Η Μεγάλη Βρετανία κυβέρνησε τα μέρη των Καραϊβικών Θαλασσών δύο φορές τόσο μακριών στη διάρκεια όσο κυβέρνησε ένα μεγάλο μέρος της Αφρικής.

Όταν η Κένυα έγινε μια βρετανική αποικία, η Μεγάλη Βρετανία κυβερνούσε ήδη την Τζαμάικα για αιώνες περισσότερο από δύο. Πράγματι, όταν Jomo Kenyatta γεννήθηκε στο 1890s Κένυα δεν ήταν ακόμα μια αποικία κορωνών. Ακόμα, όταν πέθανε το 1978 Κένυα είχε παψει να είναι μια βρετανική αποικία. Το Kenyatta είχε ζήσει δεξιά μέσω της ολόκληρης περιόδου κατοίκων αποικίας της χώρας. Επέζησε του βρετανικού κανόνα μέχρι 15 έτη, κυβερνών την Κένυα ο ίδιος ως πρώτο Πρόεδρο μετα-κατοίκων αποικίας του.

Ενώ ο βρετανικός κανόνας στην Κένυα ήταν ένα θέμα μιας ενιαίας διάρκειας ζωής, ο βρετανικός κανόνας στην Τζαμάικα διέβηκε βασιλεύει περίπου 10 βρετανικών μοναρχών. Από οποιοδήποτε μέτρο, επομένως, η Τζαμάικα και ένα μεγάλο μέρος των βρετανικών Δυτικών Ινδιών ήταν πιό βαθειά Anglicised από η Κένυα ήταν. Αλλά δεδομένου ότι η ανεξαρτησία είναι καραϊβική να πάρει de-Anglicised; Σε αυτή την περίπτωση, ποιες είναι οι αιτίες;

Διάφοροι παράγοντες μπορεί να είχαν συμβάλει σε μια τέτοια διαδικασία του μετα-κατοίκου αποικίας de-Anglicisation. Κάποιο είναι το εκπληκτικό φαινόμενο της πολιτιστικής παραίτησης της Μεγάλης Βρετανίας. Αυτό είναι στην αιχμηρή αντίθεση στον ιεραποστολικό ζήλο των Γάλλων στη σφαίρα του πολιτισμού. British commitment to cultural diplomacy is much weaker than that of France-both in Africa and the Caribbean.

The United Kingdom spends the equivalent of only a fraction of the French budget for cultural diplomacy. The very success of the English language globally has reduced Britain’s need to promote the language in other lands. That there is an English-speaking power mightier than Britain (the United States) also helped to dwarf Britain’s cultural role in promoting Anglo-Saxon culture.

The French language, on the other hand, is on the defensive against the devastating competition of Anglo-American cultural and linguistic expansionism. There is no French-speaking super power the equivalent of the United States. France tries to play the cultural roles of both Britain and the United States.

But the United States is itself another reason British influence in the Caribbean continues to decline. In the post-colonial era, the sheer proximity and size of the United States have been felt more directly than was possible under British imperial rule.

American investment, American tourism, American television programmes, American goods and services, and even Caribbean membership of the Organisation of American States, have all played their part in tilting the balance towards Americanisation in the Caribbean experience.

Then there is the phenomenon of American education as compared with the old colonial infatuation with the prestige of British education. There was a time when West Indians and Africans asked themselves whether being educated in the US was a more radicalising experience than being educated in Great Britain.

In the first half of the 20th Century the evidence seemed to support that proposition. Kwame Nkrumah was mainly educated in the US; his rival in Ghana, Kofi Busia, was educated in Great Britain. Nkrumah captured the torch of radical nationalism, while Busia moved to the right.

In Nigeria, the younger Nnamdi Azikiwe (Zik) was the voice of nationalist militancy. He was American educated. The leading British-educated Nigerians in the 1940s and even the 1950s were mainly to Zik’s right ideologically.

If it was true that American education in the first half of the 20th Century was a more radicalising experience for Africans and West Indians than was British education, what were the reasons at that time?

One factor in the first half of the century was that the United States was not only a much more racist society than Great Britain but American racism at the time was still highly institutionalised. African and Caribbean students in the United States were therefore more subject to racial humiliation and harassment than their counterparts in the United Kingdom. African and Caribbean students in American colleges were as a result more liable to get radicalised in response.

Also contributing to this radicalisation was African and Caribbean intermingling with Black Americans and being exposed to a more intense pan-African experience. Indeed, African students in the first half of the 20th C moved even further to the left.

Middle class Caribbean Blacks could go either way when highly educated. They could move more decisively to the left (going even Marxist) or become more eloquent defenders of the capitalist status quo. Less privileged Caribbean Blacks educated in the United States were more likely to go nationalist rather than socialist — often emphasising race rather than class, although their own origins were often rooted in class disadvantages.

By the second half of the 20th Century some of the most eloquent voices of the socialist left in Commonwealth Caribbean were British educated. Even Eric Williams of Trinidad was initially a product of British leftism.

George Padmore flirted with communism. And C L R James was both highly anglicised and highly leftist to the end of his days when he was nearly 90.

Today, more and more positions in journalism, the bureaucracy, politics and education are gradually occupied by the ‘Americanised’ West Indians.

The statistics are shifting in favour of the American educated. But in reality they are only narrowing the gap between them and the more influential British-educated. The de-Anglicisation of the Caribbean has not yet gone far enough to dethrone the Anglophiles in the Commonwealth Caribbean completely.

Afterall, Michael Manley in power was more prominent than Edward Seaga was in office. Manley symbolised Anglophilia; Seaga was a product of Pax-Americana.

For the products of the American experience it is still too early for them to celebrate the following: The stream of experience meanders on in the vast expanse of Caribbean time. The new will come and the old be gone. Let’s toast the fortunes of changing clime.

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