by the USA, Germany, and other major European powers. The Canadian Supreme Court made clear in its ruling in the Quebec case in 1998 that the status of statehood is not conditioned upon such recognition, but that (p. 289):

“…(T)he viability of a would-be state in the international community depends, as a practical matter, upon recognition by other states.”

The constitutional law of some federal states provides for a mechanism of orderly secession. The constitutions of both the late USSR and SFRY (Yugoslavia, 1974) incorporated such provisions. In other cases - the USA, Canada, and the United Kingdom come to mind - the supreme echelons of the judicial system had to step in and rule regarding the right to secession, its procedures, and mechanisms.

Again, facts on the ground determine international legitimacy. As early as 1877, in the wake of the bloodiest secessionist war of all time, the American Civil War (1861-5), the Supreme Court of the USA wrote (in William vs. Bruffy):

“The validity of (the secessionists’) acts, both against the parent State and its citizens and subjects, depends entirely upon its ultimate success. If it fail (sic) to establish itself permanently, all such acts perish with it. If it succeed (sic), and become recognized, its acts from the commencement of its existence are upheld as those of an independent nation.”

In “The Creation of States in International Law” (Clarendon Press, 2nd ed., 2006), James Crawford suggests that there is no internationally recognized right to secede and that secession is a “legally neutral act”. Not so. As Aleksandar Pavkovic observes in his book (with contributions by Peter Radan), “Creating New States - Theory and Practice of Secession” (Ashgate, 2007), the universal legal right to self-determination encompasses the universal legal right to secede.

The Albanians in Kosovo are a “people” according to the Decisions of the Badinter Commission. But, though, they occupy a well-defined and demarcated territory, their land is within the borders of an existing State. In this strict sense, their unilateral secession does set a precedent: it goes against the territorial definition of a people as embedded in the United Nations Charter and subsequent Conventions.

Still, the general drift of international law (for instance, as interpreted by Canada’s Supreme Court) is to allow that a State can be composed of several “peoples” and that its cultural-ethnic constituents have a right to self-determination. This seems to uphold the 19th century concept of a homogenous nation-state over the French model (of a civil State of all its citizens, regardless of ethnicity or religious creed).

Pavkovic contends that, according to principle 5 of the United Nations’ General Assembly’s Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation Among States in Accordance With the Charter of the United Nations, the right to territorial integrity overrides the right to self-determination.

Thus, if a State is made up of several “peoples”, its right to maintain itself intact and to avoid being dismembered or impaired is paramount and prevails over the right of its constituent peoples to secede. But, the right to territorial integrity is limited to States:

“(C)onducting themselves in compliance with the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples … and thus possessed of a government representing the whole people belonging to the territory without distinction as to race, creed, or colour.”

The words “as to race, creed, or colour” in the text supra have been replaced with the words “of any kind” (in the 1995 Declaration on the Occasion of the Fiftieth Anniversary of the United Nations).

Yugoslavia under Milosevic failed this test in its treatment of the Albanian minority within its borders. They were relegated to second-class citizenship, derided, blatantly and discriminated against in every turn. Thus, according to principle 5, the Kosovars had a clear right to unilaterally secede.

As early as 1972, an International Commission of Jurists wrote in a report titled “The Events in East Pakistan, 1971″:

“(T)his principle (of territorial integrity) is subject to the requirement that the government does comply with the principle of equal rights and does represent the whole people without distinction. If one of the constituent peoples of a state is denied equal rights and is discriminated against … their full right of self-determination will revive.” (p. 46)

A quarter of a century later, Canada’s Supreme Court concurred (Quebec, 998): “(T)he international law right to self-determination only generates, at best, a right to external self-determination in situations … where a definable group is denied meaningful access to government to pursue their political, economic, social, and cultural development.”

In his seminal tome, “Self-Determination of Peoples: A Legal Appraisal” (Cambridge University Press, 19950, Antonio Cassese neatly sums up this exception to the right to territorial integrity enjoyed by
States:

“(W)hen the central authorities of a sovereign State persistently refuse to grant participatory rights to a religious or racial group, grossly and systematically trample upon their fundamental rights, and deny the possibility of reaching a peaceful settlement within the framework of the State structure … A racial or religious group may secede … once it is clear that all attempts to achieve internal self-determination have failed or are destined to fail.” (p. 119-120)

VI. The Cases of Kosovo and Western Macedonia

In former Yugoslavia (SFRY), Kosovo was an autonomous province within the Socialist Republic of Serbia. The Albanians in Yugoslavia were not recognized as a “people” (narod), merely as a “nationality” (narodnost).

In January 1990, the Constitutional Court of SFRY ruled illegal a unilateral secession from the Yugoslav Federation. The right to secede belonged to “the peoples of Yugoslavia and their socialist republics (and autonomous provinces)”. Kosovo was an autonomous province, but the Albanians were not a “people”. Indeed, in a later decision, dealing specifically with Kosovo’s first declaration of independence, the Constitutional Court
spoke:

“(O)nly peoples of Yugoslavia had the right of self-determination.”

Western Macedonia has always been an integral part of the Republic of Macedonia within the SFRY. It had never acquired the status of an autonomous province, let alone a Republic. Albanians in Macedonia are a minority. They are well-represented in government and law enforcement and have equal access to education and the institutions of the State. Their rights are guaranteed by multiple constitutional, legal, and international instruments. They have no leg to stand on if they choose to unilaterally secede from Macedonia (for instance, in order to join Kosovo).

The Albanians of western Macedonia may, however, successfully secede from Macedonia within the framework of a realignment of borders between Serbia, Kosovo, Albania, Macedonia, and, perhaps, Greece, and Bulgaria. While Macedonia is extremely unlikely to welcome such a move, it may be coerced into acquiescence by the international community. Macedonia was strong-armed into the Ohrid Framework Agreement in 2001. There is no guarantee that this scenario will not repeat itself.

Macedonia should urgently adopt steps to change the demographic composition of its western territories. This is not without precedent. Israel has done the same in its northern territory (the Galilee), Poland with its Ukrainian Borderlands, Germany in its east, the USA in its “wild” West.

Macedonia should offer economic incentives to anyone willing to relocate from the rest of its territory to its west: jobs, free land and agricultural inputs, subsidized credits, housing, infrastructure, and educational opportunities. The government should move many of its ministries, agencies, and facilities from Skopje to western Macedonia.

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