Recently, after a period of prolonged strife within the Islamic Religious Community (IVZ), its leader Sulejman Rexhepi publicly asked the government of Macedonia and representatives of the international community for protection from radical Islamic groups. He called in particular on the “embassy of the United States and the European Union to support the IVZ and take appropriate measures” against such groups. Rexhepi’s public cry for help echoed internationally. It was interpreted as one more sign of the rising influence of radical Islam in the Balkans.
Pressure within the IVZ has been mounting all summer. Rumors, hushed and denied, have gone on for years that the IVZ does not have effective control of all of its mosques in the capital city of Skopje, Macedonia. Late June, the Friday prayer at the Isa Beg Mosque was violently interrupted. A group of people, reportedly led by Ramadan Ramadani, attacked and chased away the Skopje mufti, Ibraim Shabani, and several other IVZ officials, preventing them from conducting the prayer. Only several days before the incident, Ramadani was revoked from his position of odza in the Isa Beg Mosque by IVZ on charges of organizing unauthorized lectures. IVZ said Ramadani was revoked after repeated warnings.
The public learned of the incident only a week later, after a tape was presented by the Democratic Party of the Albanians (DPA), one of the two major parties in the Albanian political block, currently in opposition. DPA accused its political opponent, the Democratic Union for Integration (DUI), part of the government coalition, of involvement in the incident.
The incident forced the IVZ, after practically years of denial, to admit that it does not have effective control over some of its mosques in Skopje. It also made it point a finger at “radical groups” that want to take control over the Islamic community in the country. The mosques most often mentioned as outside IVZ control are the Isa Beg, Aladza, Sultan Murat and Hatandzuk.
The dismissed Ramadani has denied accusations of spreading radicalism and has also disputed IVZ’s decision for his removal. “The decision is not valid. This is a first in IVZ’s history that someone is dismissed in such a non-transparent way,” said Ramadani. He argued that IVZ did not have a quorum when it made the decision. He accused the IVZ leader Sulejman Rexhepi of serious financial wrongdoings and said the rhetoric of radicalism was just an excuse. Ramadani started collecting signatures for the removal of Rexhepi from his position as leader of IVZ. He put on hold his initiative mid-August as Ramadan started, but was reported to have collected some 7,000 signatures.
Ramadani’s civic initiative cannot replace the chief mufti Rexhepi?the IVZ leader can only be revoked by the Riaset, the IVZ top body?but if the number of 7,000 signatures is accurate, it indicates a significant following.
After the June incident at the Isa Beg Mosque, IVZ asked the Ministry of Interior (MoI) for protection, that is, to help it restore its control over the mosque. The police said they can only intervene if ordered to by the court. Apparently, in legal terms, the administration of the mosque is a civil matter and the police cannot intervene without a court order (the violent incident is a separate matter and can be a simple misdemeanor). “The moment we are ordered by the court, we will intervene” said MoI spokesperson Ivo Kotevski. The ministry said its hands were tied also concerning the allegations of spreading radical teaching of Islam. As long as there is no direct incitement of racial or ethnic hatred, or direct calls for subversion of institutions of government, the police cannot intervene, was the reaction of the MoI.
Insiders explain the police’s inertia with the political interests involved. According to them, the two major Albanian political parties, DUI and DPA, are not without a stake in the entire affair. Also, according to some of those interpretations, the accusations of radical teachings are just the front for internal struggles over power and control within IVZ. Several years ago there was an even more serious, armed incident, involving known criminals, in a mosque in the village of Kondovo, apparently over who would have control over the mosque.
Institutions’ inertia can easily be explained with political backing in a country such as Macedonia. But it would be completely improbable to think that a major Albanian political party would in any way be supportive of radical Islamic elements. Politics is strongly secular in Macedonia. In addition, Albanian politicians would know better than to risk the support by the international community.
However, elements exist in support of IVZ’s claims over the spread of radical teaching. Citing the unauthorized lectures as the grounds for his dismissal, the Skopje mufti, Ibraim Shabani, in particular objected to the lectures by a local Islamic scholar, Bekir Halimi. In July, after the incident, IVZ directly brought Halimi’s name in connection with the spreading of Wahabism. Two years ago the police raided the premises of Halimi’s association called Bamsiera on suspicion of links with radical groups in the region and internationally. The suspicion was apparently caused by a small money transfers by an organization from Kuwait. Halimi was however neither detained nor charged. Some media subsequently reported the case as a mistake. Halimi himself has denied allegations of spreading radical ideas in the past. He has claimed that the local Muslim tradition is “immune to such influences” and that local priests know how to protect the believers. Ramadani, for his part, justified Halimi’s unauthorized lectures arguing that he was a recognized scholar and that it was a privilege to have him speak.
There have been no public reactions following the IVZ’s leader call upon Europe and the United States to defend moderate Islam in the country. However, after years of rumors and denials, the clash is now out in the open. Further unraveling seems imminent.
The Macedonian dilemma-to change the name or not to change it-that is the question?
The Macedonian state like any in the world has its dilemmas. Should this democratic state change its name and, thanks to a “European dictate” enter the European Union, or not accept this dictate and remain outside the Union?
Game of the European Union
The European Union acknowledges that Macedonia, more than any other country in the Western Balkans, at present meets, just as it did prior to the adoption of Romania and Bulgaria to the European Union, all the requirements for entry into the Union, but there is a “but.” That “but” is that it must first change the name of the Republic of Macedonia into the Republic of Northern Macedonia or another name that is acceptable, and now attention- to Greece. Probably the majority of readers will ask why? Because Greece has a region that also has the name Macedonia. Paranoia? Yes, indeed, and the worst is that all of the governments of the countries in the EU know that, and so they accept that paranoia.
The will of a sovereign nation is not valid
It does not matter that the Macedonians in a referendum Sept. 8, 1991 expressed their will as a sovereign state and that their country is to be called the Republic of Macedonia. The European Union hides behind Greece like a little coward who is not only a coward but a hypocrite. Neither the Union nor the EU hypocrites, the politicians, diplomats and experts of all kinds considers it important that this is contrary to international law, and that this claim would be political suicide for the government of the Prime Minister of Macedonia Nikola Gruevski as indeed for any Western government. But what if the economically weak Macedonia can be moved by such a paranoid request? The hope is that strong pressure will eventually succeed. The most interesting thing is that this absurd demand comes from the “heralds of democracy” and “teachers” of the countries of Central Europe and the Balkans.
Rights for minorities in Western Europe
The fact that the EU states themselves have problems with the rights of minorities such as those in France (Alsatians, Basques, Bretons, Catalans, Corsicans, Provencals), in Greece (Macedonians, Pomaks, Turks, Roma) and Spain (the Basques, Galicians, Catalans and those who dwell in the Leon region), is of little interest to anyone in the Union. This is in essence the hypocrisy of the European Union – one set of rights for us and another set for others. And still the mentoring tone, for teaching all in the Union and those outside. The Irish referendum is the example of Europe’s recognition of the will of the people. You will be voting as long as it takes to get the vote the EU wants. And now the same request is put to Macedonia. We know that you’re right but because of the fact that we are not a democratic EU federation of states and your country is too weak to oppose us directly, as Germany, France and the United Kingdom do, we will impose on you and the Serbs demands which that will break you, but then you will be accepted.”
The Macedonian government now finds itself in a difficult situation. On the one hand Macedonians see their future in the Union. They still erroneously believe that it will be a new phase, which will increase their living standard and promote the economic development of the country. Wrong, because you need to have well-developed and competitive industries, which, unfortunately, Macedonia does not have. Not recognizing the Macedonian nation?s decision in naming their own state also does not bode well for the future, because if they do not recognize the state name now they will never recognize it in the future. While other EU countries will be able to redeem what they want, the sovereignty of Macedonia. Will have been weakened. Macedonia will become a colony or protectorate. But, of course, no one will acknowledge that the Union’s policy is such in relation to Macedonia.
Changing the name-the political suicide
Changing the name would be political suicide not only for the current government, but for everyone else. Unfortunately, Macedonian opposition – the party of the former communists – SDSM is doing everything to accept the demand of the EU – read the Greek ultimatum to change the name. This party has a huge influence on the media (90%), which presents a vision of political hecatomb if Macedonia does not change its name and remain outside the Union. On the other hand, a recent poll shows that 57% of the Macedonians refuse to accept the change. By contrast, 90% of the Albanians want the change in order to enter the Union, and thanks this change, they will be able to work freely and migrate to EU countries. Unfortunately, this is how different visions of the future of the state look in a multiethnic society. For some, Macedonian is a matter of self-identification and the historical past and for a second group, Albanians, it is a matter of self-interest rather than state interest, which for them is not regarded as the same as their own interest. Continual Albanian claims have led to political tension. Macedonians still feel the injustice of the international pressure which has granted disproportionate rights to Albanians. This gives them disproportionate access to wealth and parity in all state institutions, and the recognition of the Albanian language as a second official language, while, in fact, Albanians constitute no more than about 18% of the population. Officially, they claim 22% to 25%, but this figure was overstated by the presence of Kosovars living in Macedonia, who did not leave Macedonia after the Albanian-Serb conflict. Does the European Union or the United States recognize minority languages as official languages? No, but Macedonia was forced to grant such recognition.
The entire set of policies of the European Union regarding the Macedonian state are legal and historical injustices against the Republic of Macedonia.
Proposed on April 11, 2010 in preparation for a simulation-game conducted by A1 TV (Macedonia).
The only way to resolve the seemingly intractable name dispute between Greece and Macedonia is to internationalize it. The negotiations should openly include — besides the primary parties and the hapless UN negotiator, Nimetz — the USA, the EU, and, possibly, Russia. The final Agreement should be signed by Macedonia and Greece with the USA, EU, and, possibly Russia as witnesses and guarantors. Such an arrangement is not unprecedented: the Ohrid Framework Agreement of 2001 included international assurances and guarantees. It is a common practice in international relations, too: Israel and Egypt signed a series of agreements in 1982 only after the USA issued side letters with guarantees and assurances to both parties.
What should such a guarantee include as a minimum? Clearly, it should cater to the needs and assuage the anxieties of both parties, the Greeks and the Macedonians. It should not be too rigid: constructive ambiguity is essential for the final resolution of the name dispute in the future.
The main elements of such an assurance side letter should be:
1. Both parties renounce all claims on each other’s territory and recognize the current borders between them as final. These borders are guaranteed by the USA, EU, and Russia;
2. The USA, EU, and Russia support the use of the term ?Macedonian? to describe the ethnicity and language of the citizens of Macedonia who so choose to define themselves;
3. Article (2) above notwithstanding, the USA, EU, and Russia, together with the United Nations, will continue to collaborate with the parties to find an appropriate and lasting solution;
4. Greece will support Macedonia’s accession to NATO and the EU and will not veto its admission, nor will it obstruct negotiations with Macedonia;
5. Macedonia will terminate all legal proceedings against Greece brought by it in international or other courts.
The “name issue” involves a protracted dispute over the last 18 years between the two Balkan polities over Macedonia’s right to use its constitutional name, “The Republic of Macedonia”. The Greeks claim that Macedonia is a region in Greece and that, therefore, the country Macedonia has no right to monopolize the name and its derivatives (“Macedonian”).
The Greeks feel that Macedonians have designs on the part of Greece that borders the tiny, landlocked country and that the use of Macedonia’s constitutional name internationally will only serve to enhance irredentist and secessionist tendencies, thus adversely affecting the entire region’s stability.
Macedonia retorts that it has publicly renounced any claims to any territory of any of its neighbors. Greece is Macedonia’s second largest foreign investor. The disparities in size, military power and geopolitical and economic prowess between the two countries make Greek “fears” appear to be ridiculous. Macedonians have a right to decide how they are to be called, say exasperated Macedonian officials.
The Greek demands are without precedent either in history or in international law. Many countries bear variants of the same name (Yemen, Korea, Germany until 1990, Russia and Byelorussia, Mongolia). Others share their name with a region in another country (Brittany in France and Great Britain across the channel, for instance).
In the alliance’s Bucharest Summit, in April 2008, Macedonia was not invited to join NATO. Macedonia was rejected because it would not succumb to Greek intransigence: Greece insisted that Macedonia should change its constitutional name to cater to Greek domestic political sensitivities.
When the Jews rebelled against the occupying Romans, they knew full well what might be the consequences of their actions: exile followed by the eventual loss of their land.
After all, the peoples that later coalesced into the Jewish nation have conquered the territory that was to become the Land of Israel from its erstwhile inhabitants, committing multiple, divinely-sanctioned genocides in the process.
By choosing mutiny, have they, therefore, relinquished their right to Palestine?
Have they given up on Eretz Israel?
Have they disastrously gambled with their future and that of their off-spring – and lost?
And, if the answers to all these questions are in the affirmative, do the Palestinians possess this right now making them the rightful owners of this disputed Middle-Eastern patch?
Israel has annexed some of the territories it has conquered in the 1967 Six-Day War. It claims historical rights to big chunks of Jerusalem and the West Bank. It, therefore, regards and treats Palestinian militants as either insurgents or terrorists. This point of view is rejected by the international community. Why so?
Insurgents in International Law
Traditionally, the international community has been reluctant to treat civil strife the same way it does international armed conflict. No one thinks that encouraging an endless succession of tribal or ethnic secessions is a good idea. In their home territories, insurgents are initially invariably labeled as and treated by the “lawful” government as criminals or terrorists.
Paradoxically, though, the longer and more all-pervasive the conflict and the tighter the control of the rebels on people residing in the territories in which the insurgents habitually operate, the better their chances to acquire some international recognition and standing. Thus, international law actually eggs on rebels to prolong and escalate conflicts rather than resolve them peacefully.
By definition, insurgents are temporary, transient, or provisional international subjects. As Antonio Cassese puts it (in his tome, “International Law”, published by Oxford University Press in 2001):
“…(I)nsurgents are quelled by the government, and disappear; or they seize power, and install themselves in the place of the government; or they secede and join another State, or become a new international subject.”
In other words, being an intermediate phenomenon, rebels can never claim sovereign rights over territory. Sovereign states can contract with insurrectionary parties and demand that they afford protection and succor to foreigners within the territories affected by their activities. However, this is not a symmetrical relationship. The rebellious party cannot make any reciprocal demands on states. Still, once entered into, agreements can be enforced, using all lawful sanctions
Third party states are allowed to provide assistance – even of a military nature – to governments, but not to insurgents (with the exception of humanitarian aid). Not so when it comes to national liberation movements.
National Liberation Movements in International Law
According to the First Geneva Protocol of 1977 and subsequent conventions, what is the difference between a group of “freedom fighters” and a national liberation movement?
A National Liberation Movement represents a collective – nation, or people – in its fight to liberate itself from foreign or colonial domination or from an inequitable (for example: racist) regime. National Liberation Movements maintain an organizational structure although they may or may not be in control of a territory (many operate in exile) but they must aspire to gain domination of the land and the oppressed population thereon. They uphold the principle of self-determination and are, thus, instantaneously deemed to be internationally legitimate.
Though less important from the point of view of international law, the instant recognition by other States that follows the establishment of a National Liberation Movement has enormous practical consequences: States are allowed to extend help, including economic and military assistance (short of armed troops) and are “duty-bound to refrain from assisting a State denying self-determination to a people or a group entitled to it” (Cassesse).
As opposed to mere insurgents, National Liberation Movements can claim and assume the right to self-determination; the rights and obligations of ius in bello (the legal principles pertaining to the conduct of hostilities); the rights and obligations pertaining to treaty making; diplomatic immunity.
Yet, even National Liberation Movements are not allowed to act as sovereigns. For instance, they cannot dispose of land or natural resources within the disputed territory. In this case, though, the “lawful” government or colonial power are similarly barred from such dispositions.
Internal Armed Conflict in International Law
Rebels and insurgents are not lawful combatants (or belligerents). Rather, they are held to be simple criminals by their own State and by the majority of other States. They do not enjoy the status of prisoner of war when captured. Ironically, only the lawful government can upgrade the status of the insurrectionists from bandits to lawful combatants (“recognition of belligerency”).
How the government chooses to fight rebels and insurgents is, therefore, not regulated. As long as it refrains from intentionally harming civilians, it can do very much as it pleases.
But international law is in flux and, increasingly, civil strife is being “internationalized” and treated as a run-of-the-mill bilateral or even multilateral armed conflict. The doctrine of “human rights intervention” on behalf of an oppressed people has gained traction. Hence Operation Allied Force in Kosovo in 1999.
Moreover, if a civil war expands and engulfs third party States and if the insurgents are well-organized, both as an armed force and as a civilian administration of the territory being fought over, it is today commonly accepted that the conflict should be regarded and treated as international.
As the Second Geneva Protocol of 1977 makes crystal clear, mere uprisings or riots (such as in Macedonia, 2001) are still not covered by the international rules of war, except for the general principles related to non-combatants and their protection (for instance, through Article 3 of the four 1949 Geneva Conventions) and customary law proscribing the use of chemical weapons, land and anti-personnel mines, booby traps, and such.
Both parties – the State and the insurrectionary group – are bound by these few rules. If they violate them, they may be committing war crimes and crimes against humanity.
Secession in International Law
The State of Israel has consistently mistreated its human charges in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. According to international law, this abuse gives them the right to secede, by force if need be.
Consider the case of Kosovo:
The new state of Kosovo has been immediately recognized by the USA, Germany, and other major European powers. The Canadian Supreme Court made clear in its ruling in the Quebec case in 1998 that the status of statehood is not conditioned upon such recognition, but that (p. 289):
“…(T)he viability of a would-be state in the international community depends, as a practical matter, upon recognition by other states.”
The constitutional law of some federal states provides for a mechanism of orderly secession. The constitutions of both the late USSR and SFRY (Yugoslavia, 1974) incorporated such provisions. In other cases – the USA, Canada, and the United Kingdom come to mind – the supreme echelons of the judicial system had to step in and rule regarding the right to secession, its procedures, and mechanisms.
Again, facts on the ground determine international legitimacy. As early as 1877, in the wake of the bloodiest secessionist war of all time, the American Civil War (1861-5), the Supreme Court of the USA wrote (in William vs. Bruffy):
“The validity of (the secessionists’) acts, both against the parent State and its citizens and subjects, depends entirely upon its ultimate success. If it fail (sic) to establish itself permanently, all such acts perish with it. If it succeed (sic), and become recognized, its acts from the commencement of its existence are upheld as those of an independent nation.”
In “The Creation of States in International Law” (Clarendon Press, 2nd ed., 2006), James Crawford suggests that there is no internationally recognized right to secede and that secession is a “legally neutral act”. Not so. As Aleksandar Pavkovic observes in his book (with contributions by Peter Radan), “Creating New States – Theory and Practice of Secession” (Ashgate, 2007), the universal legal right to self-determination encompasses the universal legal right to secede.
The Albanians in Kosovo are a “people” according to the Decisions of the Badinter Commission. But, though, they occupy a well-defined and demarcated territory, their land is within the borders of an existing State. In this strict sense, their unilateral secession does set a precedent: it goes against the territorial definition of a people as embedded in the United Nations Charter and subsequent Conventions.
Still, the general drift of international law (for instance, as interpreted by Canada’s Supreme Court) is to allow that a State can be composed of several “peoples” and that its cultural-ethnic constituents have a right to self-determination. This seems to uphold the 19th century concept of a homogenous nation-state over the French model (of a civil State of all its citizens, regardless of ethnicity or religious creed).
Pavkovic contends that, according to principle 5 of the United Nations’ General Assembly’s Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation Among States in Accordance With the Charter of the United Nations, the right to territorial integrity overrides the right to self-determination.
Thus, if a State is made up of several “peoples”, its right to maintain itself intact and to avoid being dismembered or impaired is paramount and prevails over the right of its constituent peoples to secede. But, the right to territorial integrity is limited to States:
“(C)onducting themselves in compliance with the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples … and thus possessed of a government representing the whole people belonging to the territory without distinction as to race, creed, or colour.”
The words “as to race, creed, or colour” in the text supra have been replaced with the words “of any kind” (in the 1995 Declaration on the Occasion of the Fiftieth Anniversary of the United Nations).
Yugoslavia under Milosevic failed this test in its treatment of the Albanian minority within its borders. They were relegated to second-class citizenship, derided, blatantly and discriminated against in every turn. Thus, according to principle 5, the Kosovars had a clear right to unilaterally secede.
As early as 1972, an International Commission of Jurists wrote in a report titled “The Events in East Pakistan, 1971″:
“(T)his principle (of territorial integrity) is subject to the requirement that the government does comply with the principle of equal rights and does represent the whole people without distinction. If one of the constituent peoples of a state is denied equal rights and is discriminated against … their full right of self-determination will revive.” (p. 46)
A quarter of a century later, Canada’s Supreme Court concurred (Quebec, 1998):
“(T)he international law right to self-determination only generates, at best, a right to external self-determination in situations … where a definable group is denied meaningful access to government to pursue their political, economic, social, and cultural development.”
In his seminal tome, “Self-Determination of Peoples: A Legal Appraisal” (Cambridge University Press, 19950, Antonio Cassese neatly sums up this exception to the right to territorial integrity enjoyed by States:
“(W)hen the central authorities of a sovereign State persistently refuse to grant participatory rights to a religious or racial group, grossly and systematically trample upon their fundamental rights, and deny the possibility of reaching a peaceful settlement within the framework of the State structure … A racial or religious group may secede … once it is clear that all attempts to achieve internal self-determination have failed or are destined to fail.” (p. 119-120)
Discussion regarding the accession of Macedonia into the European Union was postponed until June 2010. Two countries have delayed this process, the first of course being Greece which cannot accept Macedonia being a member of the EU. Neither can it accept the name ‘Macedonia’ nor the Macedonian idenity or language. In other words, everything that has any connotation to ‘Macedonia’ and ‘Macedonian’ is unacceptable to Greece.
The other country that opposes Macedonia by supporting Greece in this endeavour is France.
Why is France doing this?
Perhaps because Greece has signed a contract to purchase military supplies from France or perhaps because, similar to Greece, France does not recognize minorities in its own territory.
What about indigenous minorities like the Alsatians, Basques, Bretons, Catalans, Corsicans and Occitans (Provencals) who today exist in France? Unfortunately all of these national minorities, and the languages they speak, are not formally recognized by France.
France, like Greece, has “specialized” in signing but not ratifying resolutions for the protection of minorities and their languages. If there is any doubt as to the existence of minority languages in France, let me remind you that all manifestos written just before and after the great French Revolution of 1789-1799 were written in these so-called local languages.
After the Revolution was over authorities withdrew from this linguistic pluralism and took advantage of a single obligatory language and that was ‘French’. The methods used to discourage the use of local languages was to make fun of adults and young children who spoke them, a similar method was used by Greece against the Macedonians.
Greek State-Promoted Terror and Persecutions
In addition to making fun of people, Greek authorities also employed terror tacticts, beatings, imprisonment and expulsion to prevent Macedonians from speaking their native language even on their own native Macedonian territories.
[Enlarge Pic][Buy Book][Back Cover] This is why these two so-called ‘democratic’ countries allied themselves to block Macedonia’s accession into the European Union. Thus the paradox; if other countries are willing to accept Macedonia into the Union they cannot because current EU law allows any single member country to veto and block the other 26. This shows how fragile and abnormal the foundation of this Union is.
Can this be called democracy? No, definitely not!
This is a dictate of one, or in this case, of two countries dictating to the rest. Also there is little logic in this. In this situation we cannot say all countries are treated equally.
This is nothing more than a European circus.
The European Union, which does not hesitate to mentor and teach others about democracy and human rights, harbours two countries which care nothing about human rights or democracy, worse, they can’t even be punished for this. New countries with aspirations of joining the European Union and have fulfilled all requirements put before them, for ‘some reason’ are being blocked while ‘old’ European Union countries, like France and Greece, which have broken every minority law, are not only allowed in, but are treated like the proverbial ‘holy cows’.
Macedonia
Macedonia, the only ex-Yugoslav country in the Balkans able to meet all European standards since 1991, has not been allowed entry into the EU. Macedonia comparing to other Western Balkan’s countries is ahead of reforms . Even today, attempt after attempt to gain entry has been obstructed by Greece and all obstructions have been accepted without question by the EU.
Where have we ever seen or heard of a situation where a paranoid country like Greece ‘forcibly imposed’ a name on a normal country like Macedonia? How is it possible for the majority of democratic European countries to accept and come to terms with such dictates from a small economically and morally bankrupt country like Greece?
The Merciless Persecution of Macedonians in Greece
A country which after its unlawful seizure of Macedonian territories in 1913 has issued a number of racist laws against its own citizens. A country which after its Civil War in 1949 exiled both Greeks and Macedonians and in 1982 and 1985 allowed only Greeks by birth to return. How long will the EU allow Greece, which does not recognize the 250 thousand strong Macedonian minority living on its territory, a minority already recognized by international organizations, to break European and international laws? When will the fools of Brussels move their heavy bottom and go to Northern Greece and see and hear for themselves the Macedonians living there?
When will decision-makers from the EU understand that it is not Macedonia but Greece that is a destabilizing factor in the Balkans? It is not Macedonian but Greek nationalism and the Greek Orthodox Church that inflames other Balkan nationalisms.
Fake “Greek History”
Another idiotic idea that inflames hatred and nationalism is Greece’s claims of having 4000 years of cultural continuity and being ethnically pure, which are nothing more than a myth. The Greek nation is an artificial creation invented in the XIX century by the Philhellenic English and German fans of Classical Greece. The Greek language is also an artificial creation which survived only because it was a language of Eastern Christianity and not the language spoken by the Greek people.
In the XIX century the language spoken in Athens, a small Ottoman village, was Albanian, called Arnautian or Arvanitika. The Greek language was revived by academics and taught in schools and in this way it became the official language of the Greek state. These facts are not taught in school.
The so-called ‘Greek studies’ offered to students are no more than fictional concepts promoting an invented continuity and an invented language. It is enough to read the 19 century memoirs of scientists and travelers in order to learn that they were not able to communicate with the people of Greece in Greek. Macedonia was incorporated into Greece in 1913 against the will of the Macedonian nation which dwelt in these territories from times immemorial.
EU support to Turkey’s Kurds – but not to Greece’s Macedonians
Turkey is constantly being accused by the EU for not respecting minority rights, particularly those of the Kurdish people.
• Why has no one in the EU accused Greece of doing the same with regards to the Turkish and Macedonian minorities living there?
• Why isn’t criticism directed at Greece?
Why this anti-Turkish obsession, not justified by the way, because racism is present in the EU and nobody in Brussels is asking questions about that?
There are more liberties for minorities in Turkey than in Greece.
It is a result of the very nature of Turkey which was an empire and was comprised of many nations and religions. While Turkey left all Christian Churches intact in its territory, Greece on the other hand after 1915 destroyed all Turkish minarets in the Greek territory.
Do Turks from Thrace have guaranteed rights as a minority? No, they, as well as the Macedonians have no minority rights and are discriminated against to no end in Greece. But do you see anyone writing about this, particularly in Europe? No, not at all! And why is Turkey presented in such bad light and not Greece?
Greeks living in Istanbul enjoy full religious freedom but not Turks living in Thrace.
These people are called Muslims because Greece forbids them to call themselves Turks. This says a lot about how the EU operates and how much member nations like Greece respect the rights of their citizens who cannot call themselves what they are but need to be called as deigned by governments!
If we are to speak frankly, Turkey, not Greece, is a stabilizing factor in the Balkans even though a small part of Turkey exists in the Balkans.
It seems that political correctness has taken European politicians away from common sense. They look at one thing and call it something else. The EU has taken a dogmatic approach to things like an aparatchik and preposterously dictates instead of using sound logic and reasoning. In theory a EU is a sound idea but it does not practice what it preaches. Instead of being a union governed by citizens, the EU is a union run by nonchalant bureaucrats.
Accepting countries like France and Greece which have committed serious human rights violations and imposing unjust conditions on countries like Macedonia will cause that the EU sooner or later, will get the hiccups which it deserves. It is not a union of equal nations. It seems that some are more equal than others in the EU and that is not right.
