Dr. Wolassa Kumo
Introduction

Fixed capital has long been considered as an engine of growth both as a factor of production and as an embodiment of technological progress. Countries that had made sustained accumulation of fixed capital were able to achieve higher and sustained economic growth and development while those who had not lagged behind. For instance, economic development in Sub-Saharan Africa has been severely constrained by inadequate saving and investment, among other things. The average annual gross domestic saving rate by 41 sub Saharan African countries during the period 1980-2010 was as little as 14.3% of GDP while the average fixed investment was 20% of GDP for the same period. Therefore, sub-Saharan Africa’s burgeoning debt was not primarily meant to finance investment as the saving- investment gap was only about 6% of GDP during the past three decades.

Sub Saharan Africa’s dismal average economic growth of about 3.8% during the past three decades was therefore a direct consequence of low saving and low investment. The Sub Saharan Africa average saving and investment rates pale in comparison to the saving and investment rates of the newly industrialized and emerging Asian economies, such as China, whose saving and investment rates of over 40% of GDP ensured real economic growth rates of over 10% during the same period, i.e. 1980-2010.

Average annual growth in Africa reached above 5% during the past decade following the commodity price boom since the early 2000s but was dampened by the global economic and financial crises during 2008-2009. Growth rebounded in 2010 and is projected to reach 5.5% in 2011 making sub Saharan Africa the second fastest growing region in the world following Asia.

However, heavy dependence on growth driven by improved commodity terms of trade subjects the sub continent to vagaries of global demand uncertainty. Unless improved commodity terms of trade translates into higher saving and investment, the sustainability of the current improved growth performance will be at stake. Equally important is the continuation of economic and political reforms that are required to enhance the participation of the private sector in economic development, and also improve productivity and investment efficiency.

This brief paper presents an overview of investment efficiency, savings and economic growth in 41 sub Saharan African countries for the past three decades using data from the IMF, World Economic Outlook Data Base, April 2011. Six countries have been excluded from the analysis for lack of consistent time series data. These are Djibouti, Liberia, Mauritania, Sao Tome and Principe, Sudan and Zimbabwe.

Investment Efficiency in Sub Saharan Africa

There are two broad concepts of efficiency: allocative efficiency and technical or production efficiency usually measured by total factor productivity. Some empirical analysts use these broad concepts of efficiency to assess inefficiency in aggregate investment in terms of excess investment demand that captures the deviations of actual investment from the desired investment. These approaches usually use nonparametric methods, such as Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA), as well as, parametric methods including multiple linear or non- linear regression models.

In this brief article, we use a simple approach based on marginal productivity of capital, known commonly as the Incremental Capital Output Ratio (ICOR) to measure investment efficiency in 41 sub Saharan African countries for the period 1980-2010. ICOR is the ratio of investments in some previous period or periods and growth in output in subsequent period or periods measured at constant prices.

Growth in output is not attributed only to investment in fixed capital. It could be due to growth in productivity (partial or total factor productivity), increased use of labour input or improvement in the level of education of the labour force (growth in human capital), and/or improvements in productive capacity utilization. However, changes in fixed investment still explain a significant portion of growth in output particularly in developing countries with limited fixed capital stock and therefore the efficiency with which this input is utilized provides a useful clue about the correlation between the later and economic growth.

The higher the ICOR, the lower is the implied investment efficiency. That is fixed investment is more efficient if fewer dollars are required to generate a unit growth in output. The average ICOR for sub Saharan Africa for the period 1980-2010 was 5.23 and was comparable with the ICOR for of about 5 during the 1980-2003 period. This implies that fixed investment in sub Saharan Africa is pretty efficient and the level of investment efficiency in the sub region is comparable with that of China during the early two decades of its rapid industrialization. This is not only because the sub region is capital scarce but also because there have been marked improvements in business climate and political environment during the past two decades. Therefore, no wonder that foreign direct investment surged in Africa from less than US$15 billion in early 2000s to over US$80 billion in 2007 before the inflow was hit by the global financial and economic crises of 2008-2009.

While average investment efficiency in sub Saharan Africa is high, performance varies from country to country. The 41 countries in sub Saharan Africa can be classified into three groups based on their ICOR performance for the period 1980-2010: (a) those with ICOR value of 1-5, (b) those with 6-9, and (c)) those with ICOR values of above 10.

The majority of the 41 counties (i.e. 25 countries) in the sub region recorded higher investment efficiency during the past three decades. These countries include both the least developed countries with very low fixed capital stock base, as well as, some middle income economies with higher level of capital stock. These best performing countries with ICOR value of 1-5 are: Botswana, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Comoros, DRC, Republic of Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Gabon, The Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinean Bissau, Kenya, Malawi, Mali, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Seychelles, Togo, Uganda, and Zambia. Most of these countries are not only face extreme capital scarcity but have also shown some progress in opening up their economies during the past 3 decades.

The countries with medium investment efficiency level of ICOR 6-9 include: Benin, Burundi, Cape Verde, Eritrea, Mauritius, Sierra Leone, and Swaziland. Mauritius is among the Upper Middle income countries and top reformers in the sub region. Lower investment efficiency may imply an over investment in the economy where marginal investment needed to generate a unit output was greater during the past three decades than during the earlier years of its economic expansion.

Investment efficiency was the lowest in the following countries during the past three decades: Angola, Chad, Cote d’Ivoire, South Africa and Tanzania. All of these four countries have experienced some form of economic and political upheavals during the past three decades. Preliminary data analyses showed that South Africa’s ICOR was comparable with that of China for the post-Apartheid period, but the number was very high for the pre 1994 period, i.e. 1980-1994 pulling the country’s overall performance significantly down. Investment efficiency was very low during the Apartheid rule in South Africa, due to global isolation and heavy state control over the economy. Thus if we exclude the pre 1994 period South Africa’s investment efficiency will fall within the first group of best performers. Poor performance by Angola, Cote d’Ivoire and Tanzania reflects the continued impacts of civil war and socialist mode of production in the case of the later which contributed to wasteful investment.

Investment required to achieve a minimum growth threshold of 7 percent

While Africa’s growth performance is the second best in the world at present, the continent still lags behind other regions in terms of socioeconomic development. Over 380 million people in Africa today live below poverty line, while youth unemployment is as high as 70% in some countries. Most economies are still heavily dependent on rain fed subsistence agriculture with extremely limited investment on irrigation. Weak economic structure reinforces poverty and poses a major risk to the sustainability of the current growth fuelled by commodity price boom.

African countries will not be able to address this fundamental economic challenge with current growth rates of 5% or less. They should achieve a minimum of 7% annual growth rate individually or collectively for the coming two decades to make a dent on poverty and unemployment. With an average ICOR of 5.23, the sub Saharan Africa region therefore requires a minimum fixed investment of 35% of GDP over the coming two decades collectively or by each country. Given the current actual average regional fixed investment rate of 20% of GDP, the desired investment rate of 35% over the coming two decades seems insurmountable, but not unrealistic. China’s economic growth during the past three decades was fuelled by fixed investment of over 40% of GDP. China’s massive investment was financed by extraordinarily high household and public savings which at times reached 50% of GDP. The major challenge for Africa, in this respect, is a culture of low savings, which we expound in the following section.

Saving-investment gap in Sub Saharan Africa

When domestic household and public savings fall short of the fixed investment needs of a country, this leads to a saving-investment gap. This gap is exacerbated when export earnings of a country fall short of import demand leading to a second, foreign exchange gap. Most developing countries in Sub Saharan Africa are often characterized by both gaps. Except five countries, i.e. Botswana, DRC, Gabon, The Gambia, Namibia, and South Africa, the rest of 41 sub Saharan African countries had an average saving -investment gap ranging from 1% to nearly 30% of GDP during the past three decades.

The saving-investment gap, however, significantly varies across the countries in the sub region. Countries that faced relatively lower saving-investment gaps ranging between 1-5% in the sub region during the period under review include Angola, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Comoros, Republic of Congo, Cote d’Ivoire, Eritrea, Ghana, Kenya, Mali, Nigeria, Swaziland and Uganda. The lower gap by some countries reflects increased savings from oil revenues, while lower gap by others simply mean lower level of investment.

Countries in the sub region with the average saving investment-gap of 6-10% during the stated period include Benin, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Central African republic, Ethiopia, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius. Niger, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Tanzania and Zambia, while those with average saving-investment gap of above 11% include Cape Verde, Chad, Equatorial Guinea, Lesotho, Mozambique, Seychelles and Togo.

The poor performance of the sub region in terms of the saving-investment gap reflects two major challenges: First, most countries are characterized by low saving and low investment and hence are at the risk of being trapped in vicious circle of poverty if the they do not raise their saving and investment rates immediately; and second if they raise their investment levels without a concomitant increase in domestic savings they may be trapped in vicious cycle of debt which could undermine the value of their investments, provided money borrowed is invested in economic development. Since the recent economic crisis proved that most of the aid pledged by non-African donors is unlikely to be delivered, the only sustainable solution to Africa’s development challenge is aggressive domestic resource mobilization for development. This could be supplemented by foreign direct investments, if the countries in the sub region speed up the current economic and political reforms.

Concluding remarks

Africa is rising. After 5 decades of civil strife and economic stagnation, the first decade of the 21st century shone a new light on the continent. Africa is no more a hopeless dark continent. Like its diamonds in the West, South and at the center, the continent is shining.

It is also shining as a second fastest growing continent in the world. However, there is no time for complacence as Africa is still the least developed continent in the world plagued with high level of poverty, unemployment, political instability and corruption. To sustainably address these fundamental socio economic challenges the region should at least grow by 7% per annum for the coming two decades. However, this is unlikely to be achieved with the current investment rate of 20% and the saving rate of 14% of GDP.

While the return to investment in Africa is high, it is such low levels of investment and saving that are holding the continent back. Given higher returns to investment, Africa’s economic transformation will depend on radical shift in the saving culture of its people, further economic and political reforms, and accelerated fixed investment.

   Dr. Wolassa Kumo
1. Introduction

Sub Saharan Africa is a home to 47 of the 53 countries in the continent. In 2009, based on GNI per capita, the World Bank classified countries into four categories: (a) low income, with GNI per capita of $995 or less; (b) lower middle income $996 – $3,945; (c) upper middle income, $3,946 – $12,195; and (d) high income, $12,196 or more. During the same year, 31 of the 47 countries in Sub Saharan Africa were low income economies. These countries include: Benin, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mozambique, Niger, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Togo, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.

The rest of the sub Saharan African economies belong to middle income and higher income groups. About 10 countries have been classified as lower middle income economies. These include: Angola, Cameron, Cape Verde, Congo Republic, Cote D’Ivoire, Lesotho, Nigeria, Sao Tome and Principe, Sudan, and Swaziland. These are predominantly oil rich economies which recorded fastest economic growth during the past decade. Among the remaining six countries: Gabon, Mauritius, Namibia, Seychelles, and South Africa are upper middle income economies while Equatorial Guinea is the only non OECD high income economy from the African continent and is the richest country in Africa owing to the discovery of vast oil and gas reserves in early 1990s. With the third largest oil reserve discovered in the African continent, Equatorial Guinea is regarded as the “African Kuwait.”

Clearly, the sub Saharan African economies are heterogeneous and hence the old “Least Developed Country” (LDCs) classification does not reflect the reality on the ground anymore and must be abandoned with immediate effect. According to this outdated classification, many lower middle income countries are still classified as LDCs, while they have already surpassed the GNI per capita threshold. It is absurd to keep Equatorial Guinea in the least of LDCs due to the economic vulnerability and human development index while it has already achieved the high income status. Apart from this, many of the current low income economies have recorded remarkable economic growth since 2001 and hopes are high that they will catch up soon. The LDC classification holds connotations of backwardness and hopelessness for a continent which already suffers from huge image problems. Presenting a positive image about Africa is as important as the inflow of the development funds. Therefore, UNCTAD and other organizations that repeatedly emphasize about the LDC characteristics of sub Saharan Africa must adopt the more positive approach. At present , most sub Saharan African countries are either emerging middle income or developing low income economies, and as such must be classified accordingly.

The remaining parts of the article is organized as follows: section 2 scrutinizes the trends in real GDP growth in low income and lower middle income sub Saharan economies for the past decade. Section three reviews the challenges of commodity driven economic growth in these countries while the last section concludes the article.

2. The real GDP growth in low income and lower middle income sub Saharan economies

Many low income and lower middle income sub Saharan African economies recorded remarkably higher economic growth between 2001 and 2009. Based on the size of the annual average percentage change in GDP at constant prices between 2001 and 2009 (calculated based on the IMF World Economic Outlook Database, April 2010) the Sub Saharan African economies can be categorized into six groups: (a) those with real GDP growth above 10%, (b) those with 7.0-9.9%, (c) those with 5.0-7.0%, (d) those with 3.0-5.0 % , (e) those with ! 3%, and (f) those with !1% of GDP growth rates during the stated period.

The fastest growing low income and lower middle income economies between 2001 and 2009 were Angola and Sierra Leone with annual average GDP growth rate in excess of 10%. Equatorial Guinea, Africa’s only high income economy, was also the economy that recorded the highest growth rate during this period. These three countries were the top performers in economic growth in Sub Saharan Africa during the past decade and belong to our group (a) above. We may regard these economies as the “African Tigers” although the growth in Sierra Leone must be taken with caution as it has shown persistent decline during the past few years following volatility in its mineral exports.

The second group that closely follows the “African Tigers” is group (b) with annual average growth rates ranging between 7% and 9.9%. These countries include: (a) Chad, (b) Ethiopia, (c) Mozambique, (d) Rwanda, (e) Nigeria, and (f) Uganda. The growth in Chad and Nigeria is driven by oil exports while the growth in Mozambique is anchored by mineral exports. Rwanda and Ethiopia’s growth is propelled by a fast growing service export, while Uganda’s growth is based on export of agricultural commodities. Most of these six economies are on track to achieve the Millennium Development Goals of halving poverty in 2015 and if they sustain the current level of growth, they may graduate from the low income group in two decades or less.

The third group of medium growth low income economies include Burkina Faso, The Gambia, Ghana, Mali, Niger, and also Cape Verde and Sao Tome and Principe from lower middle income group. These economies grew between 5.0% and 7.0% for the period 2001-2009. The growth performance of many countries in this group was dampened by the recent global financial and economic crisis that led to sharp contractions in GDP in 2009. Within this group, Ghana’s growth is expected to improve faster following the recent discovery of oil reserves.

Many sub Saharan Africa countries, however, recorded real GDP growth rates of less than 5% on average for the period 2001-2009. These countries belong to the groups (d) with average growth of 3.0-5.0% including Benin, Botswana, Burundi, Cameron, DRC, Congo, Kenya, Lesotho, Malawi, Mauritius, Namibia, Senegal and South Africa; group (e) with average annual growth of Less than 3% including Comoros, Gabon, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Madagascar, Swaziland and Togo; and group (f) with average annual growth of less than 1% including Central African Republic, Cote D’Ivoire, Eritrea, Seychelles and Zimbabwe.

Most of the lower and upper middle income sub Saharan African economies recorded growth rates of less than 5% per annum during this period. Some middle income countries experience similar challenges to those of low income economies such as high level of unemployment, low savings and investment and lower integration to the global economy among other things.

The worst performers in economic growth during the past decade, however, are: Central African Republic, Cote D’Ivoire, Eritrea, Seychelles and Zimbabwe. Although Seychelles is one of the upper middle income economies, its growth performance during the past decade was dismal owing to tight monetary policy, currency devaluation and large current account deficit, and declining private sector investment among others. Poor economic growth performance in Central African Republic, Cote D’Ivoire and Zimbabwe was linked to the continued political instability in the three countries during the past decade. In fact, Zimbabwe recorded decline in real GDP for the period 2001-2009 on average as a result of which the country has now been downgraded to low income country status. However, the recent positive developments in political climate are expected to improve growth performance in Zimbabwe going forward. Eritrea, which became independent from Ethiopia in 1993, did not live up to its promises with dismal growth performance of less than 1 % for the past decade unlike its bigger neighbor, Ethiopia, which recorded over 8% GDP growth during this period on average. The five worst performers have been characterized by macroeconomic and political instability and have to work hard to turn their economies around during the second decade of the century.

Economic growth in fast growing low income and lower middle income economies was largely driven by commodity price boom. Many analysts worry that heavy dependence on commodity may expose these economies to external shocks and may severely limit the sustainability of such growth. The next section highlights the challenges of relying on commodity driven growth in sub Saharan Africa.

3. The sustainability of commodity driven growth in sub Saharan Africa

Most of the low and lower middle income African economies that recorded higher growth during the past decade were either oil or mineral exporters. Economic growth driven by the commodity price boom exposes the economies to the external trade shock where growth prospects will be dependent on exogenous, foreign demand. However, the good news is that most of the commodity exports from these countries are going to China and India and other fast growing economies with insatiable appetite for raw materials. This is unlikely to change in the immediate future. Even then the African economies should not be complacent. The fundamental structural weaknesses of these economies must be addressed as a matter of urgency. Countries must revisit their industrialization strategy not only to raise the share of manufactures in total output but also to reduce the current high and unsustainable level of unemployment in these economies. This also requires transformation of the traditional subsistence agriculture that currently supports over 70% of the population in most of the low income and some of the middle income sub Saharan economies.

Another challenge is the low level of domestic savings. In most low and middle income economies in Africa the level of domestic savings is less than 15% of GDP as opposed to 40% in China. This implies that these countries rely on foreign capital to finance domestic expenditure and investment. Given the current low level of FDI attractions, this means that most funds come either in the form of aid or loans which may complicate development efforts by leading to dependency and debt traps. Related to this is the underdevelopment of financial institutions required to mobilize domestic resources for development.

Widening current account deficits particularly for non-oil exporting low income economies is another development bottleneck. While higher oil prices will spur growth in oil rich economies, it widens the trade deficits of non-oil and mineral exporting countries forcing them to borrow or depend on aid inflows to finance investment and other expenditure. In this regard, the challenge faced by non resource rich countries is formidable.

High level skills and technological gap constitute another critical challenge to sustainable development in sub Saharan economies. At present most of the sub Saharan economies face critical shortage of high level skills required to lead technological transformation. As a result, there is a growing technological gap between Africa and the rest of the world. To sustain the current growth moment African economies must spend an increasing higher resources on high level skills generation.

Last but not least, sub Saharan Africa faces massive infrastructure gaps. Roads, railways, airports, ports, energy, water and sewerage, and telecommunication are underdeveloped. Investment in economic infrastructure not only directly alleviates poverty by improving access to the services by the poor, but also fosters investment by the private sector, which is regarded as an engine of growth and development in market economies.

4. Concluding Remarks

After decades of stagnation, many sub Saharan African economies have recorded impressive economic growth for almost a decade. The continued discovery of oil and gas and other mineral resources in several of the low income economies coupled with the sustained rise in the prices of these commodities afforded great opportunity for growth and revival. The discovery of vast oil and gas reserves in the coast of Equatorial Guinea in early 1990s, ensured sustained and fast economic growth for over a decade as a result of which the country emerged as the only African and non-OECD high income economy. The discovery of oil reserves in Angola, Sudan, Chad, Ghana, in addition to the traditional oil exporters, Nigeria and Gabon buoyed the growth performance in these economies. This also implied improved accountability by resource rich countries compared to earlier years where revenues from oil have been vastly squandered.

The recently discovered coal reserves in Mozambique are considered to be one of the largest in the world. Sierra Leone and the Democratic Republic of the Congo are endowed with vast diamond resources while South Africa has over 40% of the World’s gold reserves. Zambia is the second largest producer of copper in the world, although its growth performance is far lower than many resource rich countries in the continent. Due to lack of political stability, the DRC has still remained one of the poorest countries in the continent with per capita income of less than US$140 in 2009 in spite of its vast mineral resources. The recent discovery of diamond in Zimbabwe provides a great shot in the arm for the economy if the rival politicians come to their senses and reintegrate the economy into the global market. Africa also has one third of the world’s cobalt, significant deposits of uranium and other strategic minerals, all of which will anchor the current growth momentum.

The expansion of service exports in place of traditional commodities by countries such as Ethiopia and Rwanda must also be encouraged as should Uganda’s innovative agriculture export led growth.

However, there still remains a lot to be done to ensure that the current impressive growth in sub Saharan economies are to be sustained and become catch-up growth. One of the most important strategic measures is an urgent diversification of the domestic output and export. Improved revenues generated through commodity exports must be wisely used to improve agricultural productivity, increase the size of manufactured output and create jobs.

Apart from this, governments must create conducive climate of doing business for the private sector, both domestic and foreign, through significant reductions in bureaucratic red tapes and improved investment in economic infrastructure as sustained economic development cannot be achieved without a strong and viable private sector.

Finally, the current macroeconomic and in particular monetary and fiscal policy resilience in many low and middle income economies must be maintained in the future. In particular, lower inflation rates, exchange rate stability, lower interest rates and improved tax revenues together with improvements in the performances of financial intermediation and capital markets will ensure that this time sub Saharan Africa will take off into self sustained development.

————————————————————————————————————————————————

———————————————————————————————————————————————–

By Rashid Suleiman

The founding father of Guinea-Conakry, Ahmed Sekou Toure, had one major difference with other despots of his time. While majority rose from military ranks, Toure was a civilian with no background in killings or coups.

Yet during his time, he was the undisputed ‘father of coups‘ in Africa and a top brain when it came to innovative methods of murder.

The firing squad, hangman’s noose, hackings and torture were the common methods employed by bloody dictators. But out of these, the most inventive were basically three.

He reportedly encouraged intermarriage within his Faranah clan to exclude outsiders.

There was the sledgehammer of death discovered by the great engineer of mass murder, Idi Amin Dada (Uganda), to save on bullets. In Ethiopia, the architect of death — Mengistu Haile Mariam — preferred the garrotte. He sometimes personally did the honours. But in Guinea-Conakry, death merchant Toure discovered a less violent but most painful method.

He killed his opponents, real or perceived, by feeding them on copious amounts of ‘black diet‘ — complete deprivation of food and water.

Its most prominent victims included army boss Gen Keita Noumandian followed by Minister of Development, Rural Economy and Labour Fodeba Keita and lawyer Diallo Telli, first Secretary-General of the defunct Organisation of African Unity. At the time of his arrest and detention in 1976, Telli was Guinea’s Justice Minister.

For better enjoyment of the ‘black diet‘, Toure set up exclusive prisons for political dissents, the most notorious being Boiro Camp in the capital Conakry.

Besides being a leading brain in the death industry, Toure was a master in unearthing coups against him though most existed in his fertile imagination.

Sadly for Guineans, the real or imagined coups provided a perfect opportunity for ‘father of nation‘ to go on killing and torturing sprees.

Almost a deity

By the time he died on the operating table in Cleveland, Ohio in the US (March 1984) after a cardiac arrest, over one million of Guinea’s then six million people had fled to exile.

Most Guineans did not believe news about his death, as they equated him to a deity.

After the discovery of each and every coup, Toure would deal with the plotters ruthlessly. He executed several people after he announced the first attempted coup in early 1960.

   [Enlarge]
PICTURE — The former President of Guinea, Ahmed Sékou Touré surrounded by his wife, Hadja Andrée, Mohamed, his son and Koureissy Sekou Conde, former Minister of Security, then a student at Universté of IPEGAN.

The bloodshed was repeated five years later when another putsch was discovered. More bloody purges followed in 1967 and 1969.

Despite the many coups against him, he effectively neutralised the Guinean military throughout his reign.

To prevent his overthrow by the soldiers he trusted, he personally controlled the supply of arms and ammunition to the military and put all armouries under his direct control. As a surety, he kept the keys to all the armouries.

He intentionally declined to expand the army and ensured a majority of the troops came from his Malinke tribe.

Spies in barracks

He reshuffled senior commanders and purged the military frequently — often without warning — and this instilled fear in soldiers.

He adopted the Russian style of appointing political officers but added another dimension because the appointments were made covertly so that political officers could act as spies in the barracks. The spies were often junior officers.

Many senior officers were caught by the intricate network of spies and died slow and painful deaths in prison, courtesy of the ‘black diet‘ or execution.

The spies came from his Malinke tribe, especially his Faranah clan or were related to him by marriage.

He ruled the country like a personal household.

Toure was given a rude awakening in 1966 when his only friend in Africa, Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana, was overthrown in a military coup. He immediately stepped up his anti-coup strategies.

He formed a people’s militia whose members were mainly drawn exclusively from the most loyal civilian members of the country’s sole political party.

In less than two years, the militia had grown to 25,000 men while the regular armed forces had a mere 6,000 soldiers.

The militia received high-level military training, equalling or even surpassing that of the armed forces. Each district in Guinea had a militia brigade.

The roles of the militia were many and often unclear. Toure said the force was meant to protect Guinea from external enemies and internal economic saboteurs like smugglers; to safeguard the country against putchists and internal enemies of the revolution; and to guard strategic points like the radio station, airports, banks and power installations.

Usually, when Toure unearthed a coup, the foreign masters behind it were invariably France, the defunct Soviet Union, the then West Germany or white-ruled Zimbabwe.

The dictator boxed himself into a tight corner right from Guinea’s independence in 1958 when he humiliated the French in a referendum to decide the future of Francophone colonies in Africa.

There were two choices in the referendum — total independence or limited autonomy within the French Commonwealth. The rest of French colonies voted for autonomy while Guineans under the hypnotic influence and persuasion of Toure overwhelmingly voted for total independence.

His slogan ‘We prefer poverty in liberty than slavery in riches‘ was effective in getting the 95 per cent ‘No‘ vote.

Lone Ranger

Thus a year after Ghana became the first sub-Saharan country to gain independence, Guinea became the first French colony in the continent to gain its freedom.

Immediately after independence, the irate French still smarting from the referendum humiliation went on the offensive against Toure and his newly independent state.

France recalled all its professionals in Guinea, which the former colony heavily relied on. To make matters worse, the departing professionals deliberately left the country in a shambles. They carted off as much property as they could and destroyed what remained.

They went as far as vandalising equipment and facilities, ripping off telephone lines from offices. Then France cut off all aid to the young nation while French businessmen withdrew their commercial and industrial investments in the country.

A number of countries came to Guinea’s aid, with the most notable being Ghana, which forked out a £10 million loan; Soviet Union arrived with technicians, a sports stadium, bulldozers and semi-luxurious goods while China provided agricultural experts.

Throughout his rule, Toure maintained what came to be known as positive or practical neutrality in dealing with the Cold War. He was no pawn of the East or West and accepted help from any quarter.

He was fiercely protective of Guinea’s independence and never accepted aid or any help that interfered with the sovereignty of his country.

He was rabidly anti-imperialists and hated Gaullism (the conservative policies of Gen Charles de Gaulle, France leader after World War II) with a passion.

Foreign Sojourns

Toure’s positive neutrality was practised at the global and African level and this earned him several foes in the continent. Apart from Nkrumah his other friend in Africa was, Modibo Keita, Mali’s founding President.

Otherwise in West Africa, he was largely on his own especially after the overthrow of Keita and Nkrumah.

For years, he had sour relations with his staunchly pro-French neighbours, Ivory Coast and Senegal. In Africa, many countries were opposed to his rule and lone ranger antics. His hard line opposition to France and other colonial masters saw him clash with several African leaders.

For years, he gave the OAU a wide berth after the overthrow of Nkrumah. For a quarter of a century, he never visited France until 1982. Later, he opened a new chapter of rapprochement both in Africa and the world.

He embarked on foreign sojourns and other leaders reciprocated by visiting Guinea, the most prominent of which was then French President Valerie Giscard d’Estaing. He was grouped with Keita of Mali and Nkrumah as the avant-garde of African politics. When Nkrumah was overthrown, he offered him asylum and bestowed on him the title of co-president till he died in 1972.

Vast Resources

Like his peer, Hastings Kamuzu Banda in Malawi, Toure has been hailed in some quarters as a hero or condemned as a paranoid and ruthless dictator who murdered his people at will and impoverished his country.

Guinea is a poor country yet it is abundantly endowed with mineral resources like diamonds, iron ore and bauxite.

Under Toure, the country was reputed to hold at least half of the world’s known high-grade bauxite reserves. But by the time of his death, the country was in economic ruin.

With independence approaching, he became Vice-President of the Government Council of Guinea — a position equivalent to that of a prime minister. In 1958, the country gained full independence after elections won by PDG with Toure as president.

Hardline Socialist

Being a master organiser, he made Guinean Democratic Party or Parti Democratique de Guinee (PDG) and himself the ultimate arbiters of power. The party, under his command, directed all national activities and had an elaborate organisation right from the grassroots.

The Guinean dictator was a hard line African socialist and a political organiser par excellence. He was a charismatic and colourful professional politician endowed with supreme self-confidence and an indomitable spirit.

He was an accomplished orator and demagogue with a common touch who could keep an audience mesmerised for hours. But he had little patience and dealt with his opponents ruthlessly.

———————————————————————————————————————————————–

———————————————————————————————————————————————–

Tribute To Barack Obama — By The North America Congolese Community

Who is Koffi Olomide?

Congolese singer Koffi Olomide, is one of Africa’s best-selling artists. After completing a maths degree in Paris, he moved back home to become one of the continent’s most controversial musical figures, clashing with the ruling regime in Zaire (DRC – Democratic Republic of Congo) and finding his music banned for obscenity in Mali.

Antoine Koffi Olomidé (born August 13, 1956), is a soukous singer, producer, and composer. Born in Kisangani, Democratic Republic of Congo to a Congolese mother and a Sierra Leonean father, Koffi grew up in Kinshasa.

While studying in Paris, he began playing the guitar and writing songs. On his return to Congo he was a member of Viva la Musica, Papa Wemba‘s band. Koffi re-popularized the slower style of soukous, which had fallen out of fashion.

He dubbed this style Tcha Tcho, and it gained popularity outside Congo. Koffi’s music can be quite controversial, taking on current events and topics considered taboo in some conservative societies. He has also participated in the salsa music project Africando. Koffi has won four Kora Awards in South Africa and also won the best artist in central Africa. He is married and the father of four children.

   [Map of DRC-Congo][Enlarge]

Koffi Olomide, also known by a plethora of other names such as Large Degaire, Akram Bourge, Gralibane Maji, Le Grande Mopao, Le Shakespeare Du Zaire, Nkolo Lupemba, Mokonzi etc., is arguably the most talented African singer, producer and composer of the 1990s..

He has dominated music charts across the continent and abroad with a combination of his deep baritone voice, sophisticated arrangements, blending old school rumba and smooth keyboard melodies as well as a searing guitar climax.

His compositions are classy and appeal to a wide spectrum of fans worldwide.

His songs delve deep into a wide variety of topics including love, politics, technology and even religion. In each song he discusses his feelings about such diverse topics while expressing confused feelings about mythical beasts and dream like fantasies.

Names of famous people like Bill Gates, Silvio Berlusconi, Saddam Hussein and even George Weah are mentioned.

Indeed He himself said you have to understand the words to fully appreciate his songs. More so, he has a keen sense of fashion and extensive sapeur wardrobe as well as a personality to match….[ read more here ]

Koffi Olomide in Action

Danger De Mort

Skol Longitima

Pharmacien

Koffi Olomide Live au Gabon : Bande Annonce

Want more video? GO HERE