Discussion regarding the accession of Macedonia into the European Union was postponed until June 2010. Two countries have delayed this process, the first of course being Greece which cannot accept Macedonia being a member of the EU. Neither can it accept the name ‘Macedonia’ nor the Macedonian idenity or language. In other words, everything that has any connotation to ‘Macedonia’ and ‘Macedonian’ is unacceptable to Greece.

The other country that opposes Macedonia by supporting Greece in this endeavour is France.

Why is France doing this?

Perhaps because Greece has signed a contract to purchase military supplies from France or perhaps because, similar to Greece, France does not recognize minorities in its own territory.

What about indigenous minorities like the Alsatians, Basques, Bretons, Catalans, Corsicans and Occitans (Provencals) who today exist in France? Unfortunately all of these national minorities, and the languages they speak, are not formally recognized by France.

France, like Greece, has “specialized” in signing but not ratifying resolutions for the protection of minorities and their languages. If there is any doubt as to the existence of minority languages in France, let me remind you that all manifestos written just before and after the great French Revolution of 1789-1799 were written in these so-called local languages.

After the Revolution was over authorities withdrew from this linguistic pluralism and took advantage of a single obligatory language and that was ‘French’. The methods used to discourage the use of local languages was to make fun of adults and young children who spoke them, a similar method was used by Greece against the Macedonians.

Greek State-Promoted Terror and Persecutions

In addition to making fun of people, Greek authorities also employed terror tacticts, beatings, imprisonment and expulsion to prevent Macedonians from speaking their native language even on their own native Macedonian territories.

   [Enlarge Pic][Buy Book][Back Cover]
This is why these two so-called ‘democratic’ countries allied themselves to block Macedonia’s accession into the European Union. Thus the paradox; if other countries are willing to accept Macedonia into the Union they cannot because current EU law allows any single member country to veto and block the other 26. This shows how fragile and abnormal the foundation of this Union is.

Can this be called democracy? No, definitely not!

This is a dictate of one, or in this case, of two countries dictating to the rest. Also there is little logic in this. In this situation we cannot say all countries are treated equally.

This is nothing more than a European circus.

The European Union, which does not hesitate to mentor and teach others about democracy and human rights, harbours two countries which care nothing about human rights or democracy, worse, they can’t even be punished for this. New countries with aspirations of joining the European Union and have fulfilled all requirements put before them, for ’some reason’ are being blocked while ‘old’ European Union countries, like France and Greece, which have broken every minority law, are not only allowed in, but are treated like the proverbial ‘holy cows’.

Macedonia

Macedonia, the only ex-Yugoslav country in the Balkans able to meet all European standards since 1991, has not been allowed entry into the EU. Macedonia comparing to other Western Balkan’s countries is ahead of reforms . Even today, attempt after attempt to gain entry has been obstructed by Greece and all obstructions have been accepted without question by the EU.

Where have we ever seen or heard of a situation where a paranoid country like Greece ‘forcibly imposed’ a name on a normal country like Macedonia? How is it possible for the majority of democratic European countries to accept and come to terms with such dictates from a small economically and morally bankrupt country like Greece?

The Merciless Persecution of Macedonians in Greece

A country which after its unlawful seizure of Macedonian territories in 1913 has issued a number of racist laws against its own citizens. A country which after its Civil War in 1949 exiled both Greeks and Macedonians and in 1982 and 1985 allowed only Greeks by birth to return. How long will the EU allow Greece, which does not recognize the 250 thousand strong Macedonian minority living on its territory, a minority already recognized by international organizations, to break European and international laws? When will the fools of Brussels move their heavy bottom and go to Northern Greece and see and hear for themselves the Macedonians living there?

When will decision-makers from the EU understand that it is not Macedonia but Greece that is a destabilizing factor in the Balkans? It is not Macedonian but Greek nationalism and the Greek Orthodox Church that inflames other Balkan nationalisms.

Fake “Greek History”

Another idiotic idea that inflames hatred and nationalism is Greece’s claims of having 4000 years of cultural continuity and being ethnically pure, which are nothing more than a myth. The Greek nation is an artificial creation invented in the XIX century by the Philhellenic English and German fans of Classical Greece. The Greek language is also an artificial creation which survived only because it was a language of Eastern Christianity and not the language spoken by the Greek people.

In the XIX century the language spoken in Athens, a small Ottoman village, was Albanian, called Arnautian or Arvanitika. The Greek language was revived by academics and taught in schools and in this way it became the official language of the Greek state. These facts are not taught in school.

The so-called ‘Greek studies’ offered to students are no more than fictional concepts promoting an invented continuity and an invented language. It is enough to read the 19 century memoirs of scientists and travelers in order to learn that they were not able to communicate with the people of Greece in Greek. Macedonia was incorporated into Greece in 1913 against the will of the Macedonian nation which dwelt in these territories from times immemorial.

EU support to Turkey’s Kurds – but not to Greece’s Macedonians

Turkey is constantly being accused by the EU for not respecting minority rights, particularly those of the Kurdish people.

•   Why has no one in the EU accused Greece of doing the same with regards to the Turkish and Macedonian minorities living there?

•   Why isn’t criticism directed at Greece?

Why this anti-Turkish obsession, not justified by the way, because racism is present in the EU and nobody in Brussels is asking questions about that?

There are more liberties for minorities in Turkey than in Greece.

It is a result of the very nature of Turkey which was an empire and was comprised of many nations and religions. While Turkey left all Christian Churches intact in its territory, Greece on the other hand after 1915 destroyed all Turkish minarets in the Greek territory.

Do Turks from Thrace have guaranteed rights as a minority? No, they, as well as the Macedonians have no minority rights and are discriminated against to no end in Greece. But do you see anyone writing about this, particularly in Europe? No, not at all! And why is Turkey presented in such bad light and not Greece?

Greeks living in Istanbul enjoy full religious freedom but not Turks living in Thrace.

These people are called Muslims because Greece forbids them to call themselves Turks. This says a lot about how the EU operates and how much member nations like Greece respect the rights of their citizens who cannot call themselves what they are but need to be called as deigned by governments!

If we are to speak frankly, Turkey, not Greece, is a stabilizing factor in the Balkans even though a small part of Turkey exists in the Balkans.

It seems that political correctness has taken European politicians away from common sense. They look at one thing and call it something else. The EU has taken a dogmatic approach to things like an aparatchik and preposterously dictates instead of using sound logic and reasoning. In theory a EU is a sound idea but it does not practice what it preaches. Instead of being a union governed by citizens, the EU is a union run by nonchalant bureaucrats.

Accepting countries like France and Greece which have committed serious human rights violations and imposing unjust conditions on countries like Macedonia will cause that the EU sooner or later, will get the hiccups which it deserves. It is not a union of equal nations. It seems that some are more equal than others in the EU and that is not right.

————————————————————————————————————————————————-

————————————————————————————————————————————————-

by Risto Karajkov

Twenty years after the fall of the Wall, the controversial lustration process – the epuration of those who cooperated with the police of Communist regimes – is still in deep waters. And many wonder whether rummaging archives still makes sense.

As the summer ended, the Macedonian lustration commission finally opened its doors for politicians who rushed in to submit their statements swearing they had not collaborated with the communist secret services. The commission, the chief instrument created to implement the law on lustration, has to verify these statements against the old secret police files.

A year and half after the Macedonian lustration law was passed, and 18 years since the beginning of transition, lustration has finally commenced.

Time is still needed to see the actual effect on Macedonian society. Some experts argued that a loud bang is out of the question; perhaps even a hushed whimper would be too much to expect. Some believe that after all these years the powerful politicians have found ways to get their names out of the dusty files.

Even the initial steps, however, hinge on the constitutional court’s assessment of the lustration law. The court recently agreed to review several petitions made by citizens and NGOs that challenged the legitimacy of parts of the legislation. Some people would be surprised if the court finds the law to be in accord with the constitution. Throughout eastern Europe, constitutional courts have regularly reviewed lustration laws.

The start of lustration makes Macedonia a leader in the western Balkans region. Albania’s lustration law adopted in early 2009 was repealed by the Albanian constitutional court just months later. The court’s decision was preceded by strong criticism by the international community, which found the bill to be a potentially serious threat to human rights in the country.

Lustration laws regularly have difficulties withstanding constitutional scrutiny. Some of their features, such as retroactive effect, broad and ill-defined categories of offenders; and problems in differentiating between the public and the private sphere, have provided reasons for constitutional courts to repeal the law. In Bulgaria, the constitutional court annulled an early lustration attempts in 1992. (Sofia enacted its last lustration instrument at the very end of 2006, two weeks before it joined the European Union. Similarly, the constitutional court in the former Czechoslovakia ruled in November 1992 to reduce the scope of the law by restricting the category of “lustrati“. More recently (May 2007), the constitutional court in Poland rescinded most key provisions of the Kaczynski brothers’ mega-lustration bill. The Polish court had also reacted similarly with the bill in 2000, which expanded the scope of previous phases of lustration.

In view of this history, the Macedonian constitutional court may also follow suit. The Macedonian law is also broad in scope, both in categories of “lustrati”, as well as the period it covers.

However, Albania and Macedonia are not the only countries in the Balkans finding it difficult to start their lustrations.

The first country in the region to actually adopt lustration legislation was Serbia. Belgrade passed its law back in 2003. However, lustration has still not effectively begun, nor is there indication that it would begin anywhere in the near future. The 2003 legislation was “born dead”. The commission that was supposed to begin work by lustrating candidates for the 2003 snap elections, never started working, and later it simply dissolved. Commentators say the lustration law had no power because supplementary legislation on opening of secret police files, which was supposed to ensue within two months, never took place.

The other countries in the region are even further behind in the process. Croatia, Montenegro, and Bosnia and Herzegovina do not even have legislation.

Croatia had several attempts to enact lustration legislation. Lustration bills were on the agenda of parliament in 1998 and 1999, and they were voted down both times. Neither Montenegro nor Bosnia has a law, although Podgorica at least has a draft bill.

Twenty years after the end of communism, lustration is still an issue, and it has not even effectively commenced. Perhaps countries in the Balkans should really rethink if they want to “forgive and forget”. In 2000, Adam Michnik advocated the abandoning of lustration in Poland and said that states cannot move forward without having reconciled with the past, but that the challenge is how to achieve this and maintain balance between justice and stability. In 2007, Serbian President Boris Tadic said it was too late for lustration in Serbia. He probably (and rightfully) feared it would further antagonise the already polarised country.

In the Balkans, the overall problem is the delay. If 18 years after the beginning of transition, countries have not even started the lustration, when will they be able to complete it? The experience of the central and east European countries has shown that immediate and quick lustration was the best and least painful way. Subsequent waves of late lustration tended to broaden, protract, and become overly politicised processes. Both the theoretical and the expert community share the consensus that timeliness was a primary factor of effectiveness in the lustration process.

How meaningful can lustration be almost two decades later? Some answers to this dilemma should perhaps be expected from the Macedonian lustration commission members. As small, busy mice, they will be sniffing the dusty police files during the coming winter.

Osservatorio Balcani
www.osservatoriobalcani.org

————————————————————————————————————————————————-

————————————————————————————————————————————————-

By Risto Karajkov

A “historic day,” the “fall of the wall,” the “end of visas” — these were some of the headlines in the Balkan media in response to the European Commission (E.C.) proposing visa liberalization for Macedonia, Serbia, and Montenegro. The visa-free travel could ideally be possible by the beginning of January 2010. Macedonia has already fulfilled all the technical conditions, while some benchmarks still remain to be met by Serbia and Montenegro.

The E.C. proposal would next be discussed in the European Parliament, and the final decision would be made by the European Council later in the year. “I trust that this proposal should be adopted by the E.U. member states by the end of this year after we have also consulted the European Parliament,” Enlargement Commissioner Olli Rehn said at the announcement of the Commission’s proposal yesterday in Brussels. Visa liberalization will bring an end to a costly, unpleasant, and sometimes humiliating ritual for people who need to travel abroad. “For the citizens of the Western Balkans, visa-free travel means no more queuing at embassies, no more visa fees, and no more collecting of supporting documents such as invitation letters, tickets and paying for their translation,” Rehn said. “In a nutshell,” he added, “this will mean a further Europeanization of the civil societies in the Western Balkans and it is an example that European integration is not only a matter of integrating nations, but also peoples and citizens.” The news was greeted with undivided enthusiasm in the three countries.

The issue of painful visa regime has made headlines and topped political agendas for some years. “Our citizens deserved this, and this is success of the European idea in Macedonia,” said Macedonian Prime Minister Nikola Gruevski, welcoming the news in Skopje. Montenegrin Prime Minister Milo Djukanovic received the news in Kotor where he was in a meeting with E.U.’s H.F.S.P. chief Javier Solana. Djukanovic said that Montenegro will meet the remaining conditions by October and expressed confidence that his country will be visa free on January 1, 2010. “We have fulfilled most of the conditions from the roadmap for visa liberalization and now we have a few more things to do,” Djukanovic said. “There is no doubt that our partners will be satisfied with our results.”

In response to the motion from Brussels, Serbian President Boris Tadic said that the Commission’s recommendation is an important thing for the citizens of Serbia. He added it was good that other countries in the region would also be visa free because that would improve the quality of life in the region overall. “Serbia is not responsible only for itself, but also for the cooperation in the region, given that it is the central country in Southeast Europe,” President Tadic said. Serbian Prime Minister Mirko Cvetkovic added that visa liberalization would restore people’s dignity. “From January 1, the citizens of Serbia will be able to travel without visas to Europe, and this will give them back their dignity,” Cvetkovic said. Serbian Deputy Prime Minister for European Integration Bozidar Djelic also welcomed the move but underscored that work had to continue. “The visa darkness has been lifted from the citizens of Serbia, but there is no time for relaxation. We have to continue the reforms.” Djelic was cited by Serbian media comparing the fall of the visa barrier with the national holiday celebrated by the French, the fall of the Bastille in 1789.

Some of the reactions in Serbia expressed concern over the fact that the visa liberalization will divide Serbs in Serbia from Serbs living in Kosovo. The visa-free travel will be a possibility for Serbian citizens with biometric passports, but because of security concerns, even with new biometric passports, residents of Kosovo will still need visas. Kosovo authorities accepted the decision as a further recognition of their separate independent status from Serbia. In addition to Kosovo, Bosnia, Herzegovina and Albania were excluded from the recommendation because they did not make sufficient progress with the needed reforms. Mr. Rehn, however, left the door open. “The ‘roadmaps’ that the E.U. gave them last year are still valid, and they are still perfectly doable if the authorities in these two countries put their full will into delivering now,” Rehn said. “If Albania and Bosnia and Herzegovina keep up the pace of reforms and thus meet the conditions, the Commission could envisage making a new proposal by mid-2010.” Bosnia greeted the news with expected disappointment, but Minister of Civilian Affairs Sredoje Novic said that the government could start issuing new biometric passports by mid-October. B.I.H. officials hope that could allow the country to join the first three countries by mid-2010.

Reactions in Albania also showed optimism. Albanian Interior Minister Bujar Nishani said that Albania needs only to meet a few technical conditions in to join the visa liberalization process, and that the country would come on target by the end of 2009. After a longer period of time, Brussels sent an encouraging message to the Balkans. For most people in the Balkans the European idea is by and large associated with the freedom of movement. This article was originally published at www.osservatoriobalcani.org

———————————————————————————————————————————-

———————————————————————————————————————————-

By Sam Vaknin — Author of “Malignant Self Love – Narcissism Revisited“

   Sam Vaknin, Ph.D.
Corruption runs against the grain of meritocratic capitalism. It skews the level playing-field; it guarantees extra returns where none should have been had; it encourages the mis-allocation of economic resources; and it subverts the proper functioning of institutions. It is, in other words, without a single redeeming feature, a scourge. Strangely, this is not how it is perceived by its perpetrators: both the givers and the recipients. They believe that corruption helps facilitate the flow and exchange of goods and services in hopelessly clogged and dysfunctional systems and markets (corruption and the informal economy "get things done" and "keep people employed"); that it serves as an organizing principle where chaos reins and institutions are in their early formative stages; that it supplements income and thus helps the state employ qualified and skilled personnel; and that it preserves peace and harmony by financing networks of cronyism, nepotism, and patronage.

I. The Facts

In 2002, just days before a much-awaited donor conference, the influential International Crisis Group (ICG) recommended to place all funds pledged to Macedonia under the oversight of a "corruption advisor" appointed by the European Commission. The donors ignored this and other recommendations. To appease the critics, the affable Attorney General of Macedonia charged a former Minister of Defense with abuse of duty for allegedly having channeled millions of DM to his relatives during the recent civil war. Macedonia has belatedly passed an anti-money laundering law recently, but failed, yet again, to adopt strict anti-corruption legislation.

In Albania, the Chairman of the Albanian Socialist Party, Fatos Nano, was accused by Albanian media of laundering $1 billion through the Albanian government. Pavel Borodin, the former chief of Kremlin Property, decided not appeal his money laundering conviction in a Swiss court. The Slovak daily "Sme" described in scathing detail the newly acquired wealth and lavish lifestyles of formerly impoverished HZDS politicians. Some of them now reside in refurbished castles. Others have swimming pools replete with wine bars.

Pavlo Lazarenko, a former Ukrainian prime minister, is detained in San Francisco on money laundering charges. His defense team accuses the US authorities of "selective prosecution".

They are quoted by Radio Free Europe as saying:

"The impetus for this prosecution comes from allegations made by the Kuchma regime, which itself is corrupt and dedicated to using undemocratic and repressive methods to stifle political opposition … (other Ukrainian officials) including Kuchma himself and his closest associates, have committed conduct similar to that with which Lazarenko is charged but have not been prosecuted by the U.S. government".

The UNDP estimated, in 1997, that, even in rich, industrialized, countries, 15% of all firms had to pay bribes. The figure rises to 40% in Asia and 60% in Russia.

Corruption is rife and all pervasive, though many allegations are nothing but political mud-slinging. Luckily, in countries like Macedonia, it is confined to its rapacious elites: its politicians, managers, university professors, medical doctors, judges, journalists, and top bureaucrats. The police and customs are hopelessly compromised. Yet, one rarely comes across graft and venality in daily life. There are no false detentions (as in Russia), spurious traffic tickets (as in Latin America), or widespread stealthy payments for public goods and services (as in Africa).

It is widely accepted that corruption retards growth by deterring foreign investment and encouraging brain drain. It leads to the misallocation of economic resources and distorts competition. It depletes the affected country’s endowments – both natural and acquired. It demolishes the tenuous trust between citizen and state. It casts civil and government institutions in doubt, tarnishes the entire political class, and, thus, endangers the democratic system and the rule of law, property rights included.

This is why both governments and business show a growing commitment to tackling it. According to Transparency International’s "Global Corruption Report 2001", corruption has been successfully contained in private banking and the diamond trade, for instance.

Hence also the involvement of the World Bank and the IMF in fighting corruption. Both institutions are increasingly concerned with poverty reduction through economic growth and development. The World Bank estimates that corruption reduces the growth rate of an affected country by 0.5 to 1 percent annually. Graft amounts to an increase in the marginal tax rate and has pernicious effects on inward investment as well.

The World Bank has appointed in 2001 a Director of Institutional Integrity – a new department that combines the Anti-Corruption and Fraud Investigations Unit and the Office of Business Ethics and Integrity. The Bank helps countries to fight corruption by providing them with technical assistance, educational programs, and lending.

Anti-corruption projects are an integral part of every Country Assistance Strategy (CAS). The Bank also supports international efforts to reduce corruption by sponsoring conferences and the exchange of information. It collaborates closely with Transparency International, for instance.

At the request of member-governments (such as Bosnia-Herzegovina and Romania) it has prepared detailed country corruption surveys covering both the public and the private sectors. Together with the EBRD, it publishes a corruption survey of 3000 firms in 22 transition countries (BEEPS – Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey). It has even set up a multilingual hotline for whistleblowers.

The IMF made corruption an integral part of its country evaluation process. It suspended arrangements with endemically corrupt recipients of IMF financing. Since 1997, it has introduced policies regarding misreporting, abuse of IMF funds, monitoring the use of debt relief for poverty reduction, data dissemination, legal and judicial reform, fiscal and monetary transparency, and even internal governance (e.g., financial disclosure by staff members).

Yet, no one seems to agree on a universal definition of corruption. What amounts to venality in one culture (Sweden) is considered no more than hospitality, or an expression of gratitude, in another (France, or Italy). Corruption is discussed freely and forgivingly in one place – but concealed shamefully in another. Corruption, like other crimes, is probably seriously under-reported and under-penalized.

Moreover, bribing officials is often the unstated policy of multinationals, foreign investors, and expatriates. Many of them believe that it is inevitable if one is to expedite matters or secure a beneficial outcome. Rich world governments turn a blind eye, even where laws against such practices are extant and strict.

In his address to the Inter-American Development Bank on March 14, 2002 President Bush promised to "reward nations that root out corruption" within the framework of the Millennium Challenge Account initiative. The USA has pioneered global anti-corruption campaigns and is a signatory to the 1996 IAS Inter-American Convention against Corruption, the Council of Europe’s Criminal Law Convention on Corruption, and the OECD’s 1997 anti-bribery convention. The USA has had a comprehensive "Foreign Corrupt Practices Act" since 1977.

The Act applies to all American firms, to all firms – including foreign ones – traded in an American stock exchange, and to bribery on American territory by foreign and American firms alike. It outlaws the payment of bribes to foreign officials, political parties, party officials, and political candidates in foreign countries. A similar law has now been adopted by Britain.

Yet, "The Economist" reports that the American SEC has brought only three cases against listed companies until 1997. The US Department of Justice brought another 30 cases. Britain has persecuted successfully only one of its officials for overseas bribery since 1889. In the Netherlands bribery is tax deductible. Transparency International now publishes a name and shame Bribery Payers Index to complement its 91-country strong Corruption Perceptions Index.

Many rich world corporations and wealthy individuals make use of off-shore havens or "special purpose entities" to launder money, make illicit payments, avoid or evade taxes, and conceal assets or liabilities. According to Swiss authorities, more than $40 billion are held by Russians in its banking system alone. The figure may be 5 to 10 times higher in the tax havens of the United Kingdom.

In a survey it conducted in February 2002 of 82 companies in which it invests, "Friends, Ivory, and Sime" found that only a quarter had clear anti-corruption management and accountability systems in place.

Tellingly only 35 countries signed the 1997 OECD "Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions" – including four non-OECD members: Chile, Argentina, Bulgaria, and Brazil. The convention has been in force since February 1999 and is only one of many OECD anti-corruption drives, among which are SIGMA (Support for Improvement in Governance and Management in Central and Eastern European countries), ACN (Anti-Corruption Network for Transition Economies in Europe), and FATF (the Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering).

Moreover, The moral authority of those who preach against corruption in poor countries – the officials of the IMF, the World Bank, the EU, the OECD – is strained by their ostentatious lifestyle, conspicuous consumption, and "pragmatic" morality.

II. What to Do? What is Being Done?

A few years ago, I proposed a taxonomy of corruption, venality, and graft. I suggested this cumulative definition:

•    The withholding of a service, information, or goods that, by law, and by right, should have been provided or divulged.

•    The provision of a service, information, or goods that, by law, and by right, should not have been provided or divulged.

•    That the withholding or the provision of said service, information, or goods are in the power of the withholder or the provider to withhold or to provide AND That the withholding or the provision of said service, information, or goods constitute an integral and substantial part of the authority or the function of the withholder or the provider.

•    That the service, information, or goods that are provided or divulged are provided or divulged against a benefit or the promise of a benefit from the recipient and as a result of the receipt of this specific benefit or the promise to receive such benefit.

•    That the service, information, or goods that are withheld are withheld because no benefit was provided or promised by the recipient.

There is also what the World Bank calls "State Capture" defined thus:

"The actions of individuals, groups, or firms, both in the public and private sectors, to influence the formation of laws, regulations, decrees, and other government policies to their own advantage as a result of the illicit and non-transparent provision of private benefits to public officials."

We can classify corrupt and venal behaviors according to their outcomes:

•    Income Supplement - Corrupt actions whose sole outcome is the supplementing of the income of the provider without affecting the "real world" in any manner.

•    Acceleration or Facilitation Fees - Corrupt practices whose sole outcome is to accelerate or facilitate decision making, the provision of goods and services or the divulging of information.

•    Decision Altering (State Capture) Fees – Bribes and promises of bribes which alter decisions or affect them, or which affect the formation of policies, laws, regulations, or decrees beneficial to the bribing entity or person.

•    Information Altering Fees - Backhanders and bribes that subvert the flow of true and complete information within a society or an economic unit (for instance, by selling professional diplomas, certificates, or permits).

•    Reallocation Fees – Benefits paid (mainly to politicians and political decision makers) in order to affect the allocation of economic resources and material wealth or the rights thereto. Concessions, licenses, permits, assets privatized, tenders awarded are all subject to reallocation fees.

To eradicate corruption, one must tackle both giver and taker.

History shows that all effective programs shared these common elements:

•    The persecution of corrupt, high-profile, public figures, multinationals, and institutions (domestic and foreign). This demonstrates that no one is above the law and that crime does not pay.

•    The conditioning of international aid, credits, and investments on a monitored reduction in corruption levels. The structural roots of corruption should be tackled rather than merely its symptoms.

•    The institution of incentives to avoid corruption, such as a higher pay, the fostering of civic pride, "good behavior" bonuses, alternative income and pension plans, and so on.

•    In many new countries (in Asia, Africa, and Eastern Europe) the very concepts of "private" versus "public" property are fuzzy and impermissible behaviors are not clearly demarcated. Massive investments in education of the public and of state officials are required.

•    Liberalization and deregulation of the economy. Abolition of red tape, licensing, protectionism, capital controls, monopolies, discretionary, non-public, procurement. Greater access to information and a public debate intended to foster a "stakeholder society".

•    Strengthening of institutions: the police, the customs, the courts, the government, its agencies, the tax authorities – under time limited foreign management and supervision.

Awareness to corruption and graft is growing – though it mostly results in lip service. The Global Coalition for Africa adopted anti-corruption guidelines in 1999. The otherwise opaque Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum is now championing transparency and good governance. The UN is promoting its pet convention against corruption.

The G-8 asked its Lyon Group of senior experts on transnational crime to recommend ways to fight corruption related to large money flows and money laundering. The USA and the Netherlands hosted global forums on corruption – as did South Korea in 2003. The OSCE has responded with its own initiative, in collaboration with the US Congressional Helsinki Commission.

The south-eastern Europe Stability Pact sports its own Stability Pact Anti-corruption Initiative (SPAI). It held its first conference in September 2001 in Croatia. More than 1200 delegates participated in the 10th International Anti-Corruption Conference in Prague last year. The conference was attended by the Czech prime minister, the Mexican president, and the head of the Interpol.

The most potent remedy against corruption is sunshine – free, accessible, and available information disseminated and probed by an active opposition, uncompromised press, and assertive civic organizations and NGO’s. In the absence of these, the fight against official avarice and criminality is doomed to failure. With them, it stands a chance.

Corruption can never be entirely eliminated – but it can be restrained and its effects confined. The cooperation of good people with trustworthy institutions is indispensable. Corruption can be defeated only from the inside, though with plenty of outside help. It is a process of self-redemption and self-transformation. It is the real transition.

III. Asset Confiscation and Asset Forfeiture

The abuse of asset confiscation and forfeiture statutes by governments, law enforcement agencies, and political appointees and cronies throughout the world is well-documented. In many developing countries and countries in transition, assets confiscated from real and alleged criminals and tax evaders are sold in fake auctions to party hacks, cronies, police officers, tax inspectors, and relatives of prominent politicians at bargain basement prices.

That the assets of suspects in grave crimes and corruption should be frozen or "disrupted" until they are convicted or exonerated by the courts – having exhausted their appeals – is understandable and in accordance with the Vienna Convention. But there is no justification for the seizure and sale of property otherwise.

In Switzerland, financial institutions are obliged to automatically freeze suspect transactions for a period of five days, subject to the review of an investigative judge. In France, the Financial Intelligence Unit can freeze funds involved in a reported suspicious transaction by administrative fiat. In both jurisdictions, the fast track freezing of assets has proven to be a more than adequate measure to cope with organized crime and venality.

The presumption of innocence must fully apply and due process upheld to prevent self-enrichment and corrupt dealings with confiscated property, including the unethical and unseemly use of the proceeds from the sale of forfeited assets to close gaping holes in strained state and municipal budgets.

In the United States, according to The Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act of 2000 (HR 1658), the assets of suspects under investigation and of criminals convicted of a variety of more than 400 minor and major offenses (from soliciting a prostitute to gambling and from narcotics charges to corruption and tax evasion) are often confiscated and forfeited ("in personam, or value-based confiscation").

Technically and theoretically, assets can be impounded or forfeited and disposed of even in hitherto minor Federal civil offenses (mistakes in fulfilling Medicare or tax return forms)

The UK’s Assets Recovery Agency (ARA) that is in charge of enforcing the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002, had this chilling statement to make on May 24, 2007:

“We are pursuing the assets of those involved in a wide range of crime including drug dealing, people trafficking, fraud, extortion, smuggling, control of prostitution, counterfeiting, benefit fraud, tax evasion and environmental crimes such as illegal dumping of waste and illegal fishing." (!)

Drug dealing and illegal fishing in the same sentence.

The British firm Bentley-Jennison, who provide Forensic Accounting Services, add:

"In some cases the defendants will even have their assets seized at the start of an investigation, before any charges have been considered. In many cases the authorities will assume that all of the assets held by the defendant are illegally obtained as he has a “criminal lifestyle”. It is then down to the defendant to prove otherwise. If the defendant is judged to have a criminal lifestyle then it will be assumed that physical assets, such as properties and motor vehicles, have been acquired through the use of criminal funds and it will be necessary to present evidence to contradict this.

The defendant?s bank accounts will also be scanned for evidence of spending and any expenditure on unidentified assets (and in some cases identified assets) is also likely to be included as alleged criminal benefit. This often leads to the inclusion of sums from legitimate sources and double counting both of which need to be eliminated."

Under the influence of the post-September 11 United States and the FATF (Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering), Canada, Australia, the United Kingdom, Greece, South Korea, and Russia have similar asset recovery and money laundering laws in place.

International treaties (for instance, the 1959 European Convention on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters, the 1990 Convention of the Council of Europe on Laundering, Search, Seizure and Confiscation of the Proceeds from Crime (ETS 141), and The U.N. Convention against Corruption 2003- UNCAC) and European Union Directives (e.g., 2001/97/EC) allow the seizure and confiscation of the assets and "unexplained wealth" of criminals and suspects globally, even if their alleged or proven crime does not constitute an offense where they own property or have bank accounts.

This abrogation of the principle of dual criminality sometimes leads to serious violations of human and civil rights. Hitler could have used it to ask the United Kingdom’s Assets Recovery Agency (ARA) to confiscate the property of refugee Jews who committed "crimes" by infringing on the infamous Nuremberg race laws.

Only offshore tax havens, such as Andorra, Antigua, Aruba, the British Virgin Islands, Guernsey, Monaco, the Netherlands Antilles, Samoa, St. Vincent, the US Virgin Islands, and Vanuatu still resist the pressure to join in the efforts to trace and seize suspects’ assets and bank accounts in the absence of a conviction or even charges.

Even worse, unlike in other criminal proceedings, the burden of proof is on the defendant who has to demonstrate that the source of the funds used to purchase the confiscated or forfeited assets is legal. When the defendant fails to furnish such evidence conclusively and convincingly, or if he has left the United States or had died, the assets are sold at an auction and the proceeds usually revert to various law enforcement agencies, to the government’s budget, or to good social causes and programs. This is the case in many countries, including United Kingdom, United States, Germany, France, Hong Kong, Italy, Denmark, Belgium, Austria, Greece, Ireland, New Zealand, Singapore and Switzerland.

According to a brief written by Jack Smith, Mark Pieth, and Guillermo Jorge at the Basel Institute on Governance, International Centre for Asset Recovery:

Article 54(1)(c) of the UNCAC recommends that states parties establish non-criminal systems of confiscation, which have several advantages for recovery actions: the standard of evidence is lower (“preponderance of the evidence” rather than “beyond a reasonable doubt”); they are not subject to some of the more restrictive traditional safeguards of international cooperation such as the offense for which the defendant is accused has to be a crime in the receiving state (dual criminality); and it opens more formal avenues for negotiation and settlements. This is already the practice in some jurisdictions such as the US, Ireland, the UK, Italy, Colombia, Slovenia, and South Africa, as well as some Australian and Canadian States."

In most countries, including the United Kingdom, the United States, Austria, Germany, Indonesia, Macedonia, and Ireland, assets can be impounded, confiscated, frozen, forfeited, and even sold prior to and without any criminal conviction. In Australia, Austria, Ireland, Hong-Kong, New Zealand, Singapore, United Kingdom, South Africa, United States and the Netherlands alleged and suspected criminals, their family members, friends, employees, and partners can be stripped of their assets even for crimes they have committed in other countries and even if they have merely made use of revenues obtained from illicit activities (this is called "in rem, or property-based confiscation"). This often gives rise to cases of double jeopardy.

Typically, the defendant is notified of the impending forfeiture or confiscation of his or her assets and has recourse to a hearing within the relevant law enforcement agency and also to the courts. If he or she can prove "substantial harm" to life and business, the property may be released to be used, though ownership is rarely restored.

When the process of asset confiscation or asset forfeiture is initiated, banking secrecy is automatically lifted and the government indemnifies the banks for any damage they may suffer for disclosing confidential information about their clients’ accounts.

In many countries from South Korea to Greece, lawyer-client privilege is largely waived. The same requirements of monitoring of clients’ activities and reporting to the authorities apply to credit and financial institutions, venture capital firms, tax advisers, accountants, and notaries.

Elsewhere, there are some other worrying developments:

In Bulgaria, the assets of tax evaders have recently begun to be confiscated and turned over to the National Revenue Agency and the State Receivables Collection Agency. Property is confiscated even when the tax assessment is disputed in the courts. The Agency cannot, however, confiscate single-dwelling houses, bank accounts up to 250 leva of one member of the family, salary or pension up to 250 leva a month, social care, and alimony, support money or allowances.

Venezuela has recently reformed its Organic Tax Code to allow for:

"(P)re-judgment enforcement measures (to) include closure of premises for up to ten days and confiscation of merchandise. These measures will be applied in addition to the attachment or sequestration of personal property and the prohibition against alienation or encumbrance of realty. During closure of premises, the employer must continue to pay workers, thereby avoiding an appeal for constitutional protection."

Finally, in many states in the United States, "community responsibility" statutes require of owners of legal businesses to
"abate crime" by openly fighting it themselves. If they fail to tackle the criminals in their neighborhood, the police can seize and sell their property, including their apartments and cars. The proceeds from such sales accrue to the local municipality.

In New-York City, the police confiscated a restaurant because one of its regular patrons was an alleged drug dealer. In Alabama, police seized the home of a senior citizen because her yard was used, without her consent, for drug dealing. In Maryland, the police confiscated a family’s home and converted it into a retreat for its officers, having mailed one of the occupants a package of marijuana.

Note – The Psychology of Corruption

Most politicians bend the laws of the land and steal money or solicit bribes because they need the funds to support networks of patronage. Others do it in order to reward their nearest and dearest or to maintain a lavish lifestyle when their political lives are over.

But these mundane reasons fail to explain why some officeholders go on a rampage and binge on endless quantities of lucre. All rationales crumble in the face of a Mobutu Sese Seko or a Saddam Hussein or a Ferdinand Marcos who absconded with billions of US dollars from the coffers of Zaire, Iraq, and the Philippines, respectively.

These inconceivable dollops of hard cash and valuables often remain stashed and untouched, moldering in bank accounts and safes in Western banks. They serve no purpose, either political or economic. But they do fulfill a psychological need. These hoards are not the megalomaniacal equivalents of savings accounts. Rather they are of the nature of compulsive collections.

Erstwhile president of Sierra Leone, Momoh, amassed hundreds of video players and other consumer goods in vast rooms in his mansion. As electricity supply was intermittent at best, his was a curious choice. He used to sit among these relics of his cupidity, fondling and counting them insatiably.

While Momoh relished things with shiny buttons, people like Sese Seko, Hussein, and Marcos drooled over money. The ever-heightening mountains of greenbacks in their vaults soothed them, filled them with confidence, regulated their sense of self-worth, and served as a love substitute. The balances in their bulging bank accounts were of no practical import or intent. They merely catered to their psychopathology.

These politicos were not only crooks but also kleptomaniacs. They could no more stop thieving than Hitler could stop murdering. Venality was an integral part of their psychological makeup.

Kleptomania is about acting out. It is a compensatory act. Politics is a drab, uninspiring, unintelligent, and, often humiliating business. It is also risky and rather arbitrary. It involves enormous stress and unceasing conflict. Politicians with mental health disorders (for instance, narcissists or psychopaths) react by decompensation. They rob the state and coerce businessmen to grease their palms because it makes them feel better, it helps them to repress their mounting fears and frustrations, and to restore their psychodynamic equilibrium. These politicians and bureaucrats "let off steam" by looting.

Kleptomaniacs fail to resist or control the impulse to steal, even if they have no use for the booty. According to the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual IV-TR (2000), the bible of psychiatry, kleptomaniacs feel "pleasure, gratification, or relief when committing the theft." The good book proceeds to say that " … (T)he individual may hoard the stolen objects …".

As most kleptomaniac politicians are also psychopaths, they rarely feel remorse or fear the consequences of their misdeeds. But this only makes them more culpable and dangerous.

————————————————————————————————————————————————-

Also Read:

•   Legalizing Crime

•   The Greatest Savings Crisis in History

•   The Typology of Financial Scandals

•   The Bursting Asset Bubbles

(Case Studies: The Savings and Loans Crisis, Crash of 1929, British Real Estate)

•   The Shadowy World of International Finance

•   Hawala, or the Bank that Never Was

•   Money Laundering in a Changed World

•   The Varieties of Corruption

•   Straf – Corruption in CEE

•   The Criminality of Transition

•   The Kleptocracies of the East

•   The Enrons of the East

•   Bully at Work – Interview with Tim Field

•   The Economics of Conspiracy Theories

•   The Industrious Spies

•   The Business of Torture

•   Fimaco Wouldn’t Die – Russia’s Missing Billions

•   Treasure Island Revisited – Maritime Piracy

•   Organ Trafficking in Eastern Europe

•   Begging Your Trust in Africa

•   Slush Funds

————————————————————————————————————————————————-

————————————————————————————————————————————————-

Interview conducted by: Sam Vaknin

Human trafficking is a sterile term, used to mask the grimmest of realities. Popular culture – from Peter Robinson’s police procedural “Strange Affair” to the film “Taken” – captures the more sensationalist dimensions of this vile and pernicious phenomenon: the coercion or abduction or of young girls (some of them minors) and their forced conversion into prostitutes. But there is a lot more to it than that.

Enter Vladimir Danailov, who is currently running a law office in Skopje, Macedonia.

He served as a National Legal Officer in the International Organization for Migration – Mission in the Republic of Macedonia for six years ( from 2000-2006), and found himself involved in the counter trafficking capacity building projects for the local Police and Judiciary.

He spent years in analysing and researching the multifarious facets of human trafficking and his professional opinion is often sought. He is an author of books on human trafficking problems, among which is: “Handbook for Public Prosecutors regarding Prosecution of the Human Trafficking Crime” (2005), published within the training program for Public Prosecutors, Police officers, and Judges. The book actually summarizes the Case Management Training program and analysis he had performed and deals with methods for the eradication of the crime of organized human trafficking.

SV: What is human trafficking and what is the difference between it and other forms of slavery and prostitution?

VD: Human trafficking or Trafficking in Persons should be understood primarily as a serious violation of fundamental human rights and freedoms: the right not to be held in slavery or servitude, the right to liberty and security, the right to be free from cruel or inhumane treatment and the freedom of movement.

Inconsistent in the past, the description of the crime has expanded and evolved beyond its historical characterizations as the realities of the movement of, and trade in people changed. Consequently, under the term “trafficking in human beings” already used in early twentieth century treaties and conventions, a separate international legal regime has gradually emerged.

In this regard, the so called “Anti-Trafficking Protocol” as a supplementing protocol to the UN Convention Against Translational Organised Crime, (full title: UN Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, especially Women and Children, opened to signature in December 2000), represents a major development in international law. It was the first time a consensus definition of trafficking in human beings has been achieved within a legally binding international instrument.

In this Protocol (Also known as the Palermo Protocol), trafficking is viewed as a contemporary form of slavery, which involves a variety of acts (recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring, receipt of person), actors (several intermediaries are often involved in the trafficking chain), coercive means (threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, abduction, fraud, deception, abuse of power or position of vulnerability, etc) and exploitative purposes (forced labour or services, slavery or slavery-like conditions, sexual exploitation, etc). These four elements, cumulatively, describe the essence of the human trafficking crime.

This means that each of these parts has to be completed and interrelated, or linked, in order for the crime of Trafficking in Human Beings (THB) to occur. Stated another way: the activity must be realized by one of the means and both must be linked/tied to achieving the exploitative purpose. If any one of the three categories is absent, then the crime of trafficking has not been committed (except where minors are involved when the coercive elements are not required).

The effective prosecution of the human trafficking crime in the region or beyond requires a unified understanding of this type of very serious crime with a recognition of its constitutive elements, including all the necessary governmental measures to be adopted for its proper and effective prosecution and suppression.

With this goal in mind, the Palermo Convention (UN Convention Against Transnational Organised Crime) and its two supplementary protocols (which deal with Human Counter-trafficking and Counter-smuggling), gave rise to the intensive process of legislative harmonisation in the region. Nowadays, 8 years after this instrument was opened to signature in 2000, we may say that we have significant efforts in place to unify and harmonise the criminal recognition of the phenomenon region-wide.

As a result of this, in the Macedonian Criminal Code in January 2002, a new article on human trafficking has been introduced (Article 418-a). In spite of the enormous importance of its adoption, the new Article has commonly been understood as constituting only a partial fulfilment of the country’s obligation to ensure the appropriate criminalization of THB as a separate and serious criminal offence.

A further legislative process of amending/revising Article 418-a on human trafficking tended to ensure its conformity and compliance with the existing UN definitions, providing for strengthened penalties for organising trafficking, as well as for invoking, encouraging and supporting the crime of THB, in accordance with the relevant international instruments (see footnote).

This process builds also upon previous amendments of the article, which encompassed other forms of exploitation (like forced marriages, exploitation for pornography, forced fertilization, and illegal adoption).

The last amendments of the national Criminal Code and Procedure were enacted in January 2008. A lot has been done by the Macedonian authorities and Macedonian law enforcement has at its disposal now a rather appropriate and well defined legislative tool for effectively fighting against human trafficking (and migrant smuggling) crimes.

In terms of the difference between human trafficking and prostitution, it is worthwhile to mention that in the period before the formal signature of this instrument (2000), there was quite a misperception of the human trafficking crime and it was confused with the phenomenon of prostitution, where victims of THB were treated as foreign prostitutes with illegal stay, and were regularly fined and expelled. This was mainly owing to the fact that the most common manifestation (form of exploitation) of the crime of human trafficking in the region was for the purpose of sexual exploitation i.e. forced prostitution. The other forms of exploitation as foreseen by the Protocol, such as forced labour, slavery, servitude, and illegal removal of human organs were rarely or never encountered.

This is why, in Macedonia’s case, the amendment of the Criminal Code with the introduction of the article on human trafficking, anticipated also other possible forms of labour-related exploitation, such as forced and illegal adoption, forced fertilisation, and marriage of convenience, in order to render them more easily recognised by the law enforcement.

The main difference between the phenomenon of prostitution and the crime of human trafficking should be viewed through the status of the victim vs. that of the prostitute. The voluntarily act of giving one’s body and the provision of sexual services for a certain material compensation is a significant characteristic in the determination of prostitution. This element can be recognized by the ability of the individual prostitute to terminate this activity more easily and at will.

In the human trafficking crime, this possibility simply does not exist for the trafficked women, i.e. victims. They have a system of dependence imposed over them, which, through threats and other coercive and physical enforcement methods and with the aid of additional artificially-created liabilities (debt bondage), make the victims incapable of freeing themselves from this devious circle of subordination, sexual exploitation and slavery. In this sense, there is a strong violation of elementary human rights and freedoms, which as such are inalienable, natural and inseparable, and are subject to international protection. Unlike the prostitutes, the victims of human trafficking, i.e. the trafficked women, are not able to enjoy any of these guaranteed basic human rights and freedoms.

In addition, the legal treatment of prostitution is varied and ranges from complete legality, through different forms of milder criminalization, to total prohibition, i.e. a ban on prostitution. In legal terms, this means that prostitution is regarded somewhere as a crime, while elsewhere it is not a crime. In some places, its public performance is regarded as a criminal action, and, like in Macedonia, as an act against public morals and order.

It is precisely because of this need for precision that I once again emphasize that human trafficking entails the illicit engagement of the person, by kidnapping, by trafficking and moving, regardless whether it is within or out of the state boundaries. It occurs where the mediators, i.e. the human traffickers, have economic gains or other benefits through the different forms of exploitation established by using various techniques of coercion, intimidation, cheating and threats, and fostering dependence under conditions that break the basic fundamental rights and freedoms of the migrants (victims).

——————————————————————————————————————————————-
See the Council framework decision of 19 July 2002 on Combating Trafficking in Human Beings, OJ L 203, 1/08/2002, p. 0001?0004.

SV: The film “Taken” portrays Albanians as cruel human traffickers. Is the Balkans really a hub of human trafficking? Which countries and ethnicities are particularly and specifically implicated – or is it a multi-ethnic venture that knows no national boundaries?

VD: I saw the film “Taken” and I liked it very much. I consider it very important for broader message outreach when famous actors like Liam Neeson are engaged in its promotion and thus foster public awareness. The film shows one of the modi operandi of traffickers: recruitment by kidnapping. It also shows forcible drug addiction as a method of making victims obey orders, while they remain silent, motionless and unable to escape. One part of the movie tackles the fact that drug-related crime and human traffickers use the same routs, which is very true as far as the Balkans go. The victims’ suffering is rather realistic and fully depicted, and I agree that these harrowing scenes can have a truly preventive effect on teen-audiences.

In terms of the ethnicity implicated, the Republic of Macedonia has successfully overcome a really challenging period. During the armed conflict in Macedonia in 2000-2001 between the Macedonian Police Forces and the Albanian rebels (later recognised as members of the so-called ONA -Liberation Army of the Albanians), a very negative attitude has been engendered towards the Albanians, singling them out as the main organisers and perpetuators of the human trafficking crime.

The Macedonian Police in that period was not in control of the whole territory of the country, especially the western part of Macedonia, which was predominantly Albanian. This lack of access of law enforcement allowed human trafficking to become a flourishing business in those parts, run mainly by ethnic Albanian bar-owners. In that period, there were a number of night bars, operating in the western part of the country, with an enormous number of girls kept in custody by the local bar-owners. Statistics presented by a respected local NGO “All for Fair Trials”, based on the outcomes of the cases initiated as human trafficking and prostitution offenses, show that almost all of the accused in that period were of Albanian ethnicity. Other ethnicities mainly appeared as accomplices. Such ethnic homogeneity prevailed and continued also during 2005, 2006 and 2007.

Throughout this period, a number of reports published by venerable international magazines, illustrated the expansion of the Albanian Mafia into continental Europe, gaining control over the prostitution business in Italy and with an increased control of the same in London. Czechoslovakia was mentioned on several occasions as a country where Albanians were in charge of the drug business and trafficking in stolen cars. Many of those reports describe Kosovo as drug cartel zone with all the logistics provided for drug, arm and human trafficking routs towards Europe.

These circumstances contributed to the creation of a prevailing attitude during and after the armed conflict in the country, depicting the Albanian ethnicity as especially affiliated with this type of crime in Macedonia and the human trafficking crime as something imported and the outcome of the Kosovo crises and the increased international presence in the region. It was really difficult to argue against such extreme ethnically-based figures and approaches towards the human trafficking crime which might have had a very negative effect upon the reconciliation efforts in that period and the confidence building process developed by the Ohrid Framework Agreement afterwards.

Fortunately, the latest legislative and structural reforms and the training of law enforcement agencies and institutions, as well as energetic anti-corruption measures applied countrywide, have increased the effectiveness of the overall suppression of organised crime, including human trafficking. They also exposed the involvement of other ethnicities, whether as accomplices or in the crimes of corruption, bribery, or abuse of one’s official position and duty.

In this respect, the latest publications by IOM (International Organization of Migration) and the data shared by different NG (non-governmental) forums including the above mentioned and respected NGO – Coalition for Fair Trials – based on indictments and court cases analysed, confirmed a balanced and more multiethnic profile of the defendants involved in the offences related to human trafficking. For example: as far as the offences of trafficking in persons (article 418-a, Criminal Code (CC)), the smuggling of migrants (418-b, CC), organizing a criminal group (418-c, CC), and mediation in prostitution (191, CC), the ethnic structure of the defendants in the cases before the Macedonian Basic Courts is: 55% Albanian, 36% Macedonian, and 9% of the defendants belong to other ethnic groups.

In addition, most of the local clients of the sexual services of trafficked women in Macedonia are Macedonians (regardless of ethnicity) and analyses show that Macedonia has provided a sizable market for the “services” of trafficked victims even before the arrival of the international community. Consequently, it stands to reason that the regional organized criminal networks are rather multi ethnic.

This helped in regaining the desired (and recommended) attitude vis-a-vis the human trafficking crime: as a regional phenomenon and as a multi-ethnic venture that knows no national boundaries, and is merely concerned with money and profit. As mentioned in the reports from this period, trafficking to Macedonia can be traced back to the beginning of the eighties when numerous groups of “exotic dancers” from Bulgaria, the Ukraine and Russia already performed dances in the nightclubs in the national capital. These women were effectively victims of trafficking at that time as information obtained from various sources shows that they were already subject to the mechanisms that bind victims to criminal organizations, with the implementation of similar measures of coercion, intimidation, abuse and torture, typical of the criminal groups operating today.

While Macedonia has emerged as a transit and source country (and to a lesser extent, a destination country), this is rather confined to women and children trafficked for the purpose of sexual exploitation (US 2007 Trafficking in Persons Report). The problem of internal trafficking is nowadays becoming more visible.

As mentioned, the recent reports by the Macedonian Ministry of Interior detected and confirmed two prevailing tendencies of the human trafficking crime in the country:

The first is related to the growing numbers of internally trafficked persons.

The second tendency is the increased number of minors among the victims rescued or detected. According to the Ministry of Interior’s statistics from this year (January-November 2008), there were 21 cases of detected and suspected traffickers involving minors! Eleven of these were recognized as the victims of trafficking, of which 10 were minors. By comparison, during the same period last year there were three registered cases and 5 victims rescued, of which 3 were minors.

SV: How involved are law enforcement officers, judges, and the state in these crimes in various countries?

DV: It is obvious that such a complex type of crime which is conducted in three disparate phases, i.e. recruitment, transportation (and harboring), and exploitation, cannot be executed solely by organized gangs without the involvement of various levels of state officials as facilitators or accomplices. Based on victim statements, obtained through standardized questionnaires while sheltered, they often point out some illicit involvement of different authorities, related to facilitation in obtaining required documents, visas, work permits, or simply an illegal entry into the territories of various countries during the transportation phase.

In the Republic of Macedonia, the issue of the involvement of the authorities could be roughly divided to two periods, although a very firm line cannot be drawn between them:

•    The first period is before and immediately after the official recognition of the human trafficking crime by the national Criminal Code (2002)

•    The second period is after the formal adoption and application of the Palermo criminal criteria in the Criminal Code, from 2002 to the present.

The second period is when the national law enforcements agencies and institutions started acquiring effective knowledge as to how to combat the human trafficking crime, using the the new legislative and procedural tools for adequate detection and prosecution.

During this period, the national institutional response was getting much more organized: shelters were established for the rescued victims; a national referral system for the victims of trafficking; the adoption of multidisciplinary approaches to processing and assisting rescued victims; improved legislation; specialized police investigation teams; specialized case management training and courses for the police and judiciary; the new special anti organized crime prosecutorial unit was established and so were the tribunals in charge of organized crime cases; new and special investigative measures were introduced; the new Law on Witness Protection was promoted, and so on. This is the period when the prosecution of the human trafficking crime was getting more effective in general.

Of course, there were a number of procedural inconsistencies and corrupt behaviors reported during this period while processing THB caseloads. Many inconsistencies have been denounced by the general public, which provoked the Ministry of Justice to take appropriate actions. The media and the general public gave high marks to the the National Court Council decision regarding the measures taken against the local judge in the Struga Basic Court (Mr. Dimitrija Cobovski) who has dealt inappropriately (between 2000-2005) with a number of indictments against a well known trafficker (Dilaver Bojku Leku) related to human trafficking and organizing and mediating prostitution. Public opinion reacted also against the promotion of a judge (Mr Krste Sivakov) to the Appellate Court in Bitola, despite serious criticisms addressed at him for the unjustified mitigation of a jail sentence for the same accused (Dilaver Bojku), and his early release due to his “effective repentance”.

Despite the success stories of effective cooperation among the media, the general public, NGOs (non-governmental organizations) and the authorities, there were a number of inconsistencies reported in dealing with and the processing of human trafficking caseload which are still left without proper attention and counteraction. It is reasonable to believe that similar unjustified “toleration, servility and receptiveness” was also demonstrated by some local judiciary officials towards defendants. Although it can not be fully proved, it is obvious that such obsequiousness and protection are results of corrupt behaviors and collusion developed among different court actors.

The other aspect of the corrupt involvement of judiciary officials, typical of the beginning of this second period, is the problematic interrelations developed between local investigative judges and prosecutors especially in the ethnically mixed or predominantly Albanian (of Macedonian citizenship) areas. This may be called “ethnic corruption” or protection and toleration developed by the local investigation judges of suspects of the same ethnicity. The local investigative judges, acting upon the instructions of prosecutors, were regularly protecting the suspected or accused perpetrators, which were their “ethnic kin and kith”. There were a number of cases reported internally, where the local investigative judges were obstructing investigative acts against their local neighbors, or friends. In such situations, the outcome was a prolonged, incomplete, or interrupted investigation, forged or manufactured evidence, suspects who fled “just-in-time”, or the submission of very subjective and altered judicial findings.

If the suspect happened to be known as a political fundraiser or donor to any of the Albanian political parties or to former insurgents, the investigative action was usually treated as a local political and security risk.

Based on those findings, the Macedonian authorities have built up an A-team of Public Prosecutors (10 members), with a country-wide remit, to deal especially with organized crime and corruption. It was followed by a similar team of investigators (4) and trial judges (5) for the same offences and by five special courts, assigned to be in charge of the organized crime caseloads. Those measures significantly diminished the possibility of further “ethnic loyalty” and corruption involving judiciary officials on the local level.

The other negative manifestation of the politically corrupt involvement of the authorities is the emergence of the spoils system of administration versus the state-mandated merit system (or at least a composite one). This is especially obvious and dangerous within the Ministry of Interior where usually the changes in the governing political structure cause radical shifts in staff, often sacrificing profoundly knowledgeable and already trained faces on all levels. These changes require additional periods for the training of newly assigned personnel and the wasting of donor community funding.

On the other hand, in order to survive and maintain a proper career development path, good police professionals are not immune to political pressures and affiliations. They are often ready to be attached to and be perceived as political fans of or sometime even formal members of the governing parties, securing in this way their position or further professional promotion. The undeclared administrative staff in the police is silently regarded as adherents of the opposition and therefore are marginalized or downgraded. As a result of this situation, which is never addressed openly, police professionalism, education, training and effectiveness suffer. The result of these practices is the long term polarization of police officers on all levels, shifting politically attached teams of professionals around, with professional agendas being regularly “flavored politically”. It is really dangerous to predict the consequences to the rule of law if the above internal semi-political constellations within the Police, now replicated in police work in the field, were to create similar political configurations among the criminal groups.

——————————————————————————————————————————————-
As a result of such activities, a police officer has been arrested recently, (A.C., aged 37, from the Matejce village in the Kumanovo region) on the Macedonian ? FR Yugoslav border, who “facilitated” the illegal crossing of trafficked persons and even the return of some victims – illegal migrants who were subjected to expulsion – for a certain amount of money (1500 DM on every occasion).

SV: What are the effects of the crime on its victims?

DV: The effects of the crime on the victims directly depend on the phase in which they have been rescued and processed and on the duration of the exploitation period.

Traffickers lure women and girls into their networks through false promises of decent working conditions at relatively good pay as nannies, maids, dancers, factory workers, restaurant workers, sales clerks, or models. They often transport victims from their home communities to unfamiliar destinations, including foreign countries away from family and friends, religious institutions, and other sources of protection and support, leaving the victims defenseless and vulnerable. With defective travel documents or with none, without proper visas and with an unlawful stay in a foreign country, the victims become submissive and obedient, thus creating an even greater dependence on the traffickers. Almost without exception they are forced to work to pay off their debts “created” by the organizers of the trafficking, ostensibly to cover the “very high amounts paid” for the illegal crossing of borders, for mediation services for job hunting, the issuance of papers, working permits etc. Almost all of them are coerced into “working off” these debts through forced prostitution or labor. The living conditions during “the trafficking journey” include complete isolation of the victims and their inability to communicate with the outside world, with friends, relatives, social or religious groups. The victims are often left without elementary hygienic and technical conditions in the premises used to incarcerate them.

Almost without exception, victims are reported to have been beaten, maltreated, with completely reduced mobility and communication, blackmailed, terrified, forced to engage in sex acts or slave-like labour. Such enforcement usually includes rape and other forms of sexual abuse, torture, starvation, imprisonment, forcible drug addiction, threats, psychological abuse, and coercion. Sometimes they are told that physical harm may occur to them or to others should the victim escape or attempt to escape. It is a fact that in most cases victims in trafficking are exposed to the most brutal violations of basic human rights and freedoms. Frequently, they are treated as animals and objects for trade, exposed to the highest degree of disrespect and lack of dignity and to very serious health risks including HIV and AIDS, completely devoid of any access to medical care.

As the subjects of enormous and brutal psychological and physical abuse, all the rescued victims are in desperate need of professional psychological and medical attention and treatment. Almost without exception during the recovery phase, victim suffer from repulsive affect and behavior, having been exposed for a long time to a system of firm subordination established by the traffickers. That is why the psycho-social therapy has to be individually tailored in order to be persuasive enough in countering the physical abuse suffered, and the strong and frequent flashbacks of rape, torture, maltreatment and threats with firearms, experienced. It is a fiendishly difficult job.

SV: Why do some victims, having been rescued and repatriated, allow themselves to be trafficked yet again?

DV: This issue should be analysed on two levels. One is the fact that direct assistance, protection and repatriation programs implemented in the transit countries and the final destinations have always attracted funding and preferred by the donor community. There is a variety of protection programs and schemes that have been successfully implemented in the region, assisting governments in transition to meet the required standards in these areas as part of their EU harmonisation priorities and stabilization and association programs.

The IOM program of protection and assistance and the voluntary repatriation of victims rescued in the Republic of Macedonia has been one of the more successful in the region. The capacity building components of many projects implemented here have contributed to a rather speedy, adaptive and organised institutional response by the Macedonian authorities in preventing, combating and suppressing the human trafficking crime on its territory.

Other NGOs active in this region have also regularly reported similar stories of success. But all of these projects and technical assistance programs, funds and assets spent, have been lopsided, empahsizing the countries of final destination or the transit countries, which means that all of them were (and still are) predominantly tailored to cure the negative consequences of THB. The amounts allocated by the international community through different programs reflect a rather imbalanced approach from the very conception and did not sufficiently address the roots of the human trafficking crime, i.e. the recruitment zones, the countries of origin, where trafficking journeys usually start.

Not enough attention has been given to the amelioration of the repercussions of the so called push-pull factors within the countries of origin and their environments: mainly, the all-pervasive poverty and the very limited and undeveloped absorption capacities of the local economy, resulting in scarce employment opportunities, especially for women; gender issues and equality in those societies (women’s restricted access to the labour markets); restrictive visa regimes; and so on.

Addressing these root causes in the countries of origin would have had a significant preventive effect and would have made it more difficult to recruit new victims in the trafficking chain. It would have allowed those who have been repatriated to get steady jobs or perspectives preventing them from new dangerous adventures. One should not forget that the lingering debts of trafficked victims who have returned home, combined with their continuing need to support their family members, make it more likely for them to migrate again with hopes of earning easy money. Regretfully, many of them end up being re-trafficked.

The other level of analysis is the imbalance between the existing assistance and protection programs for VoT and the voluntary repatriation programs which take place in the final destination or transition countries. The post-repatriation components of most of the protection and assistance programs are still vague and have yet to be developed to be sustainably continued in certain countries of origin. Limited in funding, the post-repatriation and re-socialisation project components are usually designed strictly on a voluntary basis and rely upon the victims’ will to attend or be a part of them. This pertains also to the reintegration assistance or vocational training courses organised within the victims’ environment. Additionally, those societies are still stigmatising women visiting such rehabilitation and reintegration programs, which indicates their prior status as prostitutes.

Yet, the countries of origin chronically suffer form budgetary constrains and lack of sustainable funding for any local reintegration measures to be feasible. The NGO sector in these countries is not well developed, nor is it qualified and skilled in fundraising issues making it dependent of funding from abroad mainly as a component of programs or projects implemented elsewhere. Although the picture as far as funding is concerned is now slowly changing, the aforementioned observations still remain valid. The intensified process of bilateral readmission state-level arrangements (especially between countries of origin and of destination such as the one signed between Macedonia and Moldova) might make the repatriation process less expensive but cannot resolve the problem of the increased need for proper reintegration and re-socialisation of the repatriated victims.

Bearing in mind all that, it is a really challenging for the victim to find her way after the process of repatriation. Suffering from many frequent and unpleasant flashbacks and a variety of psychological disorders, and left without proper assistance by professionals, many of them cannot get reintegrated successfully and are rejected by the local community. Thus, they easily get recruited back into the trafficking chain by the local tentacles of organised crime.

SV: What is the profile of the typical human trafficking victim? Are there children and Westerners among the victims?

DV: Generally, traffickers primarily target women and girls, who are disproportionately affected by poverty, the lack of access to education, chronic unemployment, gender discrimination, and the lack of economic opportunities in the countries of origin. Most of the victims rescued and assisted originate from the countries of Eastern Europe and especially from Moldova.

Traffickers lure women and girls into their networks through false promises of decent working conditions at a relatively good pay as nannies, maids, dancers, factory workers, restaurant workers, sales clerks, or models.

Traffickers also buy children from poor families and sell them into prostitution or into various types of forced or bonded labor.

The figures and profile of the assisted victims of trafficking rescued on the territory of Macedonia by the local IOM Mission (August 2000- Dec 2007):

Nationality of the victim’s assisted according to the same source

Gender and age profile of the victims assisted according to the same source (IOM)

Educational Level of the victims assisted according to the same source

Economic Status- of the victims assisted in the country of origin

SV: To what extent do victims enjoy institutional protection in Macedonia?

DV: The legislative harmonization initiated by the currently binding Palermo protocols and the Palermo Convention in general, made a significant positive impact towards a more effective and proper prosecution of the human trafficking crime on the national level. The institutional response in this regard has become more organized and consolidated, along with the fulfilment of all the requirements as proclaimed in binding or related instruments.

The crucial step with regards to proper housing and assistance provided to the victims was taken when the former ministry of interior asylum shelter has been reconstructed and reassigned by the authorities to serve as a shelter transit centre for  foreign nationals, victims of trafficking  rescued on the  territory of the country. This Transit Centre was formally opened on April 4, 2001. Since its establishment, the immediate deportation and banning of the rescued victims from the territory of Macedonia has been prevented as a mandatory processing of all identified victims was implemented through the Transit Centre (TC), granting them (by the new Law on Foreigners) an extended decriminalised status and lawful stay until they are voluntarily repatriated to their country of origin.

Within the centre and in coordination with the authorities (the Ministry of Interior and the Ministry of Labour and Social Policy), victims have now started being provided with an adequate post-traumatic, socially re-integrative and psycho-social therapy by experts including counselling services by specialized and trained NGOs, which fully corresponds with the standards and requirements proclaimed in the Palermo Protocol and other relevant and related instruments (see footnote).

Once accommodated in these sheltering premises, victims receive appropriate legal advice on their legal status, their rights and obligations in accordance with the existing legislation and, in case they are involved in court hearings or pre-investigative activities, they are provided with free legal counselling, assistance and representation by the team of NGO women lawyers assigned to this centre.

A big step ahead  was also the establishment of the specialised team of senior police inspectors qualified for the timely detection and prosecution of human trafficking operations within the anti organised crime sector in the Ministry of Interior. Continuing education and training of the police officers of those units, including the new Border Police structures, have been ensured through the specialised training curricula at the Police Academy and the Centre for Education of the Police Forces, supported by the CARDS funding mechanisms or by various project funding actions of various donors.

On the inter-ministerial level a special National Commission for Combating Trafficking in Persons and Irregular Migration has been formed on the 27^th of  February 2001, comprising representatives from different ministries ensuring a multidisciplinary approach to the suppression of the THB crime and its prevention on the national level.  The work of the Commission has been facilitated by the establishment of the Secretariat as an executive body of the Commission, in 2003.

On 16th January 2002, urged by the Stability Pact, a special  sub-group for the prevention of the trafficking in children started operating within the National Commisison.

Drafted by this Commisison, the  Government of the Republic of Macedonia  has formally adopted on  March 23rd,  2006 a National Action Plan and a comprehensive National Strategy to Combat Trafficking in Persons.

In May 2005, a Law on Witness Protection has been adopted provididng for posibilities for additional protection of victims who serve as witnesses.

The Ministry of Labour and Social Policy established in September 2005 the National Referral Mechanism for Victims of Trafficking with the core objective of improving and ensuring that proper victim identification, referral and assistance are systematically carried out. The system, theoretically in place for both international and national victims of trafficking, is for the time being mainly focused on the national caseload. This referral mechanism  is also involved in the procedure of appointing guardians for minors who are victims of trafficking, incorporating specially trained teams of the local Centers for Social Care in charge, operating within the Ministry of Labor and Social Policy and the national NGO sector active in this field.

With the support and collaboration of the international donor community, there were a number of campaigns to raise public awareness and of a preventive nature as well as initiatives supported by the national authorities regarding the human trafficking phenomenon, launched and implemented countrywide. Some of them were specially tailored to reach out to particularly vulnerable categories of population, which are exposed to risk.

The Academy for the Continuing Education of Judiciary Officials (judges and public prosecutors) requires an official exam at the end to qualify for election and reelection processes. The Academy’s curriculum also includes instruments and best practices in the prosecution of the human trafficking crime.

——————————————————————————————————————————————-
See also the Council of Europe’s Recommendation R 2000) 11 on Action against THBs for the Purpose of Sexual Exploitation (19 May, 2000) which calls on member states to grant victims a temporarily residence status in the country of destination in order to enable them to act as witnesses during judicial proceedings against offenders ” and to provide victims with social and medical assistance

SV: Are the courts knowledgeable and efficient in processing human trafficking cases?

DV: The intensive EU association process compelled the signature and ratification by the Macedonian authorities of a number of new treaties and international conventions, which made them applicable and a part of the national legal system. In order to render national legislation in conformity with all of those instruments, the national laws has been subjected to a process of intensive harmonisation, introducing a number of changes, new articles, and modifications.

Because laws are continually being revised and amended, the process of the continuing education of judges and prosecutors is crucial to the proper functioning of the rule of law in the country.

The involvement of the judiciary, especially trial judges, in educational and training courses for police officers was mainly done on ad hoc basis which caused them to be somewhat inferior as far as the timely acknowledgement of the new treaty requirements regarding human trafficking caseloads. From 2002- 2004, there were court verdicts related to human trafficking offences that have been regarded as rather inappropriate from the punishment point of view. Although 2004 is a turning point in terms of more severe punishment for traffickers, the need for continued education of judges and prosecutors emerged as a priority.

In March 2006, a new Academy for the Training of Judges and Prosecutors was opened in the capital city (Skopje), marking the institutionalisation of an erstwhile ad hoc educational approach previously carried out by the domestic Association of Judges. The establishment of this Academy was an important step in the process of the ongoing overall judicial reform, ensuring the effectiveness and professionalism of the judiciary officials during the application and interpretation of laws and other legal provisions.

The main purpose of the Academy is to ensure the competent, professional, independent, impartial and efficient performance of judicial and prosecution functions through the selection, organisation, and implementation of initial training for candidates for judges and prosecutors as well as the continuous professional training of judges and prosecutors.

The Academy’s training curricula also includes relevant ratified instruments and conventions related to the human trafficking crime. The Academy’s educational program for the new candidates and the ongoing refresher courses organized for their active colleagues is allowing the national judiciary to be knowledgeable and aware of all the relevant aspects while processing human trafficking caseloads, among others.

SV: What are the most efficacious deterrents and punishments for human traffickers: monetary fines, confiscation of property, or imprisonment?

DV: Imprisonment is being regularly imposed as the main punishment for convicted traffickers. To effectively combat this crime it is necessary to combine imprisonment with monetary fines and the confiscation of property, thus depleting the resources of organised crime. Regretfully, the last two remedies have been rather poorly applied in practise and do not fully meet expectations.

Namely, the monetary fine as envisaged by the Law on Criminal Procedure has been exercised as sporadic punishment next to imprisonment. Additionally, even when imposed, it was usually in an amount that does not reflect the gravity of the crime and could not compensate the victim’s claims for psychosocial damage suffered. The confiscation of property, or forfeiture of profits generated by the crime usually amount to the seizure of movable property, money, and vehicles used for the transportation of the victims at the crime scene. Although the law now foresees the confiscation of real estate, none of these remedies have been applied in human trafficking cases, yet.

In general, as observed by some local NGOs, in the period from 2002 until 2004, almost half of prison sentences in the Republic of Macedonia for human trafficking crimes were below the legal minimum (4 years). This evidences the gap between the court practice in that period and the concept of the penal policy of the country to sanction and underline the severity of the crime.

The picture has changed in 2004 when the penal policy has been made more rigorous, but still with a judicial tendency to hover around the minimum imprisonment prescribed.

SV: Victims sometimes serve as witnesses against human traffickers. Having testified, they are usually repatriated. Can you discuss these two complex problems: witness protection and repatriation? How does one make sure that the victims won’t fall prey again to human trafficking or be “penalized” by the perpetrators for their testimony?

DV: Since the Article on Human Trafficking in the Criminal Code of Republic of Macedonia has been introduced and applied, the practise confirmed the fact that victims’ statements were the most solid and crucial pieces of evidence that effectively led to the locking up of traffickers. Therefore, law enforcement in that period was focused on obtaining and upholding quality victim statements and charges against traffickers until the end of the criminal procedure and the court proceedings initiated. Law enforcement practise has demonstrated that once the victims are rescued and have properly recuperated while sheltered in the transit centre, it was not difficult to sustain such charges and statements, mainly due to sufficient security measures and protection afforded the intimidated witnesses as granted by the national Law on Criminal procedure.

The problems started if the initiated procedures got extended and lasted a long time, during which period the victims-witnesses got repatriated (returned to their countries of origin) even as appeals were not yet consummated and final verdicts not handed down. The principles of “directness” and “contradiction” (the ability to directly confront the witness and question her under oath) in the Macedonian Criminal Procedure constitute a legitimate right of the defendant (trafficker). They allow him to oppose, challenge, deny and argue the evidence against him brought to the court and to question and oppose witnesses. The need for the repeated and permanent presence of the victims during the whole procedure was a real problem for proper prosecution in that period especially because most of the victims, once repatriated, became part of special social reintegration programs, which regularly prevented them from anything that might lead to re-victimisation or harm the process of their of psycho-social reintegration. In the absence of a crucial testimony, the indictment against the trafficker was difficult to uphold.

On the other hand it was not always easy for Macedonian law enforcement authorities to secure the presence of the victim with the same quality of statements or testimony during the initial and other phases or instances of the trial, especially in terms of the victim’s consent (to be exploited by the trafficker) which was seen and regularly interpreted as a radically mitigating circumstance for the accused. This reversal of testimony was mainly due to the fact that that the victim (regardless whether repatriated or still sheltered in the country of destination) may have received threats and got seriously intimidated (even through their families) by the tentacles of organised crime, or by the traffickers’ relatives.

A positive step in overcoming the problem regarding the victim’s presence was the installation of an audio-visual link between the court and the office of the prosecution in Macedonia on the one side and the corresponding institutions (or via the Embassy) in the victim’s country of origin. This was made possible with a donation through a US Embassy supported project in Macedonia.

A positive legislative development with regards to witness protection on the national level was the enactment of the Law on Witness Protection which foresees also possibilities for the victims of trafficking to enter the program if they meet certain criteria and conditions. But, up to now, there hasn’t been a victim of trafficking that has entered the national program of witness protection.

Perhaps the most valuable amendment to the Article on Human Trafficking in the Criminal Code was the last one, introduced in January this year (2008). It finally defined the victim’s consent as irrelevant for the crime of human trafficking. This actually reinforced the principle highlighted in the Palermo Protocol and the Council Framework Decision that an investigation or prosecution of offences of trafficking in human beings will not depend on reports or accusations made by the persons subjected to the offence (see footnote).

Taken practically, this is expected to alleviate the burden of proof, currently always borne by the victim and her statements. Now law enforcement and investigations focus only on the statements of victim-witnesses as a means to verifying the existing conditions where, additionally, the victim’s abuses are photo-documented and material evidence is gathered carefully and secured independently from the victim’s statement. Furthermore, the relevance of the victim’s statements is considered to be merely one instrument among others in support of the prosecution of the traffickers. Such a solution is expected to further ameliorate the pressure and intimidation of victims-witnesses, exerted by organised crime networks and the relatives of the traffickers accused.

Apart from this amendment to the law, it is worthwhile to mention the international cooperation that has developed among law enforcement agencies in the region within the SECI Initiative and its Regional Centre in Bucharest during 2002- 2004. The purpose of the SECI Initiative and the Centre was to improve regional law enforcement cooperation, through the joint activities of police and customs administrations of the different countries involved. This was accomplished by facilitating investigations, sharing experiences, establishing common operations, and continually evaluating and analyzing the crime situation in the region (Operation Mirage ). The system of protection of victims as witnesses was also one of the common activities coordinated.

——————————————————————————————————————————————-
Council Framework Decision from 19 July 2002 on Combating THB 2002/629/JHA

SV: What is the role of NGOs (non-government organizations) in victim rehabilitation and victim interface with law enforcement authorities?

DV: The role of the NGO sector in Macedonia in effectively countering and suppressing the human trafficking crime has been underestimated in the past, when the victim identification process was a solemn right of the Macedonian Ministry of Interior (i.e., the Unit in charge of Human Trafficking, within the Organised Crime sector).

That period was characterise by major cases of rescued victims being treated as foreign nationals and an official attitude of the authorities who denied the existence of any domestic human trafficking caseload. In that period, the national police was rather sceptic and distrustful towards any attempt at joint action or cooperation with NGOs. A few cases of criminal infiltration and illicit intimidation of victims sheltered in the Transit Centre, justified for a while this kind of suspicious and protective police approach.

A deeper, trust-based cooperation and coordination has been achieved within the Transit Centre between the Police and the NGOs involved in the victims’ assistance and rehabilitation programs. Under the auspices of the Ministry of Interior, National Commissions, and Secretariat a few specialised and trained NGOs have been entrusted and security-cleared to access the Transit Centre on a daily basis in order to provide regular psycho-social, medical and legal aid to the victims sheltered (in accordance with the requirements set in the Article 5 of the Palermo Protocol).

This form of coordination and cooperation has been further formalised through the internal endorsement and application of the so-called special Standard Operation Procedures (SOP), developed with aim of regulating all the procedures and internal and external duties and responsibilities of each of the players (state organs, ministries, and NGOs) involved in the referral system developed (see footnote).

The experience gleaned from this period underlined that multiple possible referral sources had no access to the victims prior to their entry into the Transit Centre. Everyone had to solely rely upon the judgment of the police, thus casting in doubt also the eligibility of persons brought to the Transit Centre.

From this perspective, local NGOs, acting on a decentralized level, as well as social centres were suggested and considered as safer and more dignified venues. The Transit Centre also became accessible to other state institutions such as Local Social Care centres who were able to provide appropriate care and social assistance to victims, especially minors in need of appointment of special guardians.

In the meantime, local NGOs reported the existence of a caseload of internal trafficking, persistently denied by the authorities.

Time was getting ripe for more comprehensive action to be undertaken on the national level by expanding the referral mechanisms to cover internal caseloads, too.

As mentioned before, in September 2005, the Ministry of Labour and Social Policy, in coordination with the NGO sector and supported by various donors, established the National Referral Mechanism for Victims of Trafficking for processing victims of trafficking in Macedonia. It is characterized by an improved and multifarious victim identification process, based on secured and systematic victims referrals and assistance schemes countrywide. Although initially focused on the national caseload, this system is now operational for both international and national victims rescued.

The presentation made by the coordinative office of the National Referral System in 2008 confirmed that it is run by a permanent staff of three, together with 58 social workers from 27 social centers countrywide who are available 24 hours a day, for the purpose of timely information, detection, coordination, and direct assistance to the victims who are detected or referred by the local NGOs. This yielded an improvement in the prescreening identification system and provided the potential victims with the most appropriate referrals, sheltering and assistance.

As was reported, from 2005 to 2008, the National Referral Mechanism succeeded to train about 525 different profiles: members of social centers expert teams, 10 representatives of different gender commissions and bodies, police counter-trafficking and border police inspectors. Twenty-one training seminars were organized for local NGOs countrywide and for 58 social workers of 27 local Centers for Social Care across the nation. The offices of 19 Centers are specifically equipped to work with victims of trafficking who are minors.

They provide this class of victims with applicable reintegration and re-socialization programs. Apart from many awareness campaigns and public pool surveys conducted by the Coordinative Office of the National Referral System in conjunction with local NGOs the following figures demonstrate the practical impact of the referral activities:

From September 2005 to December 2006, there were 23 potential victims registered throughout this referral mechanism, out of which 16 were minors.

From December 2006 to December 2007, there were 30 domestic victims of trafficking identified, out of whom 5 were foreign nationals and 28 were minors. From 2005 until December 2008 there were 13 individuals that have been referred through the National Referral Mechanisms to the sheltering premises of the NGO Open Gate. Four of them underwent risk and family assessments, requisite for their safe return home. Four girls have received direct assistance and included in reconciliation and reintegration programs run by IOM (International Organization of Migration). A temporary social guardian has been appointed for seven minors within the current Transit Centre.

Generally speaking, the role of the NGO sector in the effective suppression of human trafficking is becoming crucial. It is irreplaceable due to its outreach: the best and farthest compared to other preventive and awareness messages launched. NGOs also expand the usually limited local capacities and the reintegration opportunities for victims.

On the other hand, the NGO sector should be used as a valuable and helpful resource at the disposal of the authorities in their quest to attain desired standards and practical solutions. NGOs maintain flexible international networking, cooperation, knowledge flow and transfer and the sharing of best practices in a manner accessible to all. Something that can be rather formal and time consuming as far as the state organs go, the NGO sector can easily expedite by making use of experience encountered worldwide.

In these contexts, trafficking-related issues and strategies should be anticipated and implemented within the human rights framework consistent with international conventions and instruments, especially with those that have already been subject to ratification. As mentioned in the Palermo Protocol, the signatory-country assumes the responsibility to review the possible measures for the appropriate psychological, psychophysical and sociological treatments for the healing and recovery of the victims, material help, as well as legal advice regarding their rights in a language they understand.

Legal aid is an exceptionally important precondition and a guarantee for the realization and appropriate protection of victims’ rights and freedoms set forth in the Constitution and in all internationally-ratified conventions. Presenting the facts this way and with properly addressed and timed campaigns, NGOs must enlarge their preventive and educational impact on the vulnerable parts of the population: women, i.e. girls and children, alerting them to new and nefarious forms of recruitment. As part of its gender mainstreaming, the NGO Sector is actually expected to further incorporate anti-trafficking measures into its ongoing human rights and institution-building programs.

In this regard, it is worth mentioning the positive impact of the Council of Europe Convention on Action against Trafficking in Human Beings of 2005 which calls upon the treaty signatories to further adopt measures for victim protection regardless of their collaboration in the criminal prosecution of traffickers, preventing them from being repatriated in the meantime. This Convention openly prompts the authorities to extend their cooperation with the NGO sector and with professional organizations that deal with these issues. The treaty also prevents victims from being repatriated before all legal proceedings are completed. The other progressive feature offered in this instrument is that the problem of human trafficking has been finally decoupled from what used to be the prevalent focus on illegal migration patterns. Whereas the Palermo Protocol has now been signed by almost all European countries, only several out of 47 members of the Council of Europe have ratified the more binding Convention on Action against Trafficking in Human Beings. The Republic of Macedonia still has to finally ratify this Convention which was formally signed on 17.11.2005.

——————————————————————————————————————————————-
Before the SOP was applied, pre-screening procedures and victim interviews were regularly performed according to police investigative provisions, set by the police itself, usually after a police raid and less frequently following an individual’s escape or a referral via a different means. In addition, many assessments and studies in the region persistently demonstrated that the number of victims referred in the region solely by the police actually amounts to only one third of the victims that might have been immediately deported or been bereft of any protection and assistance schemes.
——————————————————————————————————————————————-

Also Read

•    The Greatest Savings Crisis in History

•    The Typology of Financial Scandals

•    The Bursting Asset Bubbles
(Case Studies: The Savings and Loans Crisis, Crash of 1929, British Real Estate)

•    The Shadowy World of International Finance

•    Hawala, or the Bank that Never Was

•    Money Laundering in a Changed World

•    The Varieties of Corruption

•    Corruption and Transparency

•    Straf – Corruption in CEE

•    The Criminality of Transition

•    The Kleptocracies of the East

•    The Enrons of the East

•    Bully at Work – Interview with Tim Field

•    The Economics of Conspiracy Theories

•    The Industrious Spies

•    The Business of Torture

•    Fimaco Wouldn’t Die – Russia’s Missing Billions

•    Treasure Island Revisited – Maritime Piracy

•    Begging Your Trust in Africa

•    Slush Funds