Dr. Wolassa Kumo
Introduction

Fixed capital has long been considered as an engine of growth both as a factor of production and as an embodiment of technological progress. Countries that had made sustained accumulation of fixed capital were able to achieve higher and sustained economic growth and development while those who had not lagged behind. For instance, economic development in Sub-Saharan Africa has been severely constrained by inadequate saving and investment, among other things. The average annual gross domestic saving rate by 41 sub Saharan African countries during the period 1980-2010 was as little as 14.3% of GDP while the average fixed investment was 20% of GDP for the same period. Therefore, sub-Saharan Africa’s burgeoning debt was not primarily meant to finance investment as the saving- investment gap was only about 6% of GDP during the past three decades.

Sub Saharan Africa’s dismal average economic growth of about 3.8% during the past three decades was therefore a direct consequence of low saving and low investment. The Sub Saharan Africa average saving and investment rates pale in comparison to the saving and investment rates of the newly industrialized and emerging Asian economies, such as China, whose saving and investment rates of over 40% of GDP ensured real economic growth rates of over 10% during the same period, i.e. 1980-2010.

Average annual growth in Africa reached above 5% during the past decade following the commodity price boom since the early 2000s but was dampened by the global economic and financial crises during 2008-2009. Growth rebounded in 2010 and is projected to reach 5.5% in 2011 making sub Saharan Africa the second fastest growing region in the world following Asia.

However, heavy dependence on growth driven by improved commodity terms of trade subjects the sub continent to vagaries of global demand uncertainty. Unless improved commodity terms of trade translates into higher saving and investment, the sustainability of the current improved growth performance will be at stake. Equally important is the continuation of economic and political reforms that are required to enhance the participation of the private sector in economic development, and also improve productivity and investment efficiency.

This brief paper presents an overview of investment efficiency, savings and economic growth in 41 sub Saharan African countries for the past three decades using data from the IMF, World Economic Outlook Data Base, April 2011. Six countries have been excluded from the analysis for lack of consistent time series data. These are Djibouti, Liberia, Mauritania, Sao Tome and Principe, Sudan and Zimbabwe.

Investment Efficiency in Sub Saharan Africa

There are two broad concepts of efficiency: allocative efficiency and technical or production efficiency usually measured by total factor productivity. Some empirical analysts use these broad concepts of efficiency to assess inefficiency in aggregate investment in terms of excess investment demand that captures the deviations of actual investment from the desired investment. These approaches usually use nonparametric methods, such as Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA), as well as, parametric methods including multiple linear or non- linear regression models.

In this brief article, we use a simple approach based on marginal productivity of capital, known commonly as the Incremental Capital Output Ratio (ICOR) to measure investment efficiency in 41 sub Saharan African countries for the period 1980-2010. ICOR is the ratio of investments in some previous period or periods and growth in output in subsequent period or periods measured at constant prices.

Growth in output is not attributed only to investment in fixed capital. It could be due to growth in productivity (partial or total factor productivity), increased use of labour input or improvement in the level of education of the labour force (growth in human capital), and/or improvements in productive capacity utilization. However, changes in fixed investment still explain a significant portion of growth in output particularly in developing countries with limited fixed capital stock and therefore the efficiency with which this input is utilized provides a useful clue about the correlation between the later and economic growth.

The higher the ICOR, the lower is the implied investment efficiency. That is fixed investment is more efficient if fewer dollars are required to generate a unit growth in output. The average ICOR for sub Saharan Africa for the period 1980-2010 was 5.23 and was comparable with the ICOR for of about 5 during the 1980-2003 period. This implies that fixed investment in sub Saharan Africa is pretty efficient and the level of investment efficiency in the sub region is comparable with that of China during the early two decades of its rapid industrialization. This is not only because the sub region is capital scarce but also because there have been marked improvements in business climate and political environment during the past two decades. Therefore, no wonder that foreign direct investment surged in Africa from less than US$15 billion in early 2000s to over US$80 billion in 2007 before the inflow was hit by the global financial and economic crises of 2008-2009.

While average investment efficiency in sub Saharan Africa is high, performance varies from country to country. The 41 countries in sub Saharan Africa can be classified into three groups based on their ICOR performance for the period 1980-2010: (a) those with ICOR value of 1-5, (b) those with 6-9, and (c)) those with ICOR values of above 10.

The majority of the 41 counties (i.e. 25 countries) in the sub region recorded higher investment efficiency during the past three decades. These countries include both the least developed countries with very low fixed capital stock base, as well as, some middle income economies with higher level of capital stock. These best performing countries with ICOR value of 1-5 are: Botswana, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Comoros, DRC, Republic of Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Gabon, The Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinean Bissau, Kenya, Malawi, Mali, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Seychelles, Togo, Uganda, and Zambia. Most of these countries are not only face extreme capital scarcity but have also shown some progress in opening up their economies during the past 3 decades.

The countries with medium investment efficiency level of ICOR 6-9 include: Benin, Burundi, Cape Verde, Eritrea, Mauritius, Sierra Leone, and Swaziland. Mauritius is among the Upper Middle income countries and top reformers in the sub region. Lower investment efficiency may imply an over investment in the economy where marginal investment needed to generate a unit output was greater during the past three decades than during the earlier years of its economic expansion.

Investment efficiency was the lowest in the following countries during the past three decades: Angola, Chad, Cote d’Ivoire, South Africa and Tanzania. All of these four countries have experienced some form of economic and political upheavals during the past three decades. Preliminary data analyses showed that South Africa’s ICOR was comparable with that of China for the post-Apartheid period, but the number was very high for the pre 1994 period, i.e. 1980-1994 pulling the country’s overall performance significantly down. Investment efficiency was very low during the Apartheid rule in South Africa, due to global isolation and heavy state control over the economy. Thus if we exclude the pre 1994 period South Africa’s investment efficiency will fall within the first group of best performers. Poor performance by Angola, Cote d’Ivoire and Tanzania reflects the continued impacts of civil war and socialist mode of production in the case of the later which contributed to wasteful investment.

Investment required to achieve a minimum growth threshold of 7 percent

While Africa’s growth performance is the second best in the world at present, the continent still lags behind other regions in terms of socioeconomic development. Over 380 million people in Africa today live below poverty line, while youth unemployment is as high as 70% in some countries. Most economies are still heavily dependent on rain fed subsistence agriculture with extremely limited investment on irrigation. Weak economic structure reinforces poverty and poses a major risk to the sustainability of the current growth fuelled by commodity price boom.

African countries will not be able to address this fundamental economic challenge with current growth rates of 5% or less. They should achieve a minimum of 7% annual growth rate individually or collectively for the coming two decades to make a dent on poverty and unemployment. With an average ICOR of 5.23, the sub Saharan Africa region therefore requires a minimum fixed investment of 35% of GDP over the coming two decades collectively or by each country. Given the current actual average regional fixed investment rate of 20% of GDP, the desired investment rate of 35% over the coming two decades seems insurmountable, but not unrealistic. China’s economic growth during the past three decades was fuelled by fixed investment of over 40% of GDP. China’s massive investment was financed by extraordinarily high household and public savings which at times reached 50% of GDP. The major challenge for Africa, in this respect, is a culture of low savings, which we expound in the following section.

Saving-investment gap in Sub Saharan Africa

When domestic household and public savings fall short of the fixed investment needs of a country, this leads to a saving-investment gap. This gap is exacerbated when export earnings of a country fall short of import demand leading to a second, foreign exchange gap. Most developing countries in Sub Saharan Africa are often characterized by both gaps. Except five countries, i.e. Botswana, DRC, Gabon, The Gambia, Namibia, and South Africa, the rest of 41 sub Saharan African countries had an average saving -investment gap ranging from 1% to nearly 30% of GDP during the past three decades.

The saving-investment gap, however, significantly varies across the countries in the sub region. Countries that faced relatively lower saving-investment gaps ranging between 1-5% in the sub region during the period under review include Angola, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Comoros, Republic of Congo, Cote d’Ivoire, Eritrea, Ghana, Kenya, Mali, Nigeria, Swaziland and Uganda. The lower gap by some countries reflects increased savings from oil revenues, while lower gap by others simply mean lower level of investment.

Countries in the sub region with the average saving investment-gap of 6-10% during the stated period include Benin, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Central African republic, Ethiopia, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius. Niger, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Tanzania and Zambia, while those with average saving-investment gap of above 11% include Cape Verde, Chad, Equatorial Guinea, Lesotho, Mozambique, Seychelles and Togo.

The poor performance of the sub region in terms of the saving-investment gap reflects two major challenges: First, most countries are characterized by low saving and low investment and hence are at the risk of being trapped in vicious circle of poverty if the they do not raise their saving and investment rates immediately; and second if they raise their investment levels without a concomitant increase in domestic savings they may be trapped in vicious cycle of debt which could undermine the value of their investments, provided money borrowed is invested in economic development. Since the recent economic crisis proved that most of the aid pledged by non-African donors is unlikely to be delivered, the only sustainable solution to Africa’s development challenge is aggressive domestic resource mobilization for development. This could be supplemented by foreign direct investments, if the countries in the sub region speed up the current economic and political reforms.

Concluding remarks

Africa is rising. After 5 decades of civil strife and economic stagnation, the first decade of the 21st century shone a new light on the continent. Africa is no more a hopeless dark continent. Like its diamonds in the West, South and at the center, the continent is shining.

It is also shining as a second fastest growing continent in the world. However, there is no time for complacence as Africa is still the least developed continent in the world plagued with high level of poverty, unemployment, political instability and corruption. To sustainably address these fundamental socio economic challenges the region should at least grow by 7% per annum for the coming two decades. However, this is unlikely to be achieved with the current investment rate of 20% and the saving rate of 14% of GDP.

While the return to investment in Africa is high, it is such low levels of investment and saving that are holding the continent back. Given higher returns to investment, Africa’s economic transformation will depend on radical shift in the saving culture of its people, further economic and political reforms, and accelerated fixed investment.

Introduction
 
Africa’s rise to prominence in the geopolitics of the 21st century is explained largely by the renewal of great power interest in the region of the world once dismissed as the “forgotten continent.” This great power concern reproduces the same power-play which is reminiscent of the Cold War when inter-locking and overlapping interests of great powers significantly shaped the outlook of international politics. The end of the Cold War and the subsequent demise of the Soviet Union gave rise to a new environment which President George H.W Bush called a “New World Order” in 1990. This new World Order or globalization as it came to be called, saw the expansion of capitalism across regional and continental boundaries at the expense of its reeling rival, communism.

Barely a decade after President Bush’s ordination of a new global environment, another world order was gradually emerging. This “Third World Order” as it has also been named, is championed by a rising eastern giant, China. The unprecedented rise of China as an economic power capable of steering the course of the global economy provides a credible alternative to the western-driven concept of globalization. The imagined rivalry between these two power blocs is the concern of this article.

In the course of expending its economic and political power, China has embraced Africa in an economic alliance which is proving to be worrisome to the West. Africa on its part, hit by the pressures of globalization and frustration following several centuries of unrewarding ties with the West has been more than enthusiastic in courting with China. This Sino-African alliance is at the core of the “Third World Order” which China is today leading. The impact of this alliance is conjured in the words of William Wallis. “The contours of a new order are still being drawn, but China’s growing stake in the continent has already shaken up an old and fraying one dominated by cautious western donors and former colonial powers”

Prelude to the “Third World Order”

Modern Sino-African cooperation or the “Third World Order,” is the full-blown stage of a relationship that traces its history as far beak as the 10th century and beyond. To fast forward this story, the most convenient and agreeable point from which to pick up an analysis of this relationship is the founding of the People’s Republic of China in 1949. This period which was largely characterized by the politics of the Cold War, saw the young communist China struggling against the odds of western capitalist domination. The shared historical, economic and cultural experiences between China and Africa marked the beginning of what Chairman Mao Ze Dong called a “Third World alliance” against western oppression.

As China and Russia struggled to battle against the forces of capitalism in the Cold War, Africa became a theatre for this fray. The resultant “proxy wars” in the continent provided an opportunity for China and Russia to extend military assistance to anti-colonial forces throughout Africa. During this period of massive Sino-Soviet military assistance to Africa, economic considerations were minimal. The relationship was shaped largely by ideological and strategic imperatives which were the defining features of the Cold War.

China gained another significant edge in Africa following disputes with Russia over the leadership of the communist world and differences over the international orientation of communism. The Sino-Soviet split as this difference came to be known, gave China considerable leverage to carve out its own “sphere of influence” in Africa. A practical manifestation of this Sino-Soviet gulf was seen in the nature of assistance given to the liberation forces in Zimbabwe in the 1970s. While China offered training to Zimbabwean guerillas in the manner of a People’s army, Russia did it in the light of a regular army. This difference not withstanding, the bottom line remained the struggle against western oppression of what China saw as “the masses of the third world.” In this military connection, Soviet arm sales to Africa rose from US $150 billion in the 1960s to US $2.5 billion in the 1970s. China on her part, sold $142 billon worth of military equipment to Africa between 1955 and 1977

Besides the Sino-soviet split, China reaped considerable diplomatic gains in Africa with the waning of Moscow’s influence due largely to the growing dissention within the Russian empire. When Russia ceased to exert any significant influence in Africa, this vacuum was immediately filled by China. This diplomatic triumph was followed up on three major fronts-economic, diplomatic and technical. Sustained dialogue through an unbroken chain of visits by Chinese officials to Africa has remained the strong point of China’s diplomatic offensive. Way back in the 1960s, Premier Zhou En Lai vowed to support African people in what he called “their struggle to oppose imperialism and old and new [forms of] colonialism and to win and safe guard national independence”

This spirit of cooperation, fraternity and support constitutes the foundation of modern Sino-African alliance, an illustration of Third World and South-South cooperation. It was re-echoed in 2006 in a policy document which Beijing called “China’s Africa Policy.” This document called for “sincerity, equality, mutual benefit and common development,” and emphasized the need for a beneficial “cultural exchange” between China and Africa. This is the strength of the “Third world Order” that faces the “New World Order” in the 21st century.

The economic foundations of the “Third World Order”

The concept of globalization is rooted mainly on the economic strength and expansion of capital. As agreed by Bonaglia, Pinaud and Wegner, globalization comprises entirely of “the deepening of financial and trade integration associated with technological progress and multilateral liberalization.” So too is the economic regime of the “Third World Order.” Sino-African economic cooperation involves several facets, the most important among them being trade, investment, aid and infrastructure development. Among these, trade has a pride of place and a long history in this alliance. When China started buying cotton from Egypt in 1956 very few observers could foresee a possible Chinese trade domination of the entire continent in less than half a century.

Today, China imports a wide range of commodities from Africa. These include oil, iron ore, cotton, diamonds, logs and several other minerals. African agricultural products which have suffered from the cruelty of globalization now find profitable markets in China. Burkina Faso, Benin and Mali provide China with 20 percent of its cotton imports. The Ivory Coast and Ghana are important sources of cocoa and Kenya sells large quantities of coffee beans and tea to China. Namibia provides large shipments of fish and fishmeal.
 
The figures about China-Africa trade illustrate the depth of this economic cooperation. This trade rose by 700% in the 1990s. In 1999, the trade volume stood at US $6.5 billion. From 2002 to 2003, trade doubled to US $18.5 billion. In 2005, it stood at US $39.7 billion and again jumped to US$50 billion in 2006. A year later in 2007, it rose to $55 billion. In February 2008, Chinese Premier Wen Jia Bao optimistically predicted that Sino-African trade would reach $100 billion in 2010 removing China from its current third position into being Africa’s first trading partner. “The opening of new trade and investment corridors between developing countriesâ?¦confirmed as a growing phenomenon in UN figuresâ?¦is a discovering sight for the old powers,” says Conal Walsh.
 
Trade in oil is among China’s priority areas in Africa. Projected to become the world’s biggest oil importer soon after 2010, China seeks to expand its foothold in the African oil sector at all cost. In Nigeria, Africa’s largest exporter of crude, China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC) has paid $2.7 billion for the right to explore oil. In Angola, China Petrochemical Corporation (SINOPEC) gained a 50% stake in the BP operated Greater Plutonic project. In Sudan where the China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) helped develop Sudanese oil fields (in the chaotic 1990s), China receives 60% of Susan’s oil output. In Somalia, CNOOC has signed a production sharing deal with the transnational government of Somalia, one of the world’s most volatile countries. China already stands on the doorsteps of Sudan, Chad, Nigeria, Angola, Algeria, Gabon, Equatorial Guinea and the Republic of Congo, Africa’s frontline oil producers.

In the mineral sector, China stretches its hands very far into Africa. President Hu jintao’s inauguration of an African economic and Trade Zone during his Africa tour of 2007 is proof of China’s emerging monopoly in the mineral trade in Africa. The Chinese –controlled Chambisi Copper Smelter in Zambia is at the heart of this economic zone and is a joint venture between China Nonferrous Metal Mining (CNMC) and Yunnan Copper Industry (YNCIG). China also lays claims on vast mineral resources in neighboring Zimbabwe where President Robert Mugabe, spited by the west, has passionately embraced a “look east policy” with inspiration from China.

In other areas of the continent, China remains the talk of the day. In Angola, China outbid Brazil in 2005 for the sight to tap into iron ore deposits. In the Democratic Republic of Congo, China struck a deal last year with 8 $ billion dollars which gives China 68 percent stake in Grecamines, the state copper mining company and costs would be repaid in minerals over 30 years. In the Ivory Coast, China exercises control over a manganese mine at Lozoua where it exports manganese to the Chinese market. In Gabon the state owned China National Machinery & equipment Import & Export Corporation struck a $ 3 billon deal to mine Iron ore in Belinga. In Mauritania, China’s Transtech Industry (together with a Sudanese company) agreed to invest more than $600 million in the construction of a railway line in exchange for an estimated 165m tons of phosphate used in the production of fertilizers. While China imports cobalt from the DR Congo, South Africa remains China’s largest supplier of ore and manganese. China’s push into the African mineral market continues to grow despite western outcry.

Besides trade in oil, minerals, agriculture and manufactured goods, aid is another key pillar in Sino-Africa economic cooperation. The most Significant difference between China’s aid to Africa and that of the west is that Beijing does not attach too many strings and “conditionalities” on its loan packages. These “soft loans” to Africa do not follow along the lines of western bureaucracy nor do they respect the western “equator principles” of lending. Estimates put Chinese loans to Africa at $19billion as of 2006. These loans despite western outcry on humanitarian grounds have been seen as positive instruments for Africa’s development. “What the Chinese are doing is taking a long term perspective of the ability to repay debts” says Donald kaberuka, President of the African Development Bank. “Take a country with [a] rich subsoil that is emerging from war. In terms of its static numbers it doesn’t look good. It would be a HIPC case or a grant case from the traditional donors,” he said. The Chinese are looking at it and saying ‘what is the capacity of this country which is not exploited?’ So they exploit that capacity, build infrastructure. It is a different analysis,” Kaberuka concluded.

Since the 1990s, the range of Chinese investment in Africa has broadened significantly. It has evolved from a few sectors such as resource development, including oil, agriculture and fishing to other areas such as textiles, consumer electronics, tourism telecommunications and road construction. By the end of 2006, the accumulated amount of Chinese investment in Africa totaled $11.7 billion. In 2005, the total Chinese Direct investment in Africa was $400 million, constituting 1.3% of total inflow of direct investment in Africa in that year. This investment driven by China’s booming economy is having a significant impact on Africa’s economic growth “China’s fast rising demand for commodities, spurred by industrialization is having an increasingly significant impact on world commodity markets as well as the resource rich regions of the world-particularly Africa and Latin America,” says Tamara Trush, Senior economist at Deutshe Bank.

Attracted by the improved political and economic climate in Africa and Africa’s untapped resources, there are currently between 800 and 900 Chinese enterprises doing business in Africa. The pressures of globalization and liberalization have also forced many African countries to open up to the outside world, thus embracing “easy-coming” investment from Chinese companies. A bulk of these companies are privately owned and driven largely by commercial motivations. These commercial motivations and their resultant constraints are some of the reasons for the rise of anti-Chinese sentiments in certain parts of Africa as workers clamor for higher wages and better working conditions.

In response to this budding resentment, Beijing has adopted or modified the language of “corporate social responsibility” to (re)define its economic ties with Africa. “For the Chinese enterprises, there is a growing awareness of this importance,” says Yang Guang, Director of the Institute of West Asian and African Studies. “This is not only for Africa but they [Chinese companies] are also aware that without achieving a kind of win-win solution, without helping the local people to see the result of development, investing counties will not sustain their achievement in this continent.” Continued Guang, “so we can see especially the large scale Chinese companies, they have already begun to pay attention to this and are doing a lot of things in this regard. For instance, many of them are involved in building schools and hospitals for the local people where they have their investment, and they also pay attention to the localization of labor to hire local laborers.”

To illustrate his thesis of China’s corporate responsibility in Africa, Guang pointed out that Chinese companies doing business in Africa have created a record number of 70 thousand jobs. He also cited the case of China National Petroleum Company (CNPC), the leading company in Africa which began its first report on corporate responsibility since 2006. “If they want to be good competitors in the market, they will have to fulfill better their corporate responsibilities,” Guang concluded.

China’s corporate responsibility and investment in Africa are largely facilitated by the flow of capital in the form of Foreign Direct Investment. Besides its record $7600 billion worth of investment in Africa, FDI is spreading across dozens of African countries as Chinese companies expand their search for raw materials in Africa. In recent years, China’s largest acquisitions have been in Africa. The monumental $5.5 billion offer by the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC) to buy 20.5 percent share in South Africa’s Standard Bank is proof of this South-South economic vibrancy. This deal between the largest bank in China, and the largest bank in Africa seeks to establish what Jacko Maree, Standard Bank Chief Executive calls a “financial services gate way” linking these two regions.

In an effort to strengthen this flow of financial capital and promote what analysts call a “go out” policy, Beijing has encouraged state-owned banks to look for overseas acquisitions in order to gain expertise and improve China’s relatively unsophisticated banking system. In this regard, the Chinese Export-Import Bank (EXIM Bank), China’s biggest Africa-related lender, said by the end of the first half of 2007, it had authorized loans worth $13.3 billion for African projects and had disbursed half of that money. This is the financial muscle which Beijing is flexing in Africa, pricking the conscience of the West and in the process provoking hostile criticisms.

These criticisms as they continue to grow fall on deaf ears as China remains defiant and unwilling to let go of its gains and prospects in Africa. Observes William Wallis, “for Africa’s traditional allies in the West, which as recently as the 2006 Summit of industrialized nations at Gleneagles were overhauling their own commitment to the continent, the terrain has shifted. Chinese funding of infrastructure, trade and development in Africa has grown to rival theirs, surpassing lending by multilateral agencies such as the World Bank and IMF.” Continued he, “the unmatched firing power of Chinese state companies and their willingness to secure supplies at all cost are at the same time driving competitors away,” Wallis affirms emphatically.

The physical impact of China’s presence is seen in the transformation of the African landscape through infrastructural development and technology transfer. This infrastructural transformation is considered vital to the economic development of Africa which had before now been hampered by the absence of infrastructure. The most significant developments in the infrastructural and technological history of modern Africa took place with the coming of China. Among these achievements are the Chinese constructed TAN-ZAM railway line in Southern Africa, a hydroelectric dam in Ghana and a mobile phone network in Ethiopia. China helped Nigeria in launching its satellite into space, one of the rare technological successes in sub-Saharan Africa. These gigantic achievements add to the list of roads, railways, bridges, dams, hospitals, airports, schools stadiums and legislative building constructed by Chinese engineers.
 
Except for the skeptics, there is unanimous agreement that China’s part in infrastructure development could help open up the continent and make business more competitive. It also leads to the transfer of technology which holds long term economic benefits for the continent. “Chinese companies are not only investing in Senegal, but transferring technology, training and know-how to Senegal at the same time. China which has fought its own battles to modernize has a much greater sense of the personal urgency of development in Africa than many western nations.” Said Senegalese President Abdoulage wade. “Todayâ?¦economic relations are based more on mutual need and the economic reality that the EU and U.S. cannot compete with China,” Wade said.

President Wade is one of the several African leaders who have given a warm embrace to Chinese trade, investment and infrastructural development. In praise of Chinese infrastructure, Wade contends firmly that “these are improvements â?¦that stay in Africa and raise the standards of living for millions of Africans, not just an elite few.” The vocal Wade has on many occasions juxtaposed Chinese benevolence with western hypocrisy towards Africa. “If Europe does not want to provide funding for African infrastructure- it pledged $15 billion under the Cotonou Agreement eight years ago; the Chinese are ready to take up the task, move rapidly and at less cost.” In Wade’s words, China has lessons to offer both Africa and Europe. “Not just Africa but the West itself has much to learn from China. It is time for the West to practice what it preaches about the value of market incentives,” Wade wagged at the West.

How strong is the “Third World Order”?

Despite western outcry about Sino-Africa economic cooperation, there is abundant evidence to suggest that these fears are highly exaggerated. China’s trade, loans and infrastructural projects have been the central objects and targets of criticism. China is blamed for flooding African markets, destabilizing local economies and selling goods of inferior quality to Africans. China’s loans are said to overlook human rights abuses and thus encourage corruption in Africa. The West also frets about China’s closeness with oil and mineral rich countries in Africa such as Sudan and Zimbabwe and its military connections with these rogue and pariah states. Chinese infrastructure projects in the continent are also predicted to end up as white elephant projects.

How justified these claims are, remains an object of intense debate. This debate notwithstanding, it could be grossly misleading to assume that this alliance goes without friction. Available evidence also suggests that western estimates about the scale of Chinese expansion in Africa is more apparent than real and China has not (yet) gone the distance it is believed to have covered in Africa.

Thabo Mbeki, South African President and one of the leading figures in African diplomacy was one of the many Africans to raise concerns about unguided optimism in Sino-African relations. He is considered as the most prominent case of African “push-back” when it comes to dealing with China, especially in the area of trade. “The challenge is that you could develop a relationship between China and African states which in reality isn’t different from the relationship that developed between Africa and the former colonial powers,” Mbeki warned.

As proof of his determination to restrain China’s unbridled trade advances, Mbeki’s government imposed quotas for Chinese textiles in an effort to revive and protect South Africa’s staggering garment industry which is threatened by cheap Chinese textiles. Mbeki’s move was a warning signal to China, and a lesson for the rest of Africa on how to deal with the “new guest.” Mr. Mbeki had earlier warned that African states run the risk of getting stuck in “an unequal relationship” with China.

Recent anti-Chinese protests in Zambia in 2006 also point to the fragility of this alliance. Poor safety conditions left 50 workers dead in a Chinese owned mine where 55 workers had earlier fallen ill from poisoning in 2003. The Chinese-owned Chambisi copper smelter has been the scene of repeated strike actions as African workers clamor for better pay and improved working conditions. Michael Sata, the opposition leader in Zambia accused China of transforming Zambia into what he called a “dumpling ground for their human beings.” Zambia’s capital Lusaka holds about 30.000 Chinese who are often viewed with scorn as exploiters especially as they pick up jobs from street hawking to industrial manufacturing. This is a growing phenomenon throughout Africa as William Wallis observes “it is possible to find Chinese foot massage parlors in Chad, doughnut hawkers in Cameroon and vegetable producers in Khartoum’s market”

Elsewhere in the continent African leaders are caught between embracing a new comer and retaining traditional alliances. Nigeria, one of America’s biggest oil suppliers in Africa is moving towards China with a lot of caution. Nigeria has made it clear that China will have to face competition from western energy companies and also national companies from India, South Korea and Malaysia. “Nigeria had been keen to cooperate with the Chinese in oil and gas but the government hasn’t given them the level of special treatment the Chinese would have wanted,” says Dapo Odesanya. Despite China’s overtures her citizens have been caught up in the spade of kidnappings that characterize the volatile Niger Delta region. Ethiopian rebels also killed nine Chinese oil workers in the Ogaden region in April 2007

In the oil sector where dissenting voices are loudest, facts and numbers on the ground tell a different story. Chinese national oil companies produced about 267.000 barrels of oil equivalent a day in Africa only one third of the amount produced by Exxon Mobil the largest foreign producer in the continent. Being a late comer, Chinese oil companies still stagger behind western oil giants in Africa. In 2006, Africa accounted for only 8.7% of China’s total oil imports as compared with 36% for the EU and 33% for the U.S. These western oil interests together with their home governments which cry out loud against China continue to enjoy the advantage of time, space and efficiency in the African oil market. “While keeping an eye out on China,” says Firose Manji, “Africans should not be distracted from paying attention to the West’s continued exploitation of the continent including the use of military might to protect its economic interests.”

Firosi maintains strongly that China is still a small player in Africa when compared with others from the West and elsewhere. She insists that Asian players such as India, Singapore and Malaysia are stronger powers in Africa in terms of FDI. These countries are the principal sources of FDI to Africa. On the other hand, when put together, the entire flow of FDI from Asia is completely eclipsed by that from the capitalist West. Borrowing from UNDP figures of 2007, Firosi compares the amount of western investment in Africa with that of China. As of 2003, the UK possessed $30 billion worth of FDI stock in Africa, the U.S. $19 billion, France $11.5billion and Germany $5.5 billion. China trailed behind with only 3% of its FDI destined for Africa while 53% of Chinese FDI went to Asia. Though recent estimates show that China has closed this gap to become Africa’s third trading partner, it highlights the contention that western criticisms have been based more on fear than fact.

Another emerging phenomenon which has the possibility of intensifying the existing crack in Sino-African relations is the problem of migration. Population movements between China and Africa have increased steadily since the 1990s. While the estimated 900 thousand Chinese migrant workers in Africa invade jobs ranging from agriculture through street peddling to industry, it is a different situation for Africans in China. These Africans who live under the constant fear of deportation are subjected to color prejudice in the job market where teaching is their only option. To secure these jobs and keep them, are the twin challenges facing African migrant workers in a society where “native speakers” are preferred irrespective of academic or professional qualifications. Obtaining and or renewing work visas for Africans is the mother of all problems, besides discriminatory salaries they receive on basis of their color. For many of these educated Africans, driven from home by harsh poverty and uncertainty and wandering in a wilderness of thorny discrimination, Sino-African cooperation remains a farce.

Conclusion

The tussle between the two rival blocs in Africa reached climax when the World Bank which has exercised unrivalled, albeit counter-productive control over Africa before the coming of China, started calling for the latter to be more transparent about its African plans. Earlier in 2006, Paul Wolferwitz, then President of the Bank accused China for ignoring human rights and environmental standards when lending to Africa. Bob Geldof, the Live 8 campaigner also warned that attempts to stamp out corruption in Africa risk being undermined by soft loans and naked mercantilism from China.

When the World Bank, the backbone of globalization joined this fray on the side of the West, it unvealed the significance of this rivalry in the geopolitics of the 21st century. In response, China has challenged the credibility of the World Bank. “The World Bank always wants countries to join them and follow their processes. But is the record of the World Bank so good?” asks Zhong Jianhua, China’s Ambassador to South Africa. “To work together is good. But you do not expect others to follow instructions” he affirmed.

Behind the shadows of this war of words is the emerging “African renaissance” declared by President Thabo Mbeki in 2000. Its symbolic instruments- African Union and NEPAD attest to Africa’s resolve to take its destiny into its own hands. It also confirms Africa’s right to carve out its own path and shun what Coral Walsh calls “finger-wagging lectures from their former colonial masters.” Former South African President Nelson Mandela reminds African leaders of the need to pick their friends with utmost care as this might prove to be a decisive moment for Africa. “Africa is beyond bemoaning the past,” Mandela said. “The task of undoing that past is on the shoulders of African leaders themselves, with the support of those willing to join in a continental renewal. We have a new generation of leaders who know that Africa must take responsibility for its own destiny, that Africa will uplift itself only by its own efforts in partnership with those who wish it well.”