This happened towards the end of his second term in 1984. The “MYTHICAL” Republican used the word NEGRO — a racist slur when referring to the ethnicity of African Americans, despite the fact that the term is still used in some contexts for historical reasons such as in the name of the United Negro College Fund.

Note: Reagan wasn’t a very bright man. His oratorical skills camouflaged this weakness quite effectively. The old man was as much a LYING WAR-MONGERING THUG as George Bush.

Ronald Reagan was a serially lying Republican with a heart of darkness who made Americans feel good about themselves. He supported and propped apartheid South Africa government, claiming in 1985 that the “reformist administration” of South Africa had “eliminated the segregation that we once had in our own country.” In 1986, Reagan gave a speech where he said Mandela should be released but denounced sanctions with crocodile tears, claiming that they would hurt black workers, who were already ridiculously impoverished.

Reagan’s go-slow speech was denounced by Bishop Desmond Tutu, who said: “I found it quite nauseating. I think the West, for my part, can go to hell . . . Your president is the pits as far as blacks are concerned. He sits there like the great, big white chief of old.”

Later in 1986, Reagan made his greatest demonstration yet that black bodies were “expendable.” Congress had finally had enough of the carnage to vote for limited sanctions. Reagan vetoed them. Congress overrode the veto. Reagan proceeded to put no muscle behind the sanctions. Mandela remained in jail and at least 2000 political prisoners remained detained without trial.

In 1987, Reagan published a report that said additional sanctions “would not be helpful.” The gleeful South African foreign minister, Roelof Botha, said Reagan “and his administration have an understanding of the reality of South Africa.”

Reagan’s and Botha’s “reality” was rendered a fantasy by the force of world opinion and a more enlightened leadership inside South Africa.

Only a year after Reagan left office, Mandela was released. One can only wonder how much sooner he would have been released and how many lives would have been saved had Reagan not behaved like the white chief of old.

The Gipper was as EVIL as every Republican I have ever heard of. They ALL are …anyway! [ READ MORE ]

P/S — Reagan like Bush in Iraq killed hundreds of thousands of central Americans in the name of FREEDOM!

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KWANXAMALALA, South Africa – There’s little question who will lead South Africa (after last Wednesday’s national election). The real mystery lies in who will be the country’s first lady.

As Jacob Zuma, the man preordained to be the country’s next president, voted in his rural Zulu homeland Wednesday, one of his two current wives stood to the side watching patiently as he was mobbed by cheering crowds and reporters.

But Nompumelelo Ntuli, 34, Zuma’s newest and youngest wife, was soon attracting her own crowd of admirers. Women whispered, “Isn’t she beautiful!” as Ntuli decked out in an apricot and blue tie-dye outfit beamed happily.

“Jesus is Lord!” is all she would say in response to questions.

Zuma, 67, a Zulu traditionalist and an unabashed polygamist, has married at least four women over the years. Only two are still with him: Sizakele Khumalo, whom he married in 1973, and Ntuli, who he wed last year.

PIC: ANC president Jacob Zuma’s youngest wife, Nompumelelo Ntuli, 34, after her husband
cast his ballot for general elections in the village of KwaNxamalala, South Africa, on Wednesday.

Of the other two, Kate Mantsho Zuma, committed suicide in 2000. He divorced the other, Nkosazana Dlamini Zuma, in 1998, although she remains a trusted aide and as the country’s foreign affairs minister is expected to join his cabinet. He is said to have more than 10 children.

Multiple wives legal

South African law recognizes such traditional marriages, though fewer and fewer younger South Africans are entering into them because they are seen as expensive and old-fashioned. It remains common among several tribes, though, including the Zulus and Swazis.

To this point, neither of his wives has played much of a public role in his life or politics.

Khumalo presides over the family compound near the school where Zuma voted in KwaNxamalala (pronounced KWAH-nxah-mah-lah-lah). She is known to be shy, and was not spotted Wednesday.

Ntuli, who uses her maiden name as is customary in polygamous marriages to differentiate among the wives, has been slightly more active outside the home. She organized a prayer meeting in southeastern South Africa earlier this year, calling for political tolerance, and established a community development foundation.

With Zuma’s African National Congress party’s overwhelming victory in the parliamentary election, the first lady question is making headlines. Parliament elects South Africa’s president, putting Zuma in line for the post when the new assembly votes in May.

Neither Zuma or the ANC have offered any answers to the question, saying the matter of his marriages is personal.

The Sunday Times newspaper in South Africa quoted Don Mkhwanazi, a trustee of the Friends of Jacob Zuma Trust, as saying Zuma most likely will be guided by tradition and choose his first wife, Sizakele, to act in that capacity.

Usually unaccompanied

Zuma usually is unaccompanied at official functions. His daughter Dudzile, a staunch supporter who has been seen on the campaign trail recording his activities with a small video camera, also could be a possible official escort.

Zuma, of course, would not be the first leader in the world with more than one wife. In the Gulf, the number of a ruler’s wives and who among them is paramount are a constant source of rumors. Publicly known first ladies in Bahrain, Abu Dhabi and even Saudi Arabia do charity work and some are outspoken women’s rights’ activists ? though their pictures never appear in the newspapers.

In recent years, rulers in Dubai and in Qatar each have designated one of their wives to speak at U.S. universities and international humanitarian foundations on pressing issues concerning the Arab world and its relations with the West.

Zuma’s father, who also had multiple wives, was a policeman who died when he was a boy. His mother worked as a maid in the coastal city of Durban. He was denied a formal education and by 15 he was doing odd jobs to help support his family.

Zuma joined the ANC in 1959 and by 21 he was arrested while trying to leave the country illegally. He was jailed for 10 years on Robben Island, alongside Mandela and other heroes of the anti-apartheid struggle. In prison, Zuma resumed his schooling and began making a name for himself among ANC prisoners.

He left South Africa in 1975 for 15 years of exile in neighboring Swaziland, Mozambique and Zambia, where he was appointed chief of the ANC’s intelligence department. Following the lifting of the ANC ban in 1990, Zuma was one of the first of the group’s leaders to return to South Africa.

Khumalo stayed with him despite those long absences.

At a small market in Eshowe, a town near Zuma’s homestead, vendors selling oranges, avocados, pineapples and bananas were more interested in chorusing a long list of woes facing South Africa than the question of who would be its first lady.

After all, post-apartheid South Africa has never really had an American-style first lady in the glamorous mode of a Michelle Obama or Jackie Kennedy, or the policy-engaged model of Hillary Rodham Clinton.

One of the market vendors, Phindile Mbatha, 21, said she thought Dlamini Zuma would make a fine first lady.

Told that Jacob Zuma had divorced her some 10 years ago, Mbatha then declared that maybe the country did not need a first lady after all.

Jacob Zuma — Interview

South Africans divided over Zuma

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Introduction

The struggle against oppression was the central thesis of Frantz Fanon’s revolutionary philosophy. And colonialism was the target of this fury. Fanon condemned colonialism in the most bitter terms and advocated violence in its most extreme form to confront this plague. In his words, “colonialism is not a thinking machine nor a body endowed with reasoning faculties. It is violence in its most natural state … and will only yield when confronted with greater violence.”

   Frantz Fanon
This revolutionary outlook is reflected in many of Fanon’s works, among which include: Black Skin White Masks, A Dying Colonialism, Toward the African Revolution and The Wretched of the Earth. The latter book, acclaimed as Fanon’s most accomplished work, has been described as the “bible of decolonization” because of its radical impact on, and eventual success of the anti-colonial struggle.

Half a century after Fanon’s death, his thesis of violence still remains an object of heated debate. This controversy is increasingly fanned by the undying contradictions within postcolonial Africa. Dr. Homi K. Bhabha questioned the relevance of Fanon’s radicalism in contemporary Africa. “Is The Wretched of the Earth now only a historical and scholarly artifact?” he asked. Continued he, “In the era of globalization is it a relic of naturalistic struggle? Or do Fanon’s insights transcend the particulars of his time? Might they help us make sense of today’s political and economic tensions?” Dr. Bhabha’s doubts suggest both the climate of tension and uncertainty in Africa on the one hand, and the almost-futile search for solutions to the innumerable problems infecting the continent. All of these calamities always boil down to conflicts of one form or another. Where is Fanon’s place in this violence-plagued continent?

Judged against the background of current upheavals in Africa, one requires a deeper reading and then a second interpretation of Fanon. These twin tasks can only make sense when we strive to understand the climate of Fanon’s time and compare it with that of today. Given that Africa alone currently accounts for more than 35% of the world’s conflicts, Fanon still has many questions to answer. Firstly, did Fanon in the middle of his rage ever prescribe an end to violence in Africa in the foreseeable future? Secondly, what is the difference between the unabated spiral of violence in Africa and the colonial-type violence? Put in other words, is violence in contemporary Africa a mark of change or is it of continuity? Thirdly, is half a century not time enough for Africa to reconsider its reverence for violence? And consequent upon these questions, is the struggle lost for Africa?

Violence in Africa, a colonial heritage

Colonialism was without doubt a turning point in Africa’s history and destiny. It accelerated the pace of devastation initiated by the obnoxious slave trade. In Walter Rodney’s words, colonialism completely destroyed what remained of the political, economic and socio-cultural achievements of Africa and left in its place “nothing of compensatory value.” This colonial havoc was the springboard of Fanon’s philosophy of violence. Its test ground was Algeria where Fanon saw for himself what he later called “the psychiatric disorders of colonialism.” Angered by this bestiality of colonialism, Fanon concluded that the Algerian revolution had created “an irreversible situation” for the entire African continent.

Fanon was not alone in preaching violence as the only way out of colonialism and neocolonialism. Che Guevara in 1964, also made it unequivocally clear that “to solve the problems now besetting mankind, there is need to eliminate completely the exploitation of the dependent countries by the developed capitalist countries.” And he spelt it out clearly “with all the consequences that this implies.” This loud call to arms explains the triumph of violence throughout Africa in the 1960s, 70s and 80s. The eventual success of liberation forces in Africa lent credit to Fanon’s dictum that “only violence pay.” Even the Organization of African Unity (OAU), the continental body formed in 1963 to free the continent from colonial rule recognized the need for violence by establishing a Liberation Committee. Its task was to use every means possible, including violence to end colonial rule. And this it did.

In calling on the African masses to resort to violence against colonialism, Fanon did not have to search too far for reasons to convince his audience. He pointed to the exploitative relationship that existed between the settlers and the Africans. The settlers used every means possible to secure their economic interests, including extreme brutality which Fanon describes as “bayonets and caning.” Violence and cruelty were therefore major features of colonialism. Fanon therefore pressed on the need to counter this violence “with greater violence.” Even at the cost of 45.000 lives in Setif, 90.000 in Madagascar, 2000 in Kenya and 250000 in German Tanganyika, Fanon urged Africans to answer violence with violence. This was only part of the price Africans had to pay for carrying the “Whiteman’s burden,” the imposed weight of colonialism.

Like Rodney, Fanon blames the diametrical relationship existing between Africa and Europe entirely on colonialism. Says Fanon, “the well-being and progress of Europe have been built on the sweat and dead bodies of negroes….” And Fanon did not mince words when he made a strong claim that “Europe is Africa’s creation.” To Fanon therefore, the colonized man only “finds freedom in and through violence.” In the course of this struggle, Fanon warns that the native should be prepared to “…sacrifice everything and water their native soil with their blood.” He further cautioned seriously that as a strategy in this struggle, the native can accept a “compromise with colonialism, but never a surrender of principle.”

Another damaging aspect of colonialism which Fanon vociferously decried was the physical and spiritual partition of Africa. It was under colonial rule that Africa was split into several halves for European domination. Colonialism seized African land and minerals for European economic enterprise. It was under colonial rule that Africans were graded, degraded and finally classified into natives and assimiles. Colonialism obliged Africans to carry identification badges on their own soil. On a more dramatic scale, colonialism dissected Africa along the Sahara and prided the northern part of the continent with civilization because it bordered Europe, the land of achievement and wonder. The Southern part of the continent was termed “barbaric” and “uncivilized.” This “primitive” part needed the civilization missions from Europe, hence the justification for European “paternalism” in Africa.

This deliberate attempt at tearing Africa apart was the handiwork of colonialism and a forerunner of (and compliment to) the “divide and rule” policy that marked colonial rule. Added to this puncture on Africa, was the tendency to implant and enforce the notion of racism and ethnicity which have today set Africa ablaze. Observes Fanon, “Colonialism does not simply state the existence of tribes, it also reinforces it and separates them … colonialism is separatist and regionalist.” As a result, continues Fanon, this “legalized racism … maintained in the very depth of the consciousness (of the African people) can only be combated by force.” Fanon’s anger at colonialism is reflected by the dose of fury with which this plague had to be confronted. “No diplomacy, no political genius, no skill can cope with it except force,” he stressed.

Violence in the postcolonial context

Did the coming of independence halt the specter of violence in Africa? Or put in other words, has independence met the expectations of Africans who fought for and eagerly awaited this “wind of Change?” The answer to this question is found on the faces of millions of African children who are either born with disease, or turned refugees or orphans at infancy. It is found on the faces of African youths with bleeding feet on the sands of the Sahara as they make their way to Europe where persecution, prejudice and deportation await them. The answer is found on the faces of millions of Africans caught in the crossfire of civil wars and armed conflicts, genocide and state brutality. Who else can tell the true meaning of independence than those Africans caught in the claws of AIDS, malaria, hunger, mismanagement and corruption? What should the peasants of Africa say of independence when they survive on what Fidel Castro calls “starvation salaries?”

When Europe granted flag independence to Africa, the new breed of European spokesmen in the name of Presidents saw no need to severe the colonial bond. Mr. leon M’ba of Gabon could claim with impunity that “Gabon is independent, but between Gabon and France nothing has changed.” His counterpart in the Ivory Coast, Houghouet Boigny had earlier opposed independence for Africa at the Bamako Conference insisting that “there is no national problem in Black Africa.” The successors of M’ba and Boigny are the current leaders of Africa. This is the bunch Fanon calls “the straw men and traveling salesmen of colonialism.”

In Fanon’s words, independence for Africa simply meant the replacing of one “species” of men with another “species” of men. This new species constitutes the core of the neocolonialist framework, the logical continuation and consequence of colonialism. Here, Fanon singles out two groups of people who need an equal dose of violence. These are the national bourgeoisie of the Third World and the lumpenproletariat. The former group Fanon says, balances its budget with loans and gifts. And together with the latter group, both simply serve the role which Fanon describes as “a transmission line between the nation and capitalism.”

To Fanon, there is a vivid contrast between the bourgeoisie of the metropole and that of the periphery. While the metropolitan bourgeoisie contributed enormously to the development of the colonial country, the bourgeoisie of the colonised country has always remained ignorant and underdeveloped. This group is more preoccupied with what in Fanon’s words are “activities of the intermediary type.” Its major concern is with “the ground nut harvest, with Cocoa Crop and olive yield.” This parasitic group remains contented with sending “out raw materials, being Europe’s small farmers who specialize in unfinished products.”

Fanon has found many apologists in modern Africa. Walter Rodney vividly painted the picture of an African peasant entering colonialism “with a hoe” and leaving “with a hoe.” Five decades after Fanon’s pronouncements on Africa, his views on African agricultural backwardness were repeated by French President Nicholas Sarkozy on his visit to Senegal in 2008. The French President observed that African peasants were living according to the seasons and were therefore outside of history. In”the African imaginary world … there was no place for human adventure or the idea of progress,” he said. Sarkozy however admitted that “Europe had ruined a way of life during its colonization of the continent.” Does Sarkozy share Fanon’s advocacy for violence? It is difficult to tell because the Frenchman expressed sympathy for Africa when he wept “the suffering of the black man is the suffering of all men.”

Insisting that the Third World bourgeoisie exists only in spirit, Fanon observes that this class invests its energy on a “neo-colonialist industrialization in which the country’s economy flounders.” This poorly informed and misdirected middle class instead of investing in the priorities of their people, instead take to leisure thus transforming Africa into what Fanon sees as “Europe’s brothel.” This class makes virtually “no change in marketing of basic products.”

It was against this background of economic inefficiency, mismanagement and misdirected priorities that Fanon reminded the exploited army of peasants throughout Africa that “only violence pays.” His thesis of violence was recently invoked by Nelson Mandela, former South African President and icon of the anti-apartheid struggle. Angered by the level of decay in Zimbabwe, Mandela was among the few African leaders to invoke a “Fanonist” approach to the crisis in Zimbabwe by calling for an uprising against the leadership. “Ordinary people should depose leaders who enrich themselves at the expense of their countrymen,” Mandela said in 2000. Was Mandela Speaking for Fanon?

One very strong case Fanon makes against the bourgeoisie of the Third World is the political weakness of this class. Its Leadership is marked by cruelty, greed and violence. This “unmasked, unpainted and cynical” dictatorship is given a tribal connotation because it emerges from the dominant tribe. If Fanon were alive today, he would have been alarmed by the fact that there is not one country in Africa which has been spared the scourge of tribalism. This tribal dominance of power and resources is at the heart of the ceaseless conflicts in Africa. These conflicts take different forms; civil wars, inter-tribal wars, coups and state brutality. From the Congo and Nigeria in the 1960s, through Rwanda in the 1990s to present day Kenya, Chad and Sudan, cases abound. There is little indication that the wave of violence in Africa shows any signs of ebbing. What then do we make of Fanon’s thesis of violence?

In Fanon’s view, the diminished effect of independence (or its complete lack of meaning) owes largely to the complacency of the Third World bourgeoisie. This class rose to power in the name of a “narrow nationalism.” Unable to put into practice a government even with a “minimum humanist content,” this class took to rhetoric and propaganda. In Fanon’s words, they “bandy about in irresponsible fashion phrases that come straight out of European treaties on morals and political philosophy.” Alex Thomson in his book “An Introduction to African Politics” seems to agree with Fanon on the surge of personal philosophies by African leaders. Thomson cites Sengho’s negritude, Kaunda’s humanism, Nyerere’s Ujama and Mobutu’s Mobutuism.

In recent years, this rhetorical campaign has grown even louder from the state to the continental level. Libyan leader Muammar Gadhaffi takes centre stage as the protector of the oppressed and defender of African unity in modern times. Zimbabwe’s Robert Mugabe, the bete noire of the West comes in as champion of a “look east” policy for Africa. South Africa’s Thabo Mbeki poses as the flag bearer of an “African renaissance.”

When cut to size, do these philosophies offer any credible alternatives to the postcolonial frustrations in Africa? Does Mr Mbeki’s silent diplomacy towards Zimbabwe and the recent upsurge of Xenophobia in his country augur well for his “renaissance scheme?” Does Mr Mugabe’s absolutism give him any moral authority to tell Africa which direction to look when his own people have nowhere to turn and no one to look up to? Does the alleged maltreatment of black Africans in Libya and the rest of North Africa speak well of President Gadhaffi’s position as the unifier of a divided continent? Are these leaders still “the transmission line between the nation and Neo-colonialism?”

When one situates Fanon within the context of ceaseless uncertainties in contemporary Africa, one easily identifies the root causes of violence. This remains the only weapon in the hands of the suppressed and exploited masses. To these “wretched of the earth” as Fanon would call them, “national consciousness is nothing but a crude empty shell…the cracks in it explain how easy it is for young independent countries to switch from nation to ethnic group and from state to tribe which is terribly detrimental to the development of the nation and national unity.”

Fanon was very prophetic in foreshadowing what Dr. Bhabha later termed “ethno-nationalistic switchbacks” of our time. In post independent Africa, such switchbacks in the form of violent conflicts are quite visible. The entire continent is ablaze with conflicts of one kind or another all of which trace their origins to bad leadership, neo-colonial intrusion and lack of vision for the continent. While serving with the Press Services of the National Liberation Front (FLN) in Algeria, Fanon seized this opportunity to amplify one of his first themes, “the unity of Africa.” What have African leaders made of this call? Fanon himself saw these compradorbourgeois as obstacles to African unity. As solution, he stressed the need to “turn the revolution inwards” against these agents of African underdevelopment.

From Fanon’s time till present, violence in Africa has taken many forms. State brutality against the people has provoked equally hostile responses from the people against the state as seen in Sudan. Tribes have stood against tribes, leading to unforgettable genocides as seen in Rwanda. Coups and counter coups, border conflicts, religious conflagrations, secessionist attempts and the struggle among people and nations for access to resources such as land and water are among the several causes of this chaos. None however, is as evident as bad leadership, greed, graft and corruption, which remain the worst forms of violence against Africans by Africans.

It was in Fanon’s own Algeria (where he gave his life in the fight against oppression), that the army showered bullets on defenceless youths in 1988. This act of carnage forced Fanon’s widow, Josie, to cry from her sickened heart “Oh Frantz, the wretched of the Earth again.” If Fanon were alive today, he would have reiterated the need for such gruesome acts to “be beaten down by force.”

Conclusion

Fanon died in 1961 at the age of 36 with the language of violence still fresh in his mouth. He was very unrepentant in his claim that “colonialism only loosens its hold when the knife is at its throat.” He would have repeated these same words in the present context of neo-colonial oppression with the conspiracy of Africa’s new “species” of men in the name of leaders.

Since Fanon’s death in the age of “the wind of change,” millions of Africans are yet to know the meaning of change. The challenges still remain for millions more who go night and day without food, clothing in a supposedly scientific, technological and space age. Adding his voice to Fanon’s call for violence against oppression, Rodney not only identifies the presence of “African accomplices in the imperialist system,” but challenges the oppressed masses to take up the responsibility to understand the system and work for its overthrow. There are two lessons to be drawn from this line of thinking. The first is that violence in Africa is intricately linked with the nature of leadership and governance. Secondly, and consequent upon the first implication, Africa still has many conflicts on its way if the current system remains unchanged. The AU and NEPAD do not have to search too far for causes of instability in Africa.

They rather have to search far for solutions beginning with “in-house” cleaning.

What Barack Obama Can Do For Africa — and Vice Versa

The first time Barack Obama came home to his father’s village of Kogelo in western Kenya, it was as a 26-year-old backpacker exploring his family roots. In 1987, he and half-sister Auma rode a dilapidated old bus from Kisumu, the provincial capital, 60 miles away. As they lurched along dirt roads, a couple of chickens nestled in Obama’s lap and mothers passed wet babies back and forth to the two young visitors.

Obama spent his time in Kogelo, a small rural village where people grow maize and raise cows, getting to know his grandmother Sarah Hussein Obama and wandering the fields and dirt lanes his late father had walked as a boy and had returned to after separating from Obama’s mother, an American, when their son was just two…..[MORE][MORE VIDEO]

Introduction
 
Africa’s rise to prominence in the geopolitics of the 21st century is explained largely by the renewal of great power interest in the region of the world once dismissed as the “forgotten continent.” This great power concern reproduces the same power-play which is reminiscent of the Cold War when inter-locking and overlapping interests of great powers significantly shaped the outlook of international politics. The end of the Cold War and the subsequent demise of the Soviet Union gave rise to a new environment which President George H.W Bush called a “New World Order” in 1990. This new World Order or globalization as it came to be called, saw the expansion of capitalism across regional and continental boundaries at the expense of its reeling rival, communism.

Barely a decade after President Bush’s ordination of a new global environment, another world order was gradually emerging. This “Third World Order” as it has also been named, is championed by a rising eastern giant, China. The unprecedented rise of China as an economic power capable of steering the course of the global economy provides a credible alternative to the western-driven concept of globalization. The imagined rivalry between these two power blocs is the concern of this article.

In the course of expending its economic and political power, China has embraced Africa in an economic alliance which is proving to be worrisome to the West. Africa on its part, hit by the pressures of globalization and frustration following several centuries of unrewarding ties with the West has been more than enthusiastic in courting with China. This Sino-African alliance is at the core of the “Third World Order” which China is today leading. The impact of this alliance is conjured in the words of William Wallis. “The contours of a new order are still being drawn, but China’s growing stake in the continent has already shaken up an old and fraying one dominated by cautious western donors and former colonial powers”

Prelude to the “Third World Order”

Modern Sino-African cooperation or the “Third World Order,” is the full-blown stage of a relationship that traces its history as far beak as the 10th century and beyond. To fast forward this story, the most convenient and agreeable point from which to pick up an analysis of this relationship is the founding of the People’s Republic of China in 1949. This period which was largely characterized by the politics of the Cold War, saw the young communist China struggling against the odds of western capitalist domination. The shared historical, economic and cultural experiences between China and Africa marked the beginning of what Chairman Mao Ze Dong called a “Third World alliance” against western oppression.

As China and Russia struggled to battle against the forces of capitalism in the Cold War, Africa became a theatre for this fray. The resultant “proxy wars” in the continent provided an opportunity for China and Russia to extend military assistance to anti-colonial forces throughout Africa. During this period of massive Sino-Soviet military assistance to Africa, economic considerations were minimal. The relationship was shaped largely by ideological and strategic imperatives which were the defining features of the Cold War.

China gained another significant edge in Africa following disputes with Russia over the leadership of the communist world and differences over the international orientation of communism. The Sino-Soviet split as this difference came to be known, gave China considerable leverage to carve out its own “sphere of influence” in Africa. A practical manifestation of this Sino-Soviet gulf was seen in the nature of assistance given to the liberation forces in Zimbabwe in the 1970s. While China offered training to Zimbabwean guerillas in the manner of a People’s army, Russia did it in the light of a regular army. This difference not withstanding, the bottom line remained the struggle against western oppression of what China saw as “the masses of the third world.” In this military connection, Soviet arm sales to Africa rose from US $150 billion in the 1960s to US $2.5 billion in the 1970s. China on her part, sold $142 billon worth of military equipment to Africa between 1955 and 1977

Besides the Sino-soviet split, China reaped considerable diplomatic gains in Africa with the waning of Moscow’s influence due largely to the growing dissention within the Russian empire. When Russia ceased to exert any significant influence in Africa, this vacuum was immediately filled by China. This diplomatic triumph was followed up on three major fronts-economic, diplomatic and technical. Sustained dialogue through an unbroken chain of visits by Chinese officials to Africa has remained the strong point of China’s diplomatic offensive. Way back in the 1960s, Premier Zhou En Lai vowed to support African people in what he called “their struggle to oppose imperialism and old and new [forms of] colonialism and to win and safe guard national independence”

This spirit of cooperation, fraternity and support constitutes the foundation of modern Sino-African alliance, an illustration of Third World and South-South cooperation. It was re-echoed in 2006 in a policy document which Beijing called “China’s Africa Policy.” This document called for “sincerity, equality, mutual benefit and common development,” and emphasized the need for a beneficial “cultural exchange” between China and Africa. This is the strength of the “Third world Order” that faces the “New World Order” in the 21st century.

The economic foundations of the “Third World Order”

The concept of globalization is rooted mainly on the economic strength and expansion of capital. As agreed by Bonaglia, Pinaud and Wegner, globalization comprises entirely of “the deepening of financial and trade integration associated with technological progress and multilateral liberalization.” So too is the economic regime of the “Third World Order.” Sino-African economic cooperation involves several facets, the most important among them being trade, investment, aid and infrastructure development. Among these, trade has a pride of place and a long history in this alliance. When China started buying cotton from Egypt in 1956 very few observers could foresee a possible Chinese trade domination of the entire continent in less than half a century.

Today, China imports a wide range of commodities from Africa. These include oil, iron ore, cotton, diamonds, logs and several other minerals. African agricultural products which have suffered from the cruelty of globalization now find profitable markets in China. Burkina Faso, Benin and Mali provide China with 20 percent of its cotton imports. The Ivory Coast and Ghana are important sources of cocoa and Kenya sells large quantities of coffee beans and tea to China. Namibia provides large shipments of fish and fishmeal.
 
The figures about China-Africa trade illustrate the depth of this economic cooperation. This trade rose by 700% in the 1990s. In 1999, the trade volume stood at US $6.5 billion. From 2002 to 2003, trade doubled to US $18.5 billion. In 2005, it stood at US $39.7 billion and again jumped to US$50 billion in 2006. A year later in 2007, it rose to $55 billion. In February 2008, Chinese Premier Wen Jia Bao optimistically predicted that Sino-African trade would reach $100 billion in 2010 removing China from its current third position into being Africa’s first trading partner. “The opening of new trade and investment corridors between developing countriesâ?¦confirmed as a growing phenomenon in UN figuresâ?¦is a discovering sight for the old powers,” says Conal Walsh.
 
Trade in oil is among China’s priority areas in Africa. Projected to become the world’s biggest oil importer soon after 2010, China seeks to expand its foothold in the African oil sector at all cost. In Nigeria, Africa’s largest exporter of crude, China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC) has paid $2.7 billion for the right to explore oil. In Angola, China Petrochemical Corporation (SINOPEC) gained a 50% stake in the BP operated Greater Plutonic project. In Sudan where the China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) helped develop Sudanese oil fields (in the chaotic 1990s), China receives 60% of Susan’s oil output. In Somalia, CNOOC has signed a production sharing deal with the transnational government of Somalia, one of the world’s most volatile countries. China already stands on the doorsteps of Sudan, Chad, Nigeria, Angola, Algeria, Gabon, Equatorial Guinea and the Republic of Congo, Africa’s frontline oil producers.

In the mineral sector, China stretches its hands very far into Africa. President Hu jintao’s inauguration of an African economic and Trade Zone during his Africa tour of 2007 is proof of China’s emerging monopoly in the mineral trade in Africa. The Chinese –controlled Chambisi Copper Smelter in Zambia is at the heart of this economic zone and is a joint venture between China Nonferrous Metal Mining (CNMC) and Yunnan Copper Industry (YNCIG). China also lays claims on vast mineral resources in neighboring Zimbabwe where President Robert Mugabe, spited by the west, has passionately embraced a “look east policy” with inspiration from China.

In other areas of the continent, China remains the talk of the day. In Angola, China outbid Brazil in 2005 for the sight to tap into iron ore deposits. In the Democratic Republic of Congo, China struck a deal last year with 8 $ billion dollars which gives China 68 percent stake in Grecamines, the state copper mining company and costs would be repaid in minerals over 30 years. In the Ivory Coast, China exercises control over a manganese mine at Lozoua where it exports manganese to the Chinese market. In Gabon the state owned China National Machinery & equipment Import & Export Corporation struck a $ 3 billon deal to mine Iron ore in Belinga. In Mauritania, China’s Transtech Industry (together with a Sudanese company) agreed to invest more than $600 million in the construction of a railway line in exchange for an estimated 165m tons of phosphate used in the production of fertilizers. While China imports cobalt from the DR Congo, South Africa remains China’s largest supplier of ore and manganese. China’s push into the African mineral market continues to grow despite western outcry.

Besides trade in oil, minerals, agriculture and manufactured goods, aid is another key pillar in Sino-Africa economic cooperation. The most Significant difference between China’s aid to Africa and that of the west is that Beijing does not attach too many strings and “conditionalities” on its loan packages. These “soft loans” to Africa do not follow along the lines of western bureaucracy nor do they respect the western “equator principles” of lending. Estimates put Chinese loans to Africa at $19billion as of 2006. These loans despite western outcry on humanitarian grounds have been seen as positive instruments for Africa’s development. “What the Chinese are doing is taking a long term perspective of the ability to repay debts” says Donald kaberuka, President of the African Development Bank. “Take a country with [a] rich subsoil that is emerging from war. In terms of its static numbers it doesn’t look good. It would be a HIPC case or a grant case from the traditional donors,” he said. The Chinese are looking at it and saying ‘what is the capacity of this country which is not exploited?’ So they exploit that capacity, build infrastructure. It is a different analysis,” Kaberuka concluded.

Since the 1990s, the range of Chinese investment in Africa has broadened significantly. It has evolved from a few sectors such as resource development, including oil, agriculture and fishing to other areas such as textiles, consumer electronics, tourism telecommunications and road construction. By the end of 2006, the accumulated amount of Chinese investment in Africa totaled $11.7 billion. In 2005, the total Chinese Direct investment in Africa was $400 million, constituting 1.3% of total inflow of direct investment in Africa in that year. This investment driven by China’s booming economy is having a significant impact on Africa’s economic growth “China’s fast rising demand for commodities, spurred by industrialization is having an increasingly significant impact on world commodity markets as well as the resource rich regions of the world-particularly Africa and Latin America,” says Tamara Trush, Senior economist at Deutshe Bank.

Attracted by the improved political and economic climate in Africa and Africa’s untapped resources, there are currently between 800 and 900 Chinese enterprises doing business in Africa. The pressures of globalization and liberalization have also forced many African countries to open up to the outside world, thus embracing “easy-coming” investment from Chinese companies. A bulk of these companies are privately owned and driven largely by commercial motivations. These commercial motivations and their resultant constraints are some of the reasons for the rise of anti-Chinese sentiments in certain parts of Africa as workers clamor for higher wages and better working conditions.

In response to this budding resentment, Beijing has adopted or modified the language of “corporate social responsibility” to (re)define its economic ties with Africa. “For the Chinese enterprises, there is a growing awareness of this importance,” says Yang Guang, Director of the Institute of West Asian and African Studies. “This is not only for Africa but they [Chinese companies] are also aware that without achieving a kind of win-win solution, without helping the local people to see the result of development, investing counties will not sustain their achievement in this continent.” Continued Guang, “so we can see especially the large scale Chinese companies, they have already begun to pay attention to this and are doing a lot of things in this regard. For instance, many of them are involved in building schools and hospitals for the local people where they have their investment, and they also pay attention to the localization of labor to hire local laborers.”

To illustrate his thesis of China’s corporate responsibility in Africa, Guang pointed out that Chinese companies doing business in Africa have created a record number of 70 thousand jobs. He also cited the case of China National Petroleum Company (CNPC), the leading company in Africa which began its first report on corporate responsibility since 2006. “If they want to be good competitors in the market, they will have to fulfill better their corporate responsibilities,” Guang concluded.

China’s corporate responsibility and investment in Africa are largely facilitated by the flow of capital in the form of Foreign Direct Investment. Besides its record $7600 billion worth of investment in Africa, FDI is spreading across dozens of African countries as Chinese companies expand their search for raw materials in Africa. In recent years, China’s largest acquisitions have been in Africa. The monumental $5.5 billion offer by the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC) to buy 20.5 percent share in South Africa’s Standard Bank is proof of this South-South economic vibrancy. This deal between the largest bank in China, and the largest bank in Africa seeks to establish what Jacko Maree, Standard Bank Chief Executive calls a “financial services gate way” linking these two regions.

In an effort to strengthen this flow of financial capital and promote what analysts call a “go out” policy, Beijing has encouraged state-owned banks to look for overseas acquisitions in order to gain expertise and improve China’s relatively unsophisticated banking system. In this regard, the Chinese Export-Import Bank (EXIM Bank), China’s biggest Africa-related lender, said by the end of the first half of 2007, it had authorized loans worth $13.3 billion for African projects and had disbursed half of that money. This is the financial muscle which Beijing is flexing in Africa, pricking the conscience of the West and in the process provoking hostile criticisms.

These criticisms as they continue to grow fall on deaf ears as China remains defiant and unwilling to let go of its gains and prospects in Africa. Observes William Wallis, “for Africa’s traditional allies in the West, which as recently as the 2006 Summit of industrialized nations at Gleneagles were overhauling their own commitment to the continent, the terrain has shifted. Chinese funding of infrastructure, trade and development in Africa has grown to rival theirs, surpassing lending by multilateral agencies such as the World Bank and IMF.” Continued he, “the unmatched firing power of Chinese state companies and their willingness to secure supplies at all cost are at the same time driving competitors away,” Wallis affirms emphatically.

The physical impact of China’s presence is seen in the transformation of the African landscape through infrastructural development and technology transfer. This infrastructural transformation is considered vital to the economic development of Africa which had before now been hampered by the absence of infrastructure. The most significant developments in the infrastructural and technological history of modern Africa took place with the coming of China. Among these achievements are the Chinese constructed TAN-ZAM railway line in Southern Africa, a hydroelectric dam in Ghana and a mobile phone network in Ethiopia. China helped Nigeria in launching its satellite into space, one of the rare technological successes in sub-Saharan Africa. These gigantic achievements add to the list of roads, railways, bridges, dams, hospitals, airports, schools stadiums and legislative building constructed by Chinese engineers.
 
Except for the skeptics, there is unanimous agreement that China’s part in infrastructure development could help open up the continent and make business more competitive. It also leads to the transfer of technology which holds long term economic benefits for the continent. “Chinese companies are not only investing in Senegal, but transferring technology, training and know-how to Senegal at the same time. China which has fought its own battles to modernize has a much greater sense of the personal urgency of development in Africa than many western nations.” Said Senegalese President Abdoulage wade. “Todayâ?¦economic relations are based more on mutual need and the economic reality that the EU and U.S. cannot compete with China,” Wade said.

President Wade is one of the several African leaders who have given a warm embrace to Chinese trade, investment and infrastructural development. In praise of Chinese infrastructure, Wade contends firmly that “these are improvements â?¦that stay in Africa and raise the standards of living for millions of Africans, not just an elite few.” The vocal Wade has on many occasions juxtaposed Chinese benevolence with western hypocrisy towards Africa. “If Europe does not want to provide funding for African infrastructure- it pledged $15 billion under the Cotonou Agreement eight years ago; the Chinese are ready to take up the task, move rapidly and at less cost.” In Wade’s words, China has lessons to offer both Africa and Europe. “Not just Africa but the West itself has much to learn from China. It is time for the West to practice what it preaches about the value of market incentives,” Wade wagged at the West.

How strong is the “Third World Order”?

Despite western outcry about Sino-Africa economic cooperation, there is abundant evidence to suggest that these fears are highly exaggerated. China’s trade, loans and infrastructural projects have been the central objects and targets of criticism. China is blamed for flooding African markets, destabilizing local economies and selling goods of inferior quality to Africans. China’s loans are said to overlook human rights abuses and thus encourage corruption in Africa. The West also frets about China’s closeness with oil and mineral rich countries in Africa such as Sudan and Zimbabwe and its military connections with these rogue and pariah states. Chinese infrastructure projects in the continent are also predicted to end up as white elephant projects.

How justified these claims are, remains an object of intense debate. This debate notwithstanding, it could be grossly misleading to assume that this alliance goes without friction. Available evidence also suggests that western estimates about the scale of Chinese expansion in Africa is more apparent than real and China has not (yet) gone the distance it is believed to have covered in Africa.

Thabo Mbeki, South African President and one of the leading figures in African diplomacy was one of the many Africans to raise concerns about unguided optimism in Sino-African relations. He is considered as the most prominent case of African “push-back” when it comes to dealing with China, especially in the area of trade. “The challenge is that you could develop a relationship between China and African states which in reality isn’t different from the relationship that developed between Africa and the former colonial powers,” Mbeki warned.

As proof of his determination to restrain China’s unbridled trade advances, Mbeki’s government imposed quotas for Chinese textiles in an effort to revive and protect South Africa’s staggering garment industry which is threatened by cheap Chinese textiles. Mbeki’s move was a warning signal to China, and a lesson for the rest of Africa on how to deal with the “new guest.” Mr. Mbeki had earlier warned that African states run the risk of getting stuck in “an unequal relationship” with China.

Recent anti-Chinese protests in Zambia in 2006 also point to the fragility of this alliance. Poor safety conditions left 50 workers dead in a Chinese owned mine where 55 workers had earlier fallen ill from poisoning in 2003. The Chinese-owned Chambisi copper smelter has been the scene of repeated strike actions as African workers clamor for better pay and improved working conditions. Michael Sata, the opposition leader in Zambia accused China of transforming Zambia into what he called a “dumpling ground for their human beings.” Zambia’s capital Lusaka holds about 30.000 Chinese who are often viewed with scorn as exploiters especially as they pick up jobs from street hawking to industrial manufacturing. This is a growing phenomenon throughout Africa as William Wallis observes “it is possible to find Chinese foot massage parlors in Chad, doughnut hawkers in Cameroon and vegetable producers in Khartoum’s market”

Elsewhere in the continent African leaders are caught between embracing a new comer and retaining traditional alliances. Nigeria, one of America’s biggest oil suppliers in Africa is moving towards China with a lot of caution. Nigeria has made it clear that China will have to face competition from western energy companies and also national companies from India, South Korea and Malaysia. “Nigeria had been keen to cooperate with the Chinese in oil and gas but the government hasn’t given them the level of special treatment the Chinese would have wanted,” says Dapo Odesanya. Despite China’s overtures her citizens have been caught up in the spade of kidnappings that characterize the volatile Niger Delta region. Ethiopian rebels also killed nine Chinese oil workers in the Ogaden region in April 2007

In the oil sector where dissenting voices are loudest, facts and numbers on the ground tell a different story. Chinese national oil companies produced about 267.000 barrels of oil equivalent a day in Africa only one third of the amount produced by Exxon Mobil the largest foreign producer in the continent. Being a late comer, Chinese oil companies still stagger behind western oil giants in Africa. In 2006, Africa accounted for only 8.7% of China’s total oil imports as compared with 36% for the EU and 33% for the U.S. These western oil interests together with their home governments which cry out loud against China continue to enjoy the advantage of time, space and efficiency in the African oil market. “While keeping an eye out on China,” says Firose Manji, “Africans should not be distracted from paying attention to the West’s continued exploitation of the continent including the use of military might to protect its economic interests.”

Firosi maintains strongly that China is still a small player in Africa when compared with others from the West and elsewhere. She insists that Asian players such as India, Singapore and Malaysia are stronger powers in Africa in terms of FDI. These countries are the principal sources of FDI to Africa. On the other hand, when put together, the entire flow of FDI from Asia is completely eclipsed by that from the capitalist West. Borrowing from UNDP figures of 2007, Firosi compares the amount of western investment in Africa with that of China. As of 2003, the UK possessed $30 billion worth of FDI stock in Africa, the U.S. $19 billion, France $11.5billion and Germany $5.5 billion. China trailed behind with only 3% of its FDI destined for Africa while 53% of Chinese FDI went to Asia. Though recent estimates show that China has closed this gap to become Africa’s third trading partner, it highlights the contention that western criticisms have been based more on fear than fact.

Another emerging phenomenon which has the possibility of intensifying the existing crack in Sino-African relations is the problem of migration. Population movements between China and Africa have increased steadily since the 1990s. While the estimated 900 thousand Chinese migrant workers in Africa invade jobs ranging from agriculture through street peddling to industry, it is a different situation for Africans in China. These Africans who live under the constant fear of deportation are subjected to color prejudice in the job market where teaching is their only option. To secure these jobs and keep them, are the twin challenges facing African migrant workers in a society where “native speakers” are preferred irrespective of academic or professional qualifications. Obtaining and or renewing work visas for Africans is the mother of all problems, besides discriminatory salaries they receive on basis of their color. For many of these educated Africans, driven from home by harsh poverty and uncertainty and wandering in a wilderness of thorny discrimination, Sino-African cooperation remains a farce.

Conclusion

The tussle between the two rival blocs in Africa reached climax when the World Bank which has exercised unrivalled, albeit counter-productive control over Africa before the coming of China, started calling for the latter to be more transparent about its African plans. Earlier in 2006, Paul Wolferwitz, then President of the Bank accused China for ignoring human rights and environmental standards when lending to Africa. Bob Geldof, the Live 8 campaigner also warned that attempts to stamp out corruption in Africa risk being undermined by soft loans and naked mercantilism from China.

When the World Bank, the backbone of globalization joined this fray on the side of the West, it unvealed the significance of this rivalry in the geopolitics of the 21st century. In response, China has challenged the credibility of the World Bank. “The World Bank always wants countries to join them and follow their processes. But is the record of the World Bank so good?” asks Zhong Jianhua, China’s Ambassador to South Africa. “To work together is good. But you do not expect others to follow instructions” he affirmed.

Behind the shadows of this war of words is the emerging “African renaissance” declared by President Thabo Mbeki in 2000. Its symbolic instruments- African Union and NEPAD attest to Africa’s resolve to take its destiny into its own hands. It also confirms Africa’s right to carve out its own path and shun what Coral Walsh calls “finger-wagging lectures from their former colonial masters.” Former South African President Nelson Mandela reminds African leaders of the need to pick their friends with utmost care as this might prove to be a decisive moment for Africa. “Africa is beyond bemoaning the past,” Mandela said. “The task of undoing that past is on the shoulders of African leaders themselves, with the support of those willing to join in a continental renewal. We have a new generation of leaders who know that Africa must take responsibility for its own destiny, that Africa will uplift itself only by its own efforts in partnership with those who wish it well.”